EASTERN ENLARGEMENT: A DEATHBLOW TO EURO-NATIONALISM

Hakan SAMUR*

ABSTRACT

The aim of attaining a common EU identity, which is vitally important for the advancement and deepening of the EU has been discussed as a very significant issue since the 1970s. In this discussion, one of the most widely supported approaches considering the context of the common EU identity has been Euro-nationalism that advocates an EU identity leans on common historical-cultural values. On the other hand, the Union has tackled another significant issue since the early 1990s: The accession process of Central and Eastern European Countries to the EU. Despite the realisation of the full membership of most of those countries, the impact of Eastern Enlargement and the debates around it will continue for a long time. The article deals with relation between these two issues that occupy a considerable place in the EU agenda and reveals the (negative) impacts of Eastern Enlargement on Euro-nationalism, one of the most fervently supported approaches regarding the EU common identity.

Key Words: EU identity, Euro-nationalism, Eastern Enlargement, Central and Eastern European Countries

ÖZET

Avrupa Birliği'nin ilerlemesi ve derinlik kazanıması açısından hayatı öneme sahip, ortak AB kimliğine ulaşma hedefi özellikle 1970'lerden itibaren, çok önemli bir mesele olarak tartışılmaktadır. Bu tartışmada, ortak AB kimliğinin ne olması gerektiğine dair ileri sürülen yaklaşımların en çok taraftar toplayanlarından biri, ortak tarihi-kültürel değerlere dayanan bir AB kimliğini savunan Avrupa milliyetçiliği

* Dicle University, Diyarbakır Vocational School.
yaklaşımındadır. Öte yandan, Birlik 1990’ların başında itibaren çok önemli bir başka mesele ile daha ugrasmak zorunda kalmıştır: Merkezi ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin Birliği dahil edilmeleri süreci. Söz konusu ülkelerden birçoğunun tam iyiilikleri gerçekleşmiş olsa da, Doğu Avrupa genişlemesinin etkileri ve üzerindeki tartışmalar uzunca bir süre daha devam edecektir. Makale, AB’nin halihazırda gündeminde önemli yer tutan bu iki mesele arasındaki ilişkiye konu edinmek ve Doğu Avrupa genişlemesi sürecinin, AB ortak kimliği hususunda ortaya atılan en hararetli yaklaşımlardan biri olan Avrupa milliyetçiliği tezine getireceği (negatif) etkileri ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB kimliği, Avrupa Milliyetçiliği, Doğu Avrupa Genişlemesi, Merkezi ve Doğu Avrupa Ülkeleri

Introduction

This study aims at relating two big challenges to the EU, namely identity formation and Eastern enlargement from a certain angle, from the angle of the (negative) impact of Eastern enlargement on the accomplishment of a Euro-nationalist type of common European identity.

As the first challenge, constructing a common identity to pursue the ideal of ever closer union has appeared as one of the most formidable challenges that the EU has faced. The challenge is assuredly important because the EU aspires to be more than an international society, a supranational one and, then, she needs to create its own identity to a greater extent than any international society. Despite the rising importance of a common identity requirement especially since the beginning of the 1970s, any solution has not been agreed on. In this heated discussion, the Euro-nationalist view of common European identity has consistently been one of the leading components. As will be unfolded in the first section, the Euro-nationalist view proposes a common identity for the Union based on so-called common cultural and common historical references.

As the second challenge, since the early 1990s, the challenge of Eastern enlargement has emerged with a similar priority and importance. According to Mayhew, to deny enlargement to the Central and East European Countries (CEECs)

2 CEECs are Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Of course, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were not alone in pursuing membership during the 1990s. Some countries had already engaged in the accession process and were seeking full membership. While three of them completed the whole process and acquired membership, as in the case of EFTA enlargement in 1995, another three countries, namely Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, have continued pursuing their application along with the CEECs. Apart from these, some other countries, i.e. the countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania, also aspire to join the EU. However, the inclusion of the CEECs in the EU structure has taken precedence over all the other cases due to its specific importance. Because of their prevailing position, the concept of ‘enlargement’ or ‘Eastern enlargement’ is used and explored within the context of the CEECs.
would create new ambiguous situations, conflicts and divisions and even lead to the
disintegration of the EU. That is why, while presenting its opinion in 1989 on Turkey’s
application for accession, the Commission readily used the argument that it was difficult
for the Community to engage in new enlargement because it was already in a ‘state of
flux’ due to the very recent completion of the third enlargement and the coming into
force of the Single Act. Less than four years after this, the Community was pledging
itself to action in the Copenhagen Summit of December 1993 by explicitly promising
membership to the ten CEECs.

