HARRY TRUMAN:
THE MAN AND HIS DOCTRINE

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I am greatly honoured to have been asked to prepare a paper - a message - to the Second Annual Presidential Conference organized by Hofstra University on Harry S. Truman - The Man from Independence: 1884 - 1972.

A first message to the Conference will relate to the MAN and to lessons, new generations of politicians may draw from studying the actions, decisions and writings of this quite ordinary person who, through strength of character, became a forceful and respected world leader.

A second one will evolve from a brief survey of how his Doctrine came into existence, emphasis being given to the position of the Republic of Turkey before and after the proclamation of the Doctrine and to lessons which could be drawn from the stand and policies of that "delicately posed" country.

First the Man

An admiring historian of the Truman area said: He is "a man of surprising knowledge and range of interests; of simple tastes and fierce convictions and opinions and old-fashioned sentiments and forward-looking social liberalism; about his almost slavclike devotion to duty and hard work; about his loneliness, a loneliness that is the fate of all presidents."1

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1Hillman (William). Mr. President, 32nd President of the U.S.A. 1952. p. 2-3.
Other people who wrote or spoke about him said that: He was friendly, considerate and helpful by nature;2 that he was kindly, firm and courageous - whatever the Truman Committee has accomplished, is but a reflection of the integrity, wisdom and courage of its chairman3; that his self-effacement is genuine - he delegates power; that he attempts consciously to avoid basing his decisions on prejudice or bias. He listens to diverse arguments, and value all shades of opinion, respecting each man's views; and then comes to his own conclusion4; that his enormous energy enabled him to work harder than had many earlier Presidents5.

At his death, Lyndon B. Johnson said:

"A twentieth century giant is gone. Few men of any times ever shaped the word as did the Man from Independence" and Richard M. Nixon said: "Our hopes today for a generation of peace rest in large measure on the firm foundation that he laid".

Finally it was said that "diaries and private papers of Truman reveal a devout man broad in his aim, stern in his purpose, firm in his loyalties yet serene about the future6.

We do agree with this last statement, a few samples of Truman's diaries, memoranda, speeches and memoirs will, we hope, show the extent of his wisdom, courage, honesty, humanity and humility7.

On April 12, 1945 he wrote:

"I was very much shocked. I am not easily shocked but was certainly shocked when I was told of the President's death and the weight of the Government had fallen on my shoulders. I did not know what reaction the country would have to the death of a man whom they all practically worshipped. I was worried about reaction of the Armed forces. I did not know what effect the situation would have on the war effort, price control, war production and everything. I knew the President had a great many meetings with Churchill and Stalin. I was not familiar with any of these things, and it was really

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2 Mc Naughton (Frank) and Hehmeyer (Walter). This Man Truman. 1945. p. 80.
3 From a speech by sen. Carl Hatch.
4 Mc Naughton and Hehmeyer. op. cit. p. 135.
6 Hillman (W) op. cit. p. 108.
7 Not everyone agreed with this evaluation. At least one writer, expressed this contrary view: "A whole government, a whole country, a whole era was permeated by that exuberant courage which was FDR. His successor, catapulted by tragedy into a job he never dreamt he would or could reach, was filled with real fear on his own capacity. There seeped out to the press in Mr. Truman's first days in the White House off-the-record accounts of frank sessions in which a little man bewailed the fate which had made him President. Mr. Truman's fears transmitted themselves to those around him and through him to the country, as Mr. Roosevelt's courage had done earlier. 'Toughness' became a mask for strength. Mr. Truman, who was really scared, launched the 'get tough' policy. Mr. Roosevelt, who was really tough, did not need to proclaim that fact to the world." (Stone, I.F. The Truman Era. 1953. p. XVI.)
something to think about but I decided the best thing to do was to go home and get as much rest as possible and face the music."

