CONSENSUAL HEGEMONY AND THE WEST EUROPEAN PROMOTION OF ORDER IN THE BALKANS

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Introduction:

As some commentators have observed, one of the effects of ‘9/11’ on the analysis international affairs is the rationalisation of agency in world politics by

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focusing as much on the social meanings of policy directions as on the empirical challenges faced by policy itself.\(^1\) Another seems to be the apparent lack of historicity — i.e. effects of identity — in the explanation of dominant trends.\(^2\) In this respect, the region of the Balkans\(^3\) has become a vestigial idiom for the volatility of the post-Cold War relations in Europe deriving from the strategic threats posed by failing states. The etiology of its conflicts has proponed the reconsideration of the agency of the dominant West European actors — predominantly the European Union (EU)\(^4\) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation — and their approaches to order in the continent. Owing to the limitations of the current publication, this exploration regards only the process of the EU’s order-promotion to the Balkans. In the context of its 2004 enlargement it is requisite to take stock of the conceptual implications of its West European approaches to Southeastern Europe. It should be mentioned at the outset that the presumption of this research is that the Balkans is a region not because of its own awareness as such, but rather owing to its external perception. Therefore, this study concentrates on the external perspective of the regional framework for inter-state relations.

The article contends that EU’s structural power in the shape of membership programs is significantly more effective than EU’s coercive power as indicated by its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The argument is that this effect is visible in the more pervasive EU presence in the Balkans coming after a switch from CFSP-measures to enlargement programs in 1999. Thereby, enlargement is perceived as a process of projecting stability through the promotion of an emulation-process for the socialisation of the decision-making practices of candidate-states’ elites. However, it took the EU nearly the whole of the 1990s — as indicated by its engagement in the Balkans — to realise the effectiveness of its accession initiatives; hence, define its hegemonic (or

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\(^3\) For the purposes of this article the term ‘Balkans’ encompasses Bulgaria, Romania and the countries of the Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia/Montenegro/Kosovo. Also, the terms ‘Balkans’ and ‘Southeastern Europe’ are used as stylistic variations, regardless of their distinct connotations.

\(^4\) For the purposes of clarity the predecessors of the European Union are also encompassed by the term ‘EU’, mainly to avoid confusion with the abbreviation ‘EC’ — European Commission.
leadership) role in the continent. The suggestion is that the shift in the EU-approach tends to facilitate the promotion of a security-community-framework of relations among policy-making elites in the Balkans.

Therefore, this research does not argue that the structural programs of the EU are always better, but that they better elicit the potential for the extension of its pattern of order. To illustrate this point the article takes a historical perspective on this process. First, it develops the order-promoting potential of EU's structural power, which led to the emergence of a (broadly defined) democratic security community in Western Europe. Subsequently, this study suggests the post-Cold War reticence of the EU to accept its leading role in the continent until 1999, when a shift in policy-approaches to the Balkans seems to have taken place. The latter development prompts a conjecture on the advancement of an elite security community in the region. Before proceeding with this analytical framework, however, a clarification is needed on the character of EU’s enlargement-socialisation as a process of consensual hegemony.

Framing Enlargement-Socialisation as a Consensual Hegemonic Process

This section prompts a consideration of the role of power in the process of order-promotion in the Balkans. The argument is that the process of external socialisation discloses the notion of power as an ‘interpersonal situation’. In this respect, the promotion of order is often ‘dependent’ on the ‘ability to nudge and occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance’ in an environment of distrust (such as in the Balkans). Such corollary intuits the role played by ‘third parties’, i.e. international actors, which ‘can observe, whether or not the participating states are honouring their contracts and obligations’. Therefore, some commentators have claimed that the EU is one such ‘third party’, being ‘the main organization’ of the ‘European international community’. What often remains overlooked, however, is that such statements come after a decade of EU attempts to assert its centrality in European affairs.

It is suggested that its actorness is (i) a variable ‘conditioned by circumstances as well as by formal grants of authority’ and (ii) that it is

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possible only after the implementation of EU’s normative power – the ability to redefine ‘what can be “normal” in international relations’. Thereby, the argument proffered here is that such role-identity became possible in the context of EU’s experience in the Balkans, and has been indicated by a procedural shift in its policies during 1999.