The advantages or disadvantages of welcoming new members from the CEECs are
open to discussion from various points. However, regarding the issue of common
identity, the main argument of this article is that, contrary to the claims of its supporters,
while the EU already has various difficulties that impede the construction of a
backward-looking Euro-nationalist identity, the realisation of Eastern enlargement is
likely to make progress in constructing such a common identity more difficult. In other
words, setting aside all the problems and discussion points in the EU of 15, this study
deals with one single problem regarding the possibility of a Euro-nationalist common
identity: the affiliation of the CEECs to the EU club seems to put the construction of a
Euro-nationalist view of identity into sharp relief, if not make it completely impossible.
In the first section, a brief explanation of the Euro-nationalist approach will be
presented. Then, in the following section, the above-mentioned main concern of this
study will be discussed.

We need to underscore one important point before going to analyse our main
concern. Constructing a common identity in the EU is a normative process that is
noticeably wider and more permanent than the formal-technical integration process of
European countries. In this sense, with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania for the
now, the CEECs’ formal accession to membership of the EU does not prevent us from
considering European integration of the CEECs as a still ongoing process for the
purpose of identity formation.

Euro-Nationalism

Among the answers, Euro-nationalism seems to appear as the oldest and one of the
most popular ones to the question of fitting a common identity to the EU. Generally
speaking, the proponents of Euro-nationalist approach believe that Europe is the land of
people sharing a common culture and common historical roots. The use of the concept
Euro-nationalism has especially been widespread since the early 1990s. However, the
culturalist-particularist context of the Euro-nationalist approach has frequently been
advocated under the rubric of Pan-europeanism since the Pan-Europa Movement of
1920s led by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.

This approach attempts to depict a European identity by taking the national
identities, to a lesser or greater extent, as a reference point. As there has been no similar
case of transnational integration in history, the formation of the nation state and national
identity has become the first source that comes to mind to refer to. This is because,
although some of the building blocks of nationalism (or national identity) have a very
long history (ethnicity, culture, etc.) and although the evolving process of national
identities and consciousness dates back to earlier times, nationalism has appeared as a
new concept that belongs to the last two centuries and, since the end of the eighteenth
century, it has explicitly become the main determining ideology of independent political
structures (states) and the basic element of collective political identities. Therefore,
starting from this saliency of the nation-state, Euro-nationalist approach gives
precedence to common history, tradition, mythical references, and other nation-state-
lke identity-shaping instruments. In other words, many political actors and scholars
have endorsed a parallel identity for the EU that leans on some similar building blocks
played role in the formation of national identities. Among these, the main tool of Euro-
nationalists has been a selective reading of the past and a common cultural heritage,
which was assumed to have been influential in every part of Europe to a greater or
lesser extent including the values of Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christianity,
Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the French revolution, ‘balance of power’ politics and
industrialisation. Paul Valery, the ardent supporter of this line, defines a ‘true
European’ as one who was Romanised and Christianised and whose mind was
disciplined by the Greeks (cited in Rougemont 1966, 367). The universal ideas that
emerged from Greco-Roman Europe, Christian Europe and technological Europe made
the world what it is. Despite many conflicts and problems between them, Hill argued

6 For example Anderson denotes the emergence of basic print languages by the 16th century as the
most important initiator of this national consciousness process. Benedict Anderson, Imagined

7 John A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism, North Carolina, The University of North
Carolina Press, 1982; Joseph. R. Llobera, “The role of the State and the Nation in Europe” in
Soledad Garcia, (ed.), European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, London, Pinter and
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993, pp. 64-79; David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1995; Craig. Calhoun, Nationalism, (Buckingham; Open University Press,
1997.