He used to consider himself the thirty-second President, instead of thirty-third. He said: "I am the thirty-second man to be President. If you count the administration of Grover Cleveland twice because another President held office between Cleveland's first and second terms, you might try to justify the designation of me as thirty-third President. But then why don't you number all the second terms of other Presidents and the third and fourth terms of President Roosevelt, and where will you be. I am the thirty-second President."8

On the presidency, he said the following in his Memoirs:

"The presidency of the United States, carries with it a responsibility so personal as to be without parallel. Very few are ever authorized to speak for the President. No one can make decisions for him. No one can know all the processes and stages in his thinking in making important decisions. Even those closest to him, even members of his immediate family, never know all the reasons why he does certain things and why he comes to certain conclusions. To be President of the United States is to be lonely, very lonely at times of great decisions."9

On the Presidents which had the greatest influence on him, Truman cited Jefferson and Jackson and evaluated the presidents thus:

"Jefferson made the people the Government, and Jackson re-established the Government of the people. Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Hayes, Cleveland, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt were strong presidents. Washington made the federal government strong. Lincoln saved the Union and the Republic as one nation indivisible. Hayes restored the Lincoln plan of forgiving the secessionists, Cleveland represents the idea that one party cannot forever control a great republic. Wilson a great historian, understood that global affairs affected the United States. The fact that he could not put over his great idea at the time killed him. FDR took the Wilson idea and, in the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations organization, started the World on a road to peace..." 

9John F. Kennedy; in a T.V. interview on December 17, 1962, speaking on the burdens of being President, expressed these similar views:
"The responsibilities placed on the United States are greater than I imagined them to be, and there are greater limitations upon our ability to bring about a favorable result that I had imagined it to be. And I think that's probably true of anyone who becomes President, because there's such a difference between those who advise or speak, or legislate, and between the man who must make -select from various alternatives proposed and say that this shall be the policy of the United States. It's much easier to make the speeches than it is to finally make the judgements, because unfortunately your advisers are frequently divided. If you take the wrong course, and on occasion I have, the President bears the burden, responsibility, quite rightly. The advisers may move on to new advice."
On June 7, 1945 he wrote:

"The United States was created by the boys and girls who could not get along at home. So-called Puritans, who were not by any manner of means pure, came to Massachusetts to try out their own witch-burning theories.

Roger Williams could not stand them any better than he could stand England under the Stuarts.

Most every colony on the East Coast was founded for about the same reason by folks who could not get along at home. But by amalgamation, we have made a very good country and a great nation with a reasonable good government..."

On July 7, 1945, on U.S.S. Augusta, en route to Postdam Conference, he wrote:

"...... I am making this trip, determined to work for and win the peace. I am giving nothing away except I will do anything I can to save starving and war-battered people but I hope we will be able to help people to help themselves. This is the only sound policy."

He was a realist, on September 19, 1946, he wrote:

"....X is a pacifist 100 percent. He wants us to disband our armed forces, give Russia our atomic secrets and trust a bunch of adventurers in the Kremlin Politburo. I do not understand a "dreamer" like that. The German-American BUND under Fritz Kuhn was not half so dangerous. The reds, phonies and 'parlor pinks' seem to be banded together and are becoming a national danger."

On December 25, 1947, regarding his health, he wrote:

"You know, I walk and swim and worry very little. I appoint people to responsible positions to worry for me. You have no idea how satisfactory that policy is."

On his determination when a decision is made: from his diary of July 19, 1948:

"Have quite a day, see some politicos. A meeting with General Marshall and Jim Forrestal on Berlin and the Russian situation. Marshall states the fact and the condition with which we are faced. I made the decision ten days ago to stay in Berlin. Jim wants to hedge... I insist we will stay in Berlin - come what may. Royal, Draper and Jim Forrestal come in later. I have to listen to a rehash of what I know already and reiterate my 'stay in berlin' decision. I do not pass the buck nor do I alibi out any decision I make."

He was a sentimentalist. In a memorandum he wrote on January 10, 1951, he says:

"Received the Woodrow Wilson Award today. A wonderful medal with a great citation on the back. Mrs. McAdoo, Mr. Sayre and other highest of the high hat present. It was quite a ceremony. Did not deserve it but that is the case in most awards. But not in those Congressional Medals of Honor I awarded to survivors of five Korean war heroes. Hope I will not have to do that again. I am a damned sentimentalist and I could
hardly hold my voice steady when I gave a medal to a widow or a father for heroism in action. It was similar to giving citations to the men who were shot protecting me at the Blair House - and I choked up just as I did then. What an old fool I am!"