This suggestion beckons the caveat that instead of reviewing the ad hoc/humanitarian-aid type of measures undertaken by the EU for the better part of the 1990s, the contention here is that 1999 indicates a watershed in post-Cold War relations in Europe. It would be ahistorical to suggest that a framework of order emerged in a given time; however, perceptions of its patterns (and the policy acts which stem from these perceptions) are often led by an emphasis on these individual years, which see the accumulation of significant events. In other words, it is as a result of the Kosovo crisis that the EU began indicating a willingness to overcome the fear of ‘itself’ by developing its own agency in the region. A statement by the then External Relations Commissioner, Hans van der Broek attests to such explanation and understanding:

Over the last ten years, the Union has gone through many changes and is reaching the third phase in its geopolitical re-definition. The first stage was the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall, which led to German re-unification and the start of the enlargement process to the east. The second phase came in 1992 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, thereby fundamentally changing the dynamics within the European continent. We are now entering the third phase, which is the stabilisation of the Balkans and their integration into the process of European Union enlargement.

In practical terms, the EU shifted its approaches to the Balkans from its incremental CFSP instruments to its more convinced (and convincing) enlargement mechanisms. This shift is indicated (i) by reinforcing Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession through the offer of ‘opening negotiations with all countries, which meet the Copenhagen political criteria’; and (ii) by offering the prospect of membership to the Western Balkans through the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which aims ‘to replicate the successful

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transition by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, on the one hand, the EU increases its socialising effectiveness in Bulgaria and Romania by rewarding their efforts. On the other, the SAP makes possible the realisation of the EU’s order-promotion in the Western Balkans by engaging (through the prospect of membership) regional elites in the dynamics of accession, which (overall) tend to ensure the establishment of appropriate (non-belligerent) decision-making. Such acknowledgement of its normative power through the prospect of accession allows the EU to operationalise the functional differentiation of the Balkans into: (a) candidates: Bulgaria and Romania, and (b) candidates-to-be: the Western Balkan countries.

It is this explanation that helps understand the significance of 1999 for the possibility of creating normative outcomes in the Balkans. The claim is that it is the enlargement dynamic, which allows for normative effects to take place and not that the EU’s CFSP mechanisms were/are not normative in nature. The suggestion is that it is the explicit conditions, practices and conjectures of the latter – i.e., its ideational and material matrix – that sanction the EU’s power of attraction. It might also be argued that such approach tends to overcome the unresolved contradiction between ‘civilian power Europe’ and the demands of international life.\textsuperscript{16} The implications of explicit enlargement are that procedural issues move beyond the possibility- and probability-of-membership paradigm, and instead focus on an applicant’s capacity for membership (through emulation). It is the latter corollary, which suggests the understanding of enlargement-socialization as a process of consensual hegemony.

It was Antonio Gramsci who first suggested the hegemonic aspects of socialisation by marking it out as a process for the diffusion of an entire system of values, attitudes and practices supporting a particular status quo in power relations.\textsuperscript{17} The notion of hegemony, however, has been so politicised that it has been divested of much of its utility as an analytical concept. Thereby, in order to elaborate the hegemonic nature of EU’s agency this study takes as a point of reference George Liska’s nous. His gumption is that the salience of hegemonic power ‘consists in the fact that no other state can ignore it and that all other states – consciously or half-consciously, gladly or reluctantly – assess their position, role, and prospects in relation to it than to closer neighbours or to local conflicts’\textsuperscript{18}

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\textsuperscript{15} European Commission, SAP – First Annual Report, COM(2002)163, Brussels, 03/04/2002, p. 6. Although the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was also officially launched at the same time, very soon it became evident that the SAP is the ‘centrepiece’ of EU’s policy to the Western Balkans (see European Commission, 2003, SAP – Second Annual Report, COM(2003)139, Brussels, 26/03/2003).
\textsuperscript{17} A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971.
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In this respect, the ‘organising principle’ of accession, itself, has been defined in terms of a ‘process directed toward a state’s internalisation of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalised in its international environment’. 19 Socialisation, therefore, is understood as the projection and incorporation (albeit to different degrees) of institutional enlargement (accompanied by economic and political conditionality) and the promotion of normative standards into Europe’s post-communist region. 20 In pragmatic terms, it also intuits a conception of a desired end state but also relates to the actual condition of international life. 21 In this context, the post-1999 approaches of the EU promote a process of two-fold socialization of the Balkans: (i) conditioning and (ii) educating Balkan elites to comply. 22 Thereby, to use Michael Walzer’s metaphor of the ‘thinness’ of universal codes and the ‘thickness’ of particularistic codes, 23 the EU’s enlargement-socialization facilitates the thickening of its rules and procedures through the ‘sticks and carrots’ of membership. Consensual hegemony, therefore, is understood in this context as the power of attraction of a strategic culture, which allows its agents the legitimacy to export (and, if required, coerce) its framework of decision-making. 24