8 William Wallace, “Introduction”, in William Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European
European Unity”, International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, 1992, p. 55-76; Lambros Couloubarris
et al., The Origins of European Identity, Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 1993;
Richard Hill, We Europeans, Brussels, Europublications, 1995; David Beetham and Christopher


10 Couloubarris et al., op. cit.

that alongside and overriding those components, the peoples of this continent, even if subconsciously, were aware of their common European roots.

According to Euro-nationalist thought, in spite of the cleavages within Christianity and of the impacts of other religions on its intellectual legacy, Europe is known as the homeland of Christendom, not of Judaism or Islam. In the same vein, language has also been a tool to be referred to by Euro-nationalists. According to this, in spite of subgroups and 'linguistic fault-lines' between them, the fact that almost all European languages belong to the Indo-European family provides at least a 'tenuous interrelationship' across these languages. More and more interactions and cultural contacts through education, tourism, mass media, etc. can decrease the negative effect of language difference.

These ideas were also strengthened by depicting elements different from so-called European ones as 'the Other'. Moving on from the functional role of 'Other' in the construction and evolution of identity, some people tend to refer to various external or internal Others to determine the substance of the European identity. Groups ranging from Muslims and the peoples of the colonial territories, that are all seen as infidels or non-civilised, to some ethnic and cultural minorities such as Jews and Freemasons have been presented as the Other of European civilisation and Europeanness (Neumann and Welsh 1991, 330).

However, for the EU to be a supranational political community, it does not seem rational and sufficient to determine her identity through the modality of the nation-state or any other culturalist-particularist tendencies. The arguments of the supporters of the Euro-nationalism have frequently been criticised from different points. Nonetheless, it is not possible to accommodate all these counter arguments within the scope of this paper. Instead, as we underlined before, the aim of this paper is to scrutinise the negative impact of Eastern enlargement on the realisation of Euro-nationalist dream. That is to say, considering the so-called Central and Eastern part of the continent, general historical, cultural and civilisational references employed by the supporters of the Euro-nationalist approach were sources of differentiation and setbacks in constructing such a common identity. Therefore, while doing our analysis, we take into consideration not the political declarations of state executives or even the formal inclusion of the CEECs in the EU but the ontological and sociological facts; that is, the essential deficiencies and disparities of the CEECs in terms of the aforementioned building-blocks of a Euro-nationalist type of common EU identity.

The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Euro-Nationalism

There is no consensus about where Europe begins and ends. This is not only in terms of political, cultural, socio-economic or institutional-legal structures but also even in geographical terms. Even the separate continentality of Europe has been the matter of

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12 Smith, op. cit., p. 68.
lasting discussion. Indeed, depending upon the different perspectives, and whether the evaluations are subjective or objective, the definitions of Europe may be changeable and paradoxical. In terms of geography, institutional-legal structure, culture, or patterns of social, economic, and political interaction, a different core area emerges. The main causative area in this uncertainty is the eastern boundaries. Historically, the region that is defined as Central and Eastern Europe did not have a homogeneous structure and stable boundaries in geographical, cultural, religious, ethnic and political terms. This is because of its geo-political location between Western Europe and Asia that has made it a stage for severe wars, waves of migration, struggle amongst superpowers and rapid ups and downs throughout its history. The final example of this is soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, more than twenty countries emerged. In this sense, leaving aside any other implication, the recent enlargement has fomented the debate about the external and regional boundaries of the EU and, therefore, the issue of common identity.

In the EU documents, the concepts of ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, or ‘Eastern Europe’ for short, are used but only with geographical implications to describe the enlargement. Usually, the candidate countries of the CEECs are classified into three groups, namely Central Europe, South-east Europe (Balkans) and the Baltic States. However, the use of different names to define this part of the continent is the matter of long-standing and excited debate in the literature.