He was a family man. In his diary dated June 5, 1945, he wrote: "I cannot help wanting to talk to my sweetheart and my baby every night. I only had one sweetheart from the time I was six. I saw her in Sunday School at the Presbyterian Church in Independence, when my Mother took me there at that age, and afterwards, in the fifth grade at the Ott School in Independence, when her aunt Nannie was our teacher and she sat behind me in the sixth, seventh and high school grades, and I thought she was the most beautiful and the sweetest person on earth - and I am still of that opinion after twenty-six years of being married to her. I am old-fashioned, I guess."

Truman was going to write to his wife every day when they were apart. According to one scholar this may be the frankest and most important Presidential correspondence of this century. It is also a wonderful 19th century love story talking to the 20th century. It is said that in addition to shedding light on diplomatic and political history, the Truman letters are certain to throw additional light on the Truman personality and on the mores of the time. It is also said that the Truman letters reveal a blend of naiveté and obstinence, tenderness and toughness, plus a touch of the pedant. A voracious reader in his early years, he once boasted of having read many of the 2000 books in the public library.

In a speech in New York City on October 29, 1948, Truman explained the American foreign policy:

"...The heart and soul of American foreign policy is peace". "We are supporting a world organization to keep the peace, and a world economic policy to create prosperity for all mankind..."

"Our guiding principle is international cooperation. The very basis of our foreign policy is co-operative action with other nations...." "We have not deserted - we will never desert - the brave men and women who have rallied to the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world. We will not sacrifice them to totalitarian aggression."

So long as I am President, the U.S. will not close its mind to peace.

I will always explore every possible means, no matter how difficult or how unconventional, for reaching agreement.

I welcome the abuse that is showered upon me by those who have made up their minds that war is inevitable.

In my search for peace, I do not care what epithets may be hurled at me by those who think that we must hurry on to inevitable catastrophe. I do not care about that...."

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10See in the 'New York Times' of March 14, 1983 the excerpts from Truman's 1911 and Postdam letters to Bess Wallace Truman and the article 'Truman letters to wife disclosed'.
"After the first World War, the U.S. had its first great opportunity to lead the world to peace. I have always believed that it was the will of God at that time that we should enter into and lead the League of Nations. How much misery and suffering the world would have been spared if we had followed Woodrow Wilson."

"We are not making the same mistake this time that we made in 1920. God willing, we will never make that mistake again."

In a speech in Berkeley, California on June 12, 1948, he said:

"I stated our American policy for peace at the end of the war. It has been restated many times, but I shall repeat essential elements of our policy again so that there can be no misunderstanding anywhere by anyone.

"We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage.

"We have no plan for aggression against any other State, large or small.

"We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation."12

After being in the White House for six years and eight months Truman was asked if he would summarize what he considered the most important achievements of his administration. He replied: "We have prevented a third world war. And we have kept American economy on an even keel. The Russians had the idea that after 1946 we would explode and they the Russians could have had the world to themselves. We have managed to keep that from happening."13

The Truman Doctrine

This last statement brings us to His Doctrine and to the situation prevailing before its adoption.

Clearly if Russia succeeded in establishing a communist puppet state in Greece by a coup d'État as had been done in Hungary on the eve of the United States ratification of the Hungarian treaty, the position of Turkey would become untenable. The Dardanelles would pass under Russian control by default. Militant communism in Italy would be given a stimulus that would surely had to be overthrow of that nation's democratic government. Then the virus might well spread to France, teetering between communism and democracy, ultimately to engulf the whole of Europe. World War III would be in the offing.14

12ibid. p. 35.
13Hillman (W.) op.cit. p. 79.
14Mc Naughton (F) and Hehmeyer (W): Harry Truman. President. 1948. p. 81.
The importance of the new policy - called the Truman Doctrine - in addition to safeguarding the independence and integrity of two countries resulted in the adoption of a global American Foreign policy. At this stage it would be appropriate to summarize the Turkish position.