As Gramsci intuits, the impact and the political strength of international actors depend on their ideational modes of production. Thus, the accession process (unlike the CFSP instruments) indicates not only the EU’s capacity to lead, but also facilitates the preparedness of candidate-states to be led by reinforcing the ‘coinciding interests’ of different elite-groups. 25 This acceptance of external authority tends to be rationalised in the context of the perceived (material) benefits from such submission, which facilitate the belief that ‘it is the proper thing to do’. 26 However, in order to prove an empirical record of order-promotion it is important to re-memory the emergence of EU’s

framework of relations; and, then, suggest its implications for its post-Cold War involvement in the Balkans.

The West European Democratic Security Community

To all intents and purposes, the capacity of the EU to promote a certain pattern of order (in the sense of a practice of consensual hegemony) is inferred from its (arguably) successful establishment of a peaceful framework of relations among its members. Nearly fifty years ago, Karl Deutsch and his associates outlined this order as a security community, meaning 'the attainment within a [transnational] territory of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time dependable expectations of peaceful change'. Thereby, the post-Cold War assumption of the order-promoting potential of the EU tends to be supported by the historical evidence deriving from the post-war relations in Western Europe. The history of the EU is usually given as an illustration of what countries working together can achieve, but there are few analyses of the process of turning former adversaries into partners.

The origins of the framework of stability and security in Western Europe are traditionally traced back to the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The pattern of inter-state relations proffered by the ECSC reflected the particular post-World War II concerns of the Allies (mainly France) in relation to the potential military capacity of Germany. Its function was to achieve reconciliation between the former adversaries by advancing collective interests. Thus, it was the pooling of the material resources for potential confrontation under the supervision of a ‘supranational’/European institution that were to create the conditions for ‘peace’ in the continent. According to its initial proposal, the ECSC’s objective was ‘to make a breach in the ramparts of national sovereignty which will be narrow enough to secure consent, but deep enough to open the way towards the unity that is essential to peace’.

As Jean Monnet makes it clear in his memoirs the consent was achieved after intensive (and discrete) elite-socialization, predominantly between French and German officials. The dynamics and subsequent practice of such socialization led to the formation of a group of like-minded individuals, whose values and interests derived from the European institutions they helped to promote and to establish. Thus, the experience and practices of working together led to the emergence of (what can only be termed as) European epistemic community, which shared any ‘needs, interests, and values’ in regards

to the issues at hand and, at the same time, working for the spread of conditions ‘favoring integration and preparing the political climate for it’. Such interactions developed rules and norms articulated at the international level by elite-groups, which were hegemonic in a consensual sense owing to their particular social relations of production. This hints at the development of an experiential ontology of the ECSC, attesting to its independent institutional responsibility. Said otherwise, its institutions provided the blueprint for a ‘technical’ environment emphasising ‘common interests’, which ‘subordinates the possible contradiction of divergent national beliefs and foreign policy interests to the common value of productive expansion’. The ‘political alchemy’ of this process stimulated the demands for further cooperation and, thence, compliance with the hegemonic norms.