During the Cold War, the terms eastern and western were used to classify European countries according to ideological difference between democratic-capitalist states and communist ones. In such a classification, the geographically eastern countries of, say, Greece, Turkey and Finland were regarded as in the western sphere while East Germany and the ex-German provinces of Western Poland, contrarily, were located within Eastern Europe. In the post-cold war period, the regional division of the continent has been the issue of more controversial debate. As Bideleux and Jeffries pointed out, it is more than finding a name to employ any of the concepts ‘eastern’, ‘central’, ‘east-central’, Balkans, etc. According to criteria to be considered, the determination of the external boundaries of the region and, at the same time, of the sub-regions varies. Besides, any of these concepts is also loaded by different individuals with different geographical, political and cultural overtones and, therefore, conducive to different analysis and controversial ideas that all inevitably have an impact on the boundaries of, and the common identity debate in, the EU; so much so that the

geographical boundaries of Europe are extended even to Vladivostok (eastern end of Russia), according to some views. There is no space to accommodate all those views here. The key issue in the discussion, however, can be denoted as the efforts to substantiate the presence of a Central Europe that is culturally and historically within the sphere of western European societies and civilisation rather than eastern ones.

The beginning of the use of the concept Central Europe arguably dates back to the 1815 Congress of Vienna, in which to ensure the balance of power between the western states of Britain and France on the one side and Russia on the other side, the term Central Europe was employed for the first time around the newly emerging Austrian Empire. Then the debate grew heated in the course of the First World War, when Friedrich Naumann employed Mitteleuropa to provide a geo-political reasoning to the war aims of Germany; that is, the whole of Central Europe would be united under the leadership of Germany.

The stormy debates around this issue have re-emerged in the 1980s to put on view a historical-cultural identity different from the imposed communist one and later to ease the integration of some countries (mainly the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary) into Western Europe. This determination of Central Europe seems the most critical point in respect of the EU identity discussion and has gained an increasingly important place since the early 1980s in consequence of the prominent works of Milan Kundera, Czeslaw Milosz and others. Most of its supporters strive to distinguish so-called Central European countries not only from the communist ideology and Russia but also from their other eastern and southern neighbours and to place them within the politico-cultural and civilisational sphere of Western Europe. Also their interpretation of Central Europe excludes Germany and any implication around the concept Mitteleuropa frame. They conceive Europe as a cultural-civilisational community, in which Central Europe has a very important place as the ‘carrier of the spirit of Europeanness’, ‘the bulwark of Christendom’ etc. Geographical closeness to

20 At times, Slovenia and/or Croatia are included in this sphere.
21 In fact, Germany, Austria and Switzerland as well, are geographically considered within the borders of Central Europe. Then, to exclude this West Central European realm, while some authors prefer to use East Central Europe to cover those mentioned countries (Wandycz; Hyde-Price; Fowkes), others use the same concept to cover all countries between Germany and Russia (Crawford; Bideleux and Jeffries). Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom, London, Routledge, 1992; Adrian Hyde-Price, The International Politics of East Central Europe, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996; Ben Fowkes, The Post-Communist Era- Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe, London, Macmillan, 1999; Keith Crawford, East Central European Politics Today: From Chaos to Stability, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996; Bideleux and Jeffries, op. cit.
the western part, remaining within the authority of the Habsburg empire rather than the more repressive Ottoman and Russian empires, and, more importantly, having Roman Catholic Christianity rather than the Orthodox variant have been the main arguments that Central Europeanists use to differentiate those particular countries from the rest and to tie them to the cultural-civilisational atmosphere of the West. In this manner, it is not used as a ‘region-building’ notion but to show that they were already natural components of Western Europe and, then, should be accepted indisputably into the European institutional framework.  

Such an overconfident view of Central Europe was conducive to not only a feeling of arrogance towards Russia and Balkans but also of ‘moral superiority’ to the West. That is, if Eastern Europe needed Western Europe for economic reasons, then Western Europe would need the Eastern part to pursue the political Community ideal beyond the Common Market, because it was that part of the continent that kept the soul of Europe, the idea of Europe as a culture.  