**Turkish position**

Turkey is a frontier country. The geographical frontier between Europe and Asia runs through it. The geopolitical realities as far as Turkey is concerned are first: the proximity of Turkey to Russia, secondly: possessing the Southern Black Sea Coast and the Straits - which have always been the stumbling block to Russian aspiration to enter the Mediterranean, this situation has brought about a centuries long conflict of interest between the two countries, third: because she constitutes the link between East and West, Turkey plays a vital part in the global balance between East and West. Thus, at the crossroads of East and West, North and South, a hybrid of Western and Eastern Civilizations, Turkey’s unique status adds many sided dimensions to its foreign policy.

After having proclaimed the Republic in 1923, following the "unprecedented success" in the war of independence, Ataturk, "although he refused to compromise on issues which he considered vital for the survival of the Turkish nation, settled on a status-quo policy as soon as these goals were attained.

He said: "Turkey does not desire an inch of foreign territory, but it will not give up an inch of what he holds." He made friends with the former enemies. He did not hesitate to accept help from Moscow while consciously retaining his Western orientation.

During the War of Independence, Soviet Russia had helped the Turkish nationalist movement by providing financial and military aid.

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18 He also said: "There are two means of conquering; one is the sword, and the other the plough... The nation whose only means for victory is the sword will be ultimately defeated. The real conquest is the one achieved by the plough. The plough and the sword - of these the second has always been defeated by the first."

Ataturk, on another occasion expressed the aim of his foreign policy with the phrase: "Peace in the Country, Peace in the World."

19 Vali (Ferenc A.). Bridge across the Bosphorus. The foreign policy of Turkey. 1971. p. 27.

20 It was for this first successful war of nationalist resistance against imperialism that the Soviet coined the technical Marxist term (War of national liberation) later to gain general currency. (See Gwynne Dyer - article on Turkey in World Armies. ed. by Keegan. 1979. p. 717).
But in spite of this aid "there was a mutual and tacit understanding that the 'friendship' was to be a limited and pragmatic one.\(^{21}\)

Following the war of Independence at the Lausanne Conference\(^{22}\), the leader of the Turkish delegation, Ismet Pasha, Foreign Minister (later to become President of Turkey), although cooperating the Russian delegation, managed to avoid being made a satellite of Russia. "Russia wanted Turkey to assert full control over the Straits and close the Black Sea to vessels of non-Black Sea Powers. This seemingly pro-Turkish view was, (at that time) for the benefit of Soviet Russia.\(^{23}\)

Nevertheless at the end in order to conciliate the Allies, Turkey had to make some concessions.

The Straits settlement at Lausanne provided for the demilitarization of the Turkish Straits and for the establishment of an international commission to regulate matters pertaining to the passage of ships. This was obviously not compatible with Turkey's national sovereignty nor did it adequately safeguard Turkey's defenses.

The situation was remedied at Montreux. During the negotiations, Moscow once more sought to have all warships of non-Black Sea powers excluded from the Black Sea, but in vain. Turkey failed to support the Soviet contention; her main ambition was to regain control over the Straits area and end its demilitarization. Eventually, Turkey's point of view was accepted; the British-Soviet confrontation ended with a compromise which was somewhat more favorable to Moscow than the Lausanne results.\(^{24}\)

Under the new Convention:

1. Demilitarization clauses of the Lausanne Convention were abrogated.

2. Freedom of navigation in the Straits was maintained.

3. Merchant vessels were allowed passage in war, if Turkey was neutral, and in case Turkey was belligerent the merchant vessels of all non-belligerents could pass freely.

\(^{21}\) See Kiliç (A.) op. cit. p. 55. According to Kiliç, Zinoviev, the President of the Congress of Eastern Peoples held in 1921, had said: "We give patient aid to group of persons who do not believe in our idea, who are even opposed to us on some points. In the same way the Soviet Government supports Kemal in Turkey. Never for one moment do we forget that the movement headed by Kemal is not a communist movement. We know it! "Mustafa Kemal on the other hand said: "We are on the same side with Russia. Her enemies are our enemies but we have no intention of fighting exploiters in order to be enslaved by others."

\(^{22}\) The Conference started on 20 November 1922. Broke up from February 4 to April 24 - resumed - a Peace Treaty was signed on July 24, 1923.

\(^{23}\) Kiliç (A.) op. cit. p. 45.