However, a further point, explicated by Monnet, is that the socialisation dynamic into this political vision for (Western) Europe did not remain the property of the decision-making elites, but trickled down to the publics of the states involved and the ‘public opinion was counting on the rapid success of [the] project’. That is, the demand for cooperation did not remain the property of a coterie of ‘Eurocrats’, but instead (arguably) managed to affect the public perceptions, as well. The important inference is that the ECSC aimed (and with the benefit of hindsight, succeeded) to affect the values not just of the decision-making elites in Western Europe, but also of the societies at large. As existing research indicates in ‘April 1964, 41% of French elites pointed West Germany as a principal ally’. At the same time, 35% of the West German leadership indicated that they have common interests with the ECSC countries and another 28% singled out France as a main partner. Moreover, general “good” feelings for Germany, reported by French poll respondents rose spectacularly from 9% in 1954 to 53% in early 1964, while West German “good” feeling about France rose similarly from 12% in 1954 to 46% in early 1963. The institutionalisation of the relations between France and West Germany (as well as the other members of the ECSC) in the 1950s enabled the development of cooperative relations around specific issues and tasks, which subsequently

32 Monnet, op. cit., p. 320.
34 L. Edinger, ‘Patterns of German Elite Opinion’ in ibid., p.150.
allowed for the promotion of collective security arrangements among the former Second World War adversaries.\textsuperscript{36}

Said otherwise, the procedural rules and values of the ECSC became the enabling conditions for trust-building among the state officials as well as the citizens of West European states. The establishment of common rules ‘to preserve the common interest’ in a ‘common market’\textsuperscript{37} had the purpose of: (i) transforming ‘old-fashioned capitalism into a means of sharing among citizens the fruits of their collective effort’,\textsuperscript{38} and (ii) creating ‘\textit{de facto} solidarity... a method for continual material and psychological integration’.\textsuperscript{39} The increase in contacts between French and West German elites initiated by the ECSC facilitated the development of a practice of working together, which altered the way they perceived each other. Although it could be contested to what degree such framework of international relations led to a reduction of the amount of clashing interests between the two countries, it clearly led to a decrease in their intensity (i.e. the occurrence of war). The salience of interlocking state interests outweighs the possible negative implications of conflicting interests by developing an agreed procedure for dealing with them.

Thus, the idea of pooling the resources affecting the military potential of West European states, spilled over into a framework of European relations that developed into a ‘\textit{union of states and citizens}’.\textsuperscript{40} The grassroots level of this process of ‘“pooling” the “life” of former enemies’\textsuperscript{41} led to the development of a \textit{democratic} West European \textit{security community} among:

Countries which throughout their history, and even the recent past, had engaged in bloody conflicts decided to unite in a common effort to create something new on a totally democratic basis. As a reaction against centuries-old hatreds the firm resolve grew to confront the future together.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{36} There is a contention that this might have developed anyways as a result of the Cold War realities. However, the argument of this study is that it was the particular dynamic initiated by the ECSC between West European elites that made possible the emergence of a collective (democratic) security community.
\textsuperscript{37} Monnet, op. cit., p. 298.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 341.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 300.
The main characteristic of a democratic security community is its capacity of responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens. In other words, the credibility of decision-making elites rested on the favorable impact of the integration process upon the conditions of the populations in EU member states. It is within this relationship that the feedback-and-output model of the European security community is construed as a pattern of relations between the publics of the states involved, their decision-making elites and the outcomes from common actions that facilitated the gradual development of cooperation. In this way, the integrative processes initiated with the ECSC (and the progeny of organizations that it sired) fulfilled the tasks of: (1) maintaining peace among the participating members; (2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities for them; (3) accomplishing the specific issues of integration; and, (4) gaining a new self-image and role-identity for the members. In a nutshell, the democratic security community is underpinned by the existence of a transnational society, whose members (not just elites) share similar norms and values; at least to the extent that there is an expectation that problems will not be solved through military means.

Figure 1: The decision-making dynamic in the West European democratic security community.