The relative advantages of matching these countries with Western Europe compared to their eastern and south-eastern neighbours have been acknowledged even by the authors who do not perceive a culturally distinct Central Europe. Nonetheless, the historical facts and the political and economic developments of these countries support the view that Central or East Central Europe is not the most easterly part of the West but the most westernised part of the East. While western civilisation, ideas and institutions have been idealised and expected for centuries, realities in that region have not developed to be consistent with these ideals. Schopflin’s words affirm this situation:  

To a greater or lesser extent, especially in Central Europe, where Eastern Europe had adopted Western Christianity, these societies shared aspects of feudalism, mediaeval Christian universalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation and the Enlightenment. Yet each one of these was shared slightly differently, less intensively, less fully, with the result that East European participation in the European experience was only partial.  

Besides, there is no certainty in the boundaries of a cultural-spiritual Central Europe, too. This means that whatever the criteria to demarcate the countries of the region under different names, there will always be exceptions, penetrations and

24 Bideleux and I. Jeffries, op. cit. This fact enables us to say that if the cultural-historical conditions and qualities in these countries are not helpful in constructing a Euro-nationalist identity, then, in relatively less advantaged countries, the situation would be more discouraging.  
25 Rupnik, op. cit.  
transitional regions. Catholic affiliation has been at the core of the arguments to distinguish culturally Central Europe from the Orthodox East but in the Czech Republic and Hungary, an important proportion of the population has been Protestant. While appearing as the wardens of Christianity, the Poles and the Hungarians, for example, could not be let off the hook of the oriental influence on their cultures, in many aspects from their national dress and food to architecture.

In the same vein, while the Roman Empire ruled over some Balkan territories, the lands of Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic had never been included in this Empire. Furthermore, it is true that the Habsburg differed from the Ottoman and Russian Empires in their impact on their subject territories, and Central Europeanists have frequently recalled this to show their relative pre-eminence over the more repressive Ottoman and Russian empires. However, the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy, either, do not correspond to the maps of exclusivist Central Europeans. Regarding the affiliation of these countries with the Enlightenment, Wolff, in his comprehensive work dealing specifically with this issue, concludes that even if it had not attained ‘the definitive otherness of the Orient’, the idea of Eastern Europe (including those Central European countries) was a ‘cultural construction’ and ‘intellectual invention’ of the Enlightenment to be visited, imagined, mapped, addressed and so on. As another point, the enthusiasts of culturally and politically Western-oriented Central Europe tend to show the Asian-barbarian rule of Soviet Communism over their territories as a reason for interrupting their ties with Western Europe but, deliberately or not, they overlook the fact that the ideology of communism was the ‘intellectual product’ of Western European philosophy.

On the other hand and as the most critical point, while striving to situate Central Europe within the wider cultural-civilisational community of Europe, those authors do not hesitate to denounce the role and place of their southern and eastern neighbours, some of which are or will be the members of the EU together with them. Delanty confirms this point that equating ‘the spirit of Europe’ with for example (Roman Catholic) Christianity as Milan Kundera did, would only serve to leave out non-Catholic parts from such spirit.

27 Rupnik, op. cit.; Wandycz, op. cit.; Crawford, op. cit.
28 Wandycz, op. cit., p.3; Hyde-Price, op. cit., p. 51.
29 Bideleux and Jeffries, op. cit.
Bideleux and Jeffries\textsuperscript{33} put forward two more counter-arguments to refute the arguments of the campaigners for a spiritually and culturally westernised Central Europe: First, these Central European countries have been pursuing a huge transformation process to adjust their political, economic and cultural structures to be the part of the EU. Second, if the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland are different from the rest, then what would be the place of the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians, who are still and especially until the Second World War were the inhabitants of those countries and participated coherently with the Poles, Hungarians and others in many ‘formative historical processes and cultural experiences’? Therefore, even if ‘the idea of Central Europe’ does not fit with the cultural and political concepts of the East, it does not fit, either, with Western European civilisation.\textsuperscript{34}