\(^{24}\) See Vâli (F.A.) op. cit. p. 186 and the Actes de la Conférence de Montreux, 22 Juin- 20 Juillet 1936 (Liège. Belgium. 1936). Text of Convention in Documents on International Affairs. 1936. pp.,643-667. Although the Convention could be denounced with a two-year notice after twenty years (no notice of denunciation has been announced, this has been possible since November 9, 1956.)
4. Warships: In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor warships and auxiliaries belonging both to riparian and non-riparian powers would have freedom of transit. Black Sea powers could send through ships of more than 15,000 tons if they pass singly. Transit of all warships would be preceded by a notification to the Turkish government.

(1) In time of war, Turkey being neutral, vessels belonging to belligerents should not pass through the Straits, except in execution of obligations under the Covenant of the League, and in cases of assistance rendered to a state victim of aggression, in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey.

(2) In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, or considering herself threatened by imminent danger of war, the passage of warships was to be left to the discretion of the Turkish government.

(3) The International Commission was abolished and its functions reverted to Turkey.

Following Montreux until the first part of 1939 harmony prevailed in the Turkish-Soviet relations as the two countries were fearing aggression by Hitlerite Germany and her ally, Italy and they were determined to resist such aggression they sought alignment with Britain and France. On May 12, 1939, an Anglo-Turkish declaration was issued to ensure security in the Mediterranean area and in the Balkans. The declaration was to be replaced by a formal treaty of alliance in which France was to participate.

The unexpected Hitler-Stalin pact, signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939, created an entirely new situation and took Turkey by surprise.25

Before final decisions were made on the treaty with Britain and France, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Saracoğlu, on September 26, 1939 went to Moscow. Turkish leaders hoped that Soviet attitudes toward their country would not change.26 Foreign Minister Saracoğlu's frustration in Moscow made it clear that Turkey had no other choice but to turn to Britain and France.28 On October 19, 1939 a Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed by Britain, France and Turkey. Protocol No. 2, attached to it, exempted Turkey from any action in the case of an armed conflict between her allies and the Soviet Union.

25Coup de Théâtre' is the term used by Feridun Cemal Erkin in his book on the Turkish-Soviet relations.
27For details see Erkin (Feridun Cemal). Les Relations Turco-Soviétiqnes et la question des détroits. 1968. Chapter V on the Turkish-Soviet negotiations. pp. 154-184. Erkin's term for the Moscow trip is 'étrange aventure diplomatique'.
28The Soviets inter alia demanded that Turkey sign a bilateral protocol which would in effect modify the Montreux Convention in accordance with Russia's favorite view that Turkey should not allow warships of non-Black Sea, and, by implication, that Russia should control all Turkish decisions relating to these seaways. Behind all this were German and Russian designs concerning the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Straits, and their effort to use Turkey as a pone. (See Kiliç (A.) op. cit p. 78).
The Soviet government expressed displeasure over the Treaty. Molotov declared: "I wonder whether Turkey will not come to regret this?" Germany and Italy threatened Turkey with all kinds of economic and other reprisals.

On March 25, 1941, Russia and Turkey proclaimed that if either becomes subject to aggression, the other will remain neutral and on June 18 of the same year, as Germany overrun the Balkans, the German-Turkish friendship and non-aggression Pact was signed\(^\text{29}\); at the end of 1941, the United States extended Lend-Lease to Turkey.\(^\text{30}\)

During the war with Germany, Soviet attitudes toward Turkey oscillated according to the fortunes of war. When the German armies were advancing, Stalin praised Turkey for its steadfast and scrupulous neutrality. After Stalingrad and once Soviet armies began to roll back the Germans, Moscow gradually changed its mood toward Turkey. From mid-1941 until mid-1943, all belligerents felt that the neutrality of Turkey was in their interest. Only after Italy was knocked out of the war and the Mediterranean was cleared of the enemy did the leaders of the Grand Alliance question Turkey's neutrality. Churchill's various plans to strike at the 'soft belly' of the Axis included the participation of Turkey. While the Turkish government was, in principle, ready to comply with her commitment as an ally of Britain, she viewed Russia with alarm and did not wish to jeopardize her strength. As President İnönü told Churchill, Turkey did not wish to be occupied by Germany and then "liberated" by the Soviet Union.