43 S. Lucarelli, 'Peace and Democracy', Report of EAPC 2000/02 Programme, 2002, p. 11. Lucarelli distinguishes between liberal-democratic security community and democratic security community. However, for the purposes of this research such distinction is deemed unnecessary, although that it follows mostly Lucarelli's understanding of the former, rather than the latter type.
45 Lucarelli, op. cit., p. 15.
46 This model is premised on the decision systems that affect foreign policy-making outlined by Deutsch, The Analysis, op. cit., pp. 117-132. However, it is argued that the current representation is a better reflection of the democratic dynamic of decision-making between the different levels of actors (which Deutsch represents as cascading channels of communication); thence, giving an improved illustration of the strategic interactions in policy-formulation.
Figure 1, gives a schematic representation of the decision-making dynamic in the West European democratic security community after World War II. This is a generalized model of the communication flows that informed the decision-making within the EU and facilitated the development of a regional security community. The decisions taken by the governing elites developed intersubjective understandings and explanations within the societies involved and of the European publics' role in the integration process; as well as the dynamics of decision-making within the West European states. The advantage of this approach is that while focusing on the part played by state-elites in the decision-making process, at the same time, it also takes into account the role of publics in shaping the direction and extension of policies, by bringing the EU's institutional approach closer to their needs and demands. The output behavior resulting from these decisions influenced the relationship between the common pool of memories to which both societies and elites referred to justify their actions. The democratic preferences affecting decision-making were determined by societal- and elite-cost/benefit analyses and were shaped by their political culture and historical experience, and were reflected in a 'process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion' Therefore, it is the 'institutions', the 'agreement among political elites on the “rules of the game”' and the pressure of 'public needs' that ‘together provide the mechanisms for resolving conflicts'. As a result of these cooperative frameworks, the order established between the EU member states at the end of the 1980s has been underlined by the ‘practice of habits and skills of mutual attention, communication and responsiveness’. 

Owing to the disciplining effects of the consensually hegemonic practice of dependable expectations of peaceful change, the communicative efficiency between state-elites, the citizens of member states and the positive feedback from the memories of their cooperative behavior enabled the potential of forging a West European community of democratic values premised on the ‘belief that others are of the same community’. It also reflected ‘an evolving

West European sense of collective identity'.\textsuperscript{53} The process was further facilitated by the promotion of commensurable political norms embedded in the rules of membership and ‘buttressed by the mythology of a shared destiny’ that helped ‘create a sense of community in populations lacking tangible homogeneity’.\textsuperscript{54}

Although intriguing in its analytical framework, such conceptualisation of a democratic security community intuits an \textit{optimal} form of security communities. This study, however, contends that the post-1999 EU approaches to the Balkans indicate the potential for extending its framework of order by introducing a ‘nascent’\textsuperscript{55} form of a security community, which this study has termed an \textit{elite security community}.

\textbf{The Elite Security Community of the Balkans?}

As already suggested, the argument of this research is that it is as a result of its Balkan experience, that the EU developed a more compelling approach to the process of order-promotion by gradually evolving from a norm-interpreter toward a (consensually) hegemonic normative superpower.\textsuperscript{56} The conjecture is that during 1999 (as a result of the Kosovo crisis) the EU developed an understanding that a refusal to adopt (and adapt to) its (Western) promoted standards of behavior challenges not only its role, but also constitutes a \textit{normative threat} to the existence of the security-community-pattern of relations in Europe. The establishment of order is, therefore, made out in the promotion of security-community-practices in Southeastern Europe through the socialisation \textit{by} and \textit{in} EU-initiated activities.\textsuperscript{57} Such self-transforming awareness of the EU agency derives from its conceptualisation that ‘Europe’s Other is Europe’s own past which should not be allowed to become its future’.\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, it is this normative securitisation of the EU’s responses to the Kosovo crisis, which produced its ‘European international identity’ through conflating the mythic narrative of the European post-war history with the obligations from the EU’s profile as an international actor.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{55} Adler and Barnett, ‘Governing Anarchy’, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{57} Kavalski, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 74.
This supposition is endorsed by the evidence from the EU-rhetoric underscoring its policy-practice: while prior the Kosovo crisis the main allusion to its actorness in the Balkans is in the context of the encouragement of a subsidiary ‘intra-regional cooperation between the associated countries themselves and their immediate neighbours’; currently, the region is being perceived as ‘our new neighbours’. Such policy-shift intimates a distinct understanding of the EU’s role-identity in the Balkans – i.e. it suggests the emergence of a particular agenda as well as a capacity (willingness) for action. The circumstantial reasoning behind such actorness could be inferred from Chris Patten’s acknowledgement that:

[the EU] needed to be able to tackle instability on our borders. Europe’s weakness was exposed, in particular, by our humiliating ‘hour of Europe’ in Bosnia, where we could neither stop the fighting, nor bring about any serious negotiation until the Americans chose to intervene. Europe’s subsequent reliance on US military capacity in Kosovo had a similar galvanizing effect. The Member States recognized that they needed to reverse the tide.