In the same vein, with the inclusion of the CEECs, the eastern boundaries of the EU political community have not been settled yet. The reciprocal minority populations between the EU members of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Romania on the one side and Ukraine, Belarus and, especially, Russia on the other side will make it difficult to say: this is the boundary of a supranational European community. The specific conditions and relations between these two groups of countries or between member state CEECs and their fellow citizens among their eastward neighbours will set hurdles in the way of establishing many common policies, ranging from visas to markets, that are very important instruments for the formation of a common EU identity. Then, this will be likely to increase not Euronationalism but ethnic nationalism and potential unrest. From a wider perspective, the CEECs have increased the heterogeneity of Europe in terms of language, ethnicity and religion that will make it more difficult to pursue the ideal of constructing a common European identity through a Euro-nationalist approach.\textsuperscript{35}

As a final point about the impact of the cultural-civilisational Europeanness of some or all the CEECs on the common identity debates in the EU can be explained in such a way: For a while, even if we assume that some countries among the candidate countries of the CEECs have historical-cultural and religious intersections with Western European states, any attempt to formulate a common EU identity in terms of historical and cultural connotations has still a fate to fail. This is because the historical and cultural references have functioned in the European realm as a cause of divisions, enmities and devastations rather than togetherness. As Delanty\textsuperscript{36} underscored, if there is an “idea of Europe”, then, it can not be thought without considering a series of events; “from the crusading genocides of medieval Christendom to the systematic extermination of other civilisations by European imperialism to the gas chambers of the Nazis and the pogroms of ethnic cleansing of the new nationalisms in the post-Cold War period.” More significantly, all the CEECs, but specifically the so-called Western-

\textsuperscript{33} Bideleux and Jeffries, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{35} Appendix 1, 2 and 3.
oriented parts, became the main stage to most of these undesired events. They served as a battleground not only in the struggles against the Eastern enemies — the Russians and Turks— but also in the religious (despite some periods of religious and cultural tolerance) and power struggles between Western European states. 37

Conclusion

A retrospective examination of the Central and East European Region with respect to the culturalist-particularist traits gave us a chance to display the negative impact of recent enlargement on constructing a common EU identity within the context of a Euronationalist view. This is because, considering the so-called Central and East European Region, general historical, cultural and civilisational references employed by the supporters of this view were sources of differentiation and setbacks in constructing such a common identity. In other words, the membership of the CEECs to the EU would increase diversity in terms of religion, language, tradition and the historical disparities of civilisational development. Besides, any attempt to show that some or all of the CEECs were already historically within the sphere of western civilisation would simply nurture counter-ideas and rivalries. This will make the diffusion and institutionalisation of such a common EU identity more difficult and longer process.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Major Languages Spoken in the CEECs

1. INDO-EUROPEAN GROUP:

Slavonic
West: Polish, Czech, Slovak
East: Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian
South: Serbo-Croat, Slovene, Bulgarian, Macedonian

Germanic
German, Yiddish

Baltic
Lithuanian, Latvian

Italic (Latin-based)
Romanian (including Moldovan dialect)

37 Hroch, op. cit.
Albanian

2. NON-INDO-EUROPEAN GROUPS:

Uralic
Finnic: Estonian
Ugric: Hungarian

Altaic:
Turkish
Gagauz


Appendix 2: Population of Minorities in the CEECs

BULGARIA
Population: 8.500.000
Area: 110.000 km²
Minorities: Armenians 20.000 - 40.000; Greeks app. 7.000; Jews app. 6.000; Macedonian 200.000; Pomaks* app. 200.000; Roma 450.000 - 800.000; Tatars 6.000 - ?; Turks 850.000 - 1.000.000

* Pomaks are Bulgarian-speaking Muslims

CZECH REPUBLIC
Population: 10.300.000
Area: 78.000 km²
Minorities: Germans 50.000 - 150.000; Hungarians app. 20.000; Jews app. 5.000; Poles app. 60.000; Roma? - 200.000; Slovaks 300.000 - 500.000.