Turkish diplomacy at that time responded to the exigencies of the war and the growing probability of Germany's defeat. A consensus exists as to the skill displayed by the Turkish leaders during the war years, their perceptiveness and realistic view of power politics are admired. "Unlike the British and Americans, who accepted at face value Soviet protestations of dedication to a free, democratic postwar world, the Turks had had too much experience with the Russians not to be cautious."

"Turkey accurately perceived that elimination of Germany as a European power would inevitably and swiftly be followed by a Soviet takeover of at least the Balkans and Eastern Europe." This fear of postwar Soviet intentions was always uppermost in the minds of the Turkish leaders and explains in large degree their determination to remain

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\(^{29}\) The Pact reaffirmed Turkey's prior obligations under the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact of October 19, 1939. In commenting on this pact, President İsmet İnönü stated: 'It was now understood that the Germans had put off their attack on Turkey to a later and more suitable time. Turkey considered it necessary to gain time, both for its own security and for the benefits of the Allies. Von Papen (Ambassador of Germany to Turkey) declares in his memoirs that Ribbentrop did, at first, object violently against such a clause concerning prior obligations. But von Papen convinced him that no alternative was possible since "Turks were gentlemen, and gentlemen had the habit of keeping their word."

The British Ambassador at that time Sir Hugh Knatchbull Hugessen expressed the following opinion: "It was evident that the Turks were driven by hard practical considerations into making their Treaty with Germany. It was in no sense due to inclination or sentiment that they did so... By the end of the year it had become obvious that the German Treaty was meant to stave off a dangerous period and represented no fundamental change of policy. (Kılıç, op. cit. p. 89)."

\(^{30}\) Vâli (F.A.). op. cit. p. 32. 
out of war: "Turkey exhausted by war would be in a poor condition to resist Soviet pressures." 31

In June of 1944, Turkey forbade the passage through the Straits into the Black Sea of several thinly disguised German naval auxiliaries. On August 1 of the same year, Turkey broke off diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. At the beginning of 1945 (Jan. 3) Turkey broke diplomatic and economic relations with Japan and on 23 February declared war on Germany and Japan. The régime of the Straits agreed to in the Montreux Convention worked satisfactorily until the last phase of the War.

"At Yalta, Stalin had spoken almost casually of hoping to share with Turkey, after the war, control of the Dardanelles. In anything but casual terms, Churchill told him no, to which Roosevelt added his endorsement. The matter was dropped for the time being." 32

Immediately after the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Government engaged in a bitter press and propaganda campaign, a campaign of nerves against Turkey.

On March 19, 1945, Molotov called in the Turkish Ambassador, Selim Sarper and informed him that the 1925 Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, which had been renewed ten years before was not to be renewed again in November, when it was due to expire.

On April 7, Turkey replied and said that she was prepared to reconsider any reasonable changes in the Treaty.

On June 7, 1945, Ambassador Sarper, discussed the problem with Molotov who declared the willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate a new treaty if Turkey would agree to return the provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Republic of Georgia and accepts Soviet participation in the defense of the Straits.

"Ambassador Sarper, made it very clear that the Turkish Republic not only would not cede bases in the Straits or give up its territory, but had no interest at all in becoming a Soviet satellite. 33


33 See Howard. op. cit. p. 218-219.

Ambassador Sarper, a good and regretted friend told me in 1946 the following: Molotov was standing and had his hand in his pocket. I immediately stood also, put my hand in my pocket and said that although I had no instructions, no Turkish Government would accept such offer. Having later received instructions, I again met Molotov (June 18) and re-emphasized Turkey's categorical rejection (I.L.)
At the Postdam Conference\(^{34}\) (July 17 - August 2, 1945), according to British sources, the three heads of governments agreed that the Montreux Convention should be revised "as failing to meet present-day conditions". They also agreed that "as the next step, the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish Government"\(^{35}\)