The strategic imperative of EU-actorness had to indicate not merely its viability, but also capability to deal with the main security threats posed by the Balkans: crime, drugs and refugees. Therefore, the conceptual and pragmatic shift in the EU approaches to the region (from its reactive CFSP mechanisms to its enlargement process) tends to facilitate (i) the EU order-promotion to the Balkans, and, thence, (ii) assists the development of a consensually hegemonic relationship between the two, by (iii) overcoming the problem of ‘consistency’ between the different arms of EU operations.

Thus, to borrow from a different context, the prospect of membership has allowed for the normalisation of EU’s power of normalisation in the Balkans, by providing regional elites with the incentives for accepting external leadership. Thereby, the enabling environment of the enlargement-socialisation reinforces the disciplining knowledge (i.e. awareness of possible sanction or punishment) of Balkan state-elites if they depart from the prescribed patterns of behaviour.

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In order to bring Balkan decision-making in line with promoted standards, the EU is actively engaging regional state-elites in the desirability of maintaining prescribed foreign-policy instruments, by including them in accession programs. To that effect the EU has advanced the Zagreb Process for the adoption of international standards within regional decision-making. Another instance of this dynamic is the Athens Process launched in November 2002 with the Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Electricity Market in Southeast Europe and its integration into the EU Internal Electricity Market. In this way, 'a high degree of trust between the leaders of the region' becomes a functional reality, resulting from EU’s normative power. This is an important argument, yet it is a hard one to substantiate. Nevertheless, the contention is that analytical inklings that might have seemed callow before 1999, now might appear prudent. Perhaps with similar thoughts in mind, Javier Solana was quick to stress at the London Conference on Defeating Organised Crime in Southeastern Europe that such meetings attest to the ‘enormous amount [of progress] that has been achieved in the last couple of years: democracy is now prevailing and the logic of political disintegration has been replaced by the logic of integration’.

Such initiatives and the transactions among Balkan elites that they have generated suggest the emergence of common meanings among regional decision-makers. As a result of these socialisation activities and the interactions between them, Balkan elites have become involved in bargaining ‘not only over the issues on the table but also about the concepts and norms that constitute their social reality’. Said otherwise, their contacts are structured around the norms and standards promoted by the EU, and therefore they develop a degree of predictability about each other’s behaviour. In this way, they begin to perceive each other as trustworthy, which facilitates the emergence of shared wreness – being part of the same normative group. As already mentioned, such development does not negate the logic of strategic adaptation (i.e. rational choice) of Balkan state-elites to externally-promoted standards; nevertheless, the very fact that they are willing to comply suggests the potential for extending the EU-order to the region.

A confirmation of this new (perhaps, mainly strategic) regional elite identity could be inferred from the unprecedented (for the Balkans) and unimaginable prior 1999 act of unanimity among the Presidents of Croatia and Macedonia, and the PMs of Serbia and Albania, who issued a joint statement indicating that ‘We know that integration into EU structures requires much

65 EC, First Annual Report, p. 11.
effort on our part and the process, depending on our achievements will take time’. This new weness was displayed at the June 2003 summit in Ohrid, Macedonia of Western Balkan leaders with the purpose of coordinating a joint strategy for the upcoming Thessaloniki Summit. Elite-coordination in the Balkans was furthered at the Informal Meeting of Prime Ministers from Southeast Europe (21-31 July 2003) in Salzburg, where the heads of government of Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Montenegro and Serbia discussed common initiatives for their EU accession. Prior to that meeting the presidents of Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia met in the Albanian town of Pogradec (13-14 July 2003) to consider joint efforts for attracting funding for the construction of Transport Corridor VIII linking their countries.

It is these post-1999 developments that suggest the emergence of an elite security community in the Balkans. It is a type of a nascent security community that promotes a framework for strategic interaction between the EU and Balkan state-elites, through which the EU advances its interests and values, while building regional consensus on the objectives of policy-making. In other words, to paraphrase the classic definition of security communities, it is a pluralistic community of decision-making elites, who have dependable (peaceful) expectations of each other’s policy-behaviour.