ESTONIA
Population: 1.600.000

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38 The statistics provide a range of figures. In some cases, the minimal and maximal plausible figures were given. In other cases, the minimum or the maximum figures were left open (indicated with a question mark). In those cases where a single figure is provided it should be seen as an approximation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>10.400.000</td>
<td>93.000 km²</td>
<td>Armenians? - 3.000; Bulgarians? - 2.000; Croats? - 60.000; Germans 65.000 - 200.000; Greeks? - 5.000; Jews 80.000 - 100.000; Poles? - 10.000; Roma 400.000 - 800.000; Serbs? - 5.000; Slovaks 30.000 - 100.000; Slovenes? - 5.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATVIA</td>
<td>2.700.000</td>
<td>64.000 km²</td>
<td>Belarussians app. 120.000; Jews? - 25.000; Lithuanians app. 35.000; Poles app. 60.000; Russians app. 900.000; Ukrainians app. 90.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITHUANIA</td>
<td>3.700.000</td>
<td>65.000 km²</td>
<td>Belarussians app 65.000; Jews 5.000 - 10.000; Poles app. 260.000; Russians app. 350.000; Ukrainians app. 45.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>39.000.000</td>
<td>312.000 km²</td>
<td>Belarussians 200.000 - 400.000; Czechs app. 2.000; Germans 300.000 - 800.000; Jews 3.000 - 10.000; Kashubes 39? - 300.000; Lithuanians app. 30.000; Roma 15.000 - 40.000; Ruthenes (= Lemkos)? - 30.000; Slovaks app. 20.000; Ukrainians 200.000 - 400.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>23.000.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39 Kashubes are considered not as an ethnic minority but an old Slavic group according to official documents and many authors in literature.
Area: 237.000 km²

Minorities: Armenians 2.000 - ?; Bulgarians 30.000 - 100.000; Croats 7.000 - ?; Germans app. 100.000; Greeks 4.000 - 20.000; Hungarians 1.600.000 - 2.000.000; Jews app. 10.000; Poles 4.000 - 10.000; Pomaks 25.000 - 50.000; Russians(& Lippovans)* 40.000 - 100.000; Roma 800.000 - 2.000.000; Serbs 35.000 - ?; Slovaks 20.000 - ?; Turks (& Tatars) 25.000 - 50.000; Ukrainians 70.000-250.000

* Lippovans are Russian Old Believers long settled in the Danube delta

SLOVAKIA

Population: 5.300.000

Area: 49.000 km²

Minorities: Czechs app. 60.000; Germans app. 5.000; Hungarians 560.000 - 700.000; Poles app. 3.000; Roma 250.000 - 500.000; Ruthenes 15.000 - 30.000; Ukrainians 15.000 - 30.000

SLOVENIA

Population: 1.900.000

Area: 20.000 km²

Minorities: Albanians app. 3.500; Croats app. 55.000; Hungarians app. 8.500; Istrians* 5.000 - ?; Italians app. 3.000; Macedonians app. 04.000; Muslims* app. 27.000; Roma 4.000 - 10.000; Serbs app. 50.000

* The census allows for a regional self-identification.

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Appendix 3: Religious Traditions in Central and Eastern Europe

MAINLY CATHOLIC

Poles
Slovaks
Lithuanians
Slovenes
German 'Schwabs' in Hungary and Romania (Eastern Banat)

**MAJORITY CATHOLIC WITH SIGNIFICANT PROTESTANT MINORITY**
- Czechs
- Slovaks
- Hungarians

**MAINLY PROTESTANT**
- Latvians
- Estonians
- German 'Saxons' in Romania (Transylvania)

**MAJORITY ORTHODOX WITH SIGNIFICANT UNIATE (GREEK or EASTERN RITE CATHOLICS) MINORITY**
- Ukrainians
- Ruthenians
- Romanians

**MAINLY ORTHODOX**
- Russians
- Bulgarians
- Serbs
- Macedonians
- Moldovans
- Gagauzi

**MUSLIMS**
- Bosnian Muslims
- Turks in Bulgaria

**MAINLY MUSLIM WITH CATHOLIC AND ORTHODOX MINORITIES**
- Albanians

**JEWISH**

Mainly urban dwellers throughout Central and Eastern Europe; much reduced by assimilation in the nineteenth century and the Holocaust in World War II.