At this stage exchanges of diplomatic notes started. Message from the American Government on November 2, 1945 to Turkey; memorandum of the British government on November 21; the Declaration on December 6 by the Turkish government expressing its readiness to participate in an international conference on the straits and to accept any decisions reached there, provided that Turkey’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are not infringed; note on August 7 by the Soviet Government proposing inter alia the principles that the regime of the Straits should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers and that Turkey and the Soviet Union should organize joint measures of defense for the prevention of the utilization of the straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers; Turkey’s reply of August 22, 1946\(^{36}\) refusing to agree to a regime of the Straits by the Black Sea Powers only and stating that any defense of the straits jointly with the Soviet Union was "not compatible with the inalienable rights of sovereignty of Turkey nor with its security brooks no restrictions"; second note of the Soviet Union on September 25, 1946 repeating the demands and chiding Turkey in declining en bloc all possibility of joint study with the Soviet Union of this important problem, indissolubly linked with the security interests of the USSR and the other Black Sea Powers; Turkey’s second reply of October 18, 1946, pointing out that thanks to Turkish vigilance, the USSR was able, during the entire length of the war, to remain in the Black Sea sheltered from every Axis attack coming from the Mediterranean, reminding that Turkey could not forget that she herself was also a Mediterranean country which made Turkey a "liaison between the two worlds separated by the restricted space of the Straits," repeating that acceptance by Turkey of Soviet defense of the Straits would mean no less than her sharing her sovereignty with a foreign power\(^{37}\). While the USSR would not formally 'push its case after the end of 1946' the pressure on Turkey would continue until 1953.

\(^{34}\)In the opinion of Secretary Brynes, Postdam was the "success that failed". It is argued that in terms of history this was not true. The agreement reached had little real substance, but it served an important historical purpose in providing an urgently needed breathing spell in the cold war....

Immediately after the Postdam meeting the French satirical weekly 'Le Canard Enchainé' commented: 'At Postdam, the Germans divided the Allies into four zones.' In fact, the East-West division of Europe had preceded Postdam and Postdam made Germany the symbol of that division. It did not alter the policy of either the Soviet Union or the United States.


\(^{36}\)For the position of the United States, see below the action taken by Truman in advising Turkey.

\(^{37}\)See especially the great debate concerning the Turkish Straits (August-October 1946) in Howard. op. cit. pp. 242-250; Erkin. op. cit.; Váli. op. cit. p. 191; Kiliç. op. cit. 129-130.
American position

Following the war, the United States assumed a direct interest in the problem of the Turkish Straits. The United States joined Great Britain and France, and the Soviet Union in discussing the problem with the government of Turkey. The United States was willing to go far in meeting the Soviet position as to use and transit of the Straits and admitted the special interest of the USSR in the Straits. It maintained its position as to commercial freedom and assimilated the Straits to other waterways of international concern (President Truman's "inland" waterways) like the Rhine, the Elbe, the Danube, the Suez and Panama Canals. But the United States, like the United Kingdom, rejected the Soviet position as to (1) the elaboration of a new convention of the Straits by "the Black Sea Powers" and (2) joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the Straits, which would have subverted Turkish independence.38

The foreign policy, Roosevelt passed to Truman was predicated on mutual trust between Russian and the West, on strict adherence to all agreements and of the substitution of collaborative for unilateral action wherever the international community was affected. In other words the concept espoused by Roosevelt was for a "new world order based on benign cooperation of the great powers" with the hope that partnership of war would become the partnership of peace.39 It took the United States practically two years - from autumn of 1945 to March 1947 - before giving up this altruistic concept and to realize that the "dynamic of Marxist expansionism" would never agree to such a cooperation. Following the war, faith in the altruistic concept begun to wear thin and the seeds of the cold war began to sprout and in 1946 and 1947 bore their first fruit.40

From the start of his Administration President Truman found Russia a difficult wartime ally and a troublesome peacetime partner.41

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38Howard op. cit. p. 260; one should recall also, the U.S. show of naval strength in the Eastern Mediterranean on April 5, 1946 as the battleship and cruiser, Providence, plus other ships arrived off Istanbul. On May 7, 1946, Turkish-American agreement on the Lend-Lease debt was reached, the U.S. was to cancel $ 100 million debt; on November 23 another U.S. naval visit to Istanbul took place.