The EU’s power of attraction (i.e. normative coercion) maintains a broad agreement on the fundamental rules of such contractual relations. The interaction among elites within this context promotes the transfer of ‘European’ standards to their policy-making. The rationale seems to be that in this way the ‘countries of the region... play their part in explaining to their populations the realities and mechanics of a closer association with the EU. This would also foster the necessary sense of ownership of the process’. In such pattern of relations, Balkan state-elites are bounded by the norms of prescribed behaviour (which includes regional cooperation) or risk exclusion. Thus, the experiences from following EU-promoted patterns of behaviour inform the decision-making process and modify its framework towards expected habits and policy outcomes.

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70 *Focus*, ‘Meeting of Balkan Presidents’, 13 July 2003.
In a nutshell (as Figure 2 indicates), the *elite security community*-framework establishes the institutions and procedures, which structure the decision-making of state-elites. In this way, by socialising the policy-process of Balkan states to prescribed (West European) standards, the EU expects to obviate the possibility of a relapse into ethnic strife. Such inference is corroborated by the increased tendency of compliance (or willingness to comply) with external agency. The socialisation process acquaints elites not only with the priority areas and standards of prospective membership, but also with one another, which facilitates the development of *predictable* policy-making. The presumption on EU's behalf is that in both applicant states as well as those preparing for candidacy, the 'major role in explaining enlargement... should come from the national government'. The socialising presence of the EU ensures a degree of reciprocity (i.e. predictability) of the policy-making of neighbouring states — i.e. they are also going through a similar process. Thus, the issue of mistrust is being pre-empted by the dynamics of EU conditionality, which promote consensus-building among state-elites and indicates the first step on establishing *trust-like* behavior among regional elites (i.e. *elite security community*).

**In lieu of a conclusion:**

In summary, the contention proffered by this research is that it was as a reaction to the events of 1999 that the EU came to terms with its centrality in European affairs. The strategic imperative of this decision has been underlined by the logic of projecting stability. In other words, the EU's impulse to forward its order to the Balkans was prompted by the threat of further 'Balkanisation'. This practice of order-promotion is characterised by a consensually hegemonic process of enlargement-socialisation. Thereby, the prospect of membership (and the subsequent recognition and legitimacy of regional decision-making, which it presupposes) advances a process of emulation aimed at making Balkan states
act and behave like West European ones; the expectation being that through repeated practice they would become like their EU-counterparts.

In spite of the apparent benefits and achievements of EU’s post-1999 approach to the Balkans, it has some shortcomings: mainly the sidelining (as Figure 2 suggests) of public opinion. As suggested, the main objective of the EU was (and still is) the maintenance of predictable patterns of regional decision-making. However, such practice has significantly hampered the socialisation of regional societies along the prescribed norms (indicated mainly by erratic voting patterns). Nevertheless, this study contends that such normative discrepancy does not appear to be inconsistent (in the short- to medium-term) with the objective of order-promotion in the region. The EU-maintained elite-socialisation introduces processes and institutions that lock-in decision-making into predictable (non-belligerent) patterns. This has most recently been indicated by the election victory of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Croatia and its apparent departure from its former nationalistic patterns. In other words, the post-1999 enlargement-socialisation of the Balkans facilitates the establishment of security-community-patterns in the region, which tend to maintain the direction (regardless of the speed) of policy-practice.

Nevertheless, a main question on the nature of EU-agency still remains unqualified. It seems that, circumstantially, in 1999 the EU delineated the ‘ultimate’ outreach of its normative power: defined by the geographic scope of the 2004 enlargement and the potential for accession of the entire Balkan region. Thus, the tentative ramifications of a Euro-polity seem to have been laid down. However, the strategic rationale behind such policy-shift — the desire to prevent the importation of instability from ‘excluded’ (failed) states by ‘including’ them into programs for eventual membership — is still not satisfactorily dealt with. Even when the Balkans ‘join in’, there is still another set of weak and decaying states, which are currently consigned to the concept of ‘Wider Europe’. Thereby, the real issue is to what extent the EU can afford to deal with strategic threats through the ‘sticks and carrots’ of its normative power; and is it capable of advancing some intermediate degrees of ‘closer cooperation’ and ‘partnerships’ for the purposes of order-promotion. Such consideration draws attention to the dilemma of EU’s outreach for the projection of stability and the potentiality of dilution due to overreach. These are issues yet to be confronted by the EU, which are implicit in its order-promoting practices in the Balkans.

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