Parallel to the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the Soviet-American relations were seriously deteriorating. On April 2, 1945, ten days before his death, Roosevelt had sent a strong message to Stalin deploring the situation, which had centered on the Polish problem.
In his book: Truman, Stalin and Peace, Albert Z. Carr (Doubleday - 1950) writes: "The cold war did not begin until after the Yalta Conference of February 1945, but a sharpening chill in the air was detectable long before then. One refrigerating element was the fiasco of the mooted American loan to the Soviet Union. Although little publicized, the possibility of this loan for a time almost certainly influenced Soviet policy toward the United States, and its refusal coincided significantly with the necessary aggressiveness of the Kremlin. (p. 13).
President Truman already on January 5, 1946 in a memo to the then Secretary of State James T. Byrnes had aired his impatience in the following words.  

"... There isn't a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand - "how many divisions have you?"

"I do not think we should play compromise any longer. We should refuse to recognize Rumania and Bulgaria until they comply with our requirements; we should let our position on Iran be known in no uncertain terms and we should continue to insist on the internationalization of the Kiel Canal, the Rhine-Danube waterway and the Black Sea Straits and we should maintain complete control of Japan and the Pacific. We should rehabilitate China and create a strong central agreement there. We should do the same for Korea.

"Then we should insist on the return of our ships from Russia and force a settlement of the Lend-Lease debt of Russia. "I'm tired babying the Soviets".

Thus, America could no longer afford to play the part of a benevolent power observing events from the outside. America was forced into the area of world politics and Harry S. Truman was to guide it. His policies were revolutionary in their departure from the traditional American foreign policy. He led America a long way from Washington's warning against entangling alliances, and a long way from the hemispheric Monroe Doctrine.

The following narrative taken from Cabell Phillip's study of the Truman Presidency will illustrate the above statement and show clearly how Truman, making good use of his knowledge of world history, helped the crystallization of American policy. The occasion was the convening by Truman of his war cabinet in order to review the situation resulting from the first note the Russians had given Turkey on the Straits:

"President Truman hastily convened his war cabinet, composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State, and told them he needed a fast rundown on the implications of the Soviet threat and some proposals on a course of action. In four days - on August 15 - they were back in the President's office. It was their unanimous opinion, they said, that the Soviet intention was to swallow up Turkey just as Rumania and Bulgaria had been swallowed and that this was a danger that the United States and other Western Powers clearly could not tolerate. The sternest diplomatic and military measures would be justified in thwarting the Soviet scheme.

Truman agreed so readily with this drastic interpretation that General Eisenhower, sitting in as Army Chief of Staff, hesitantly and anxiously raised the question of whether the President fully understood and appreciated all the implications of his decision. Dean

\[\text{\textsuperscript{42}}\]This historic memo had a note signed H.S.T. which read: "I wrote this memo and read it to my Secretary of State. So urgent were its contents I neither had it typed nor mailed but preferred to read it in order to give emphasis to the points I wanted to make."

\[\text{\textsuperscript{43}}\]Druks (H.), op. cit. p. 2.
Acheson recalls that Truman took a well-worn map of the region from his desk drawer and, using it as a guide, delivered a ten-minute dissertation on the historical significance of the Dardanelles and the eastern Mediterranean, "stretching from Tamerlane to the day before yesterday."44

When the President had finished, he looked up with a smile and asked: "Does that satisfy you, General?" There was a good-natured laughter all around as Eisenhower admiringly replied: "It sure does, Mr. President. Strike my question from the record."

The next day, Acheson, as Acting Secretary of State, after coordinating his actions with his opposite number in London, told the Turks to stand firm. To the Soviet Ambassador in Washington he handed a polite but diplomatically loaded note which said:

"It is the firm opinion of this government that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and could clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations."45

The involvement of the United States and ultimately the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine 'came to a head' with the inability of Great Britain to fulfill its responsibilities vis à vis the preservation of the political integrity of Greece and Turkey.

"A crisis in the tottering Greek Government was imminent if Greece fell, Turkey would be drawn under with her; and if Turkey fell, the fate of Greece would be automatically sealed. And once Communist power broke through these political barricades into the Mediterranean, all of the Middle-East, India, North Africa and even Italy would be in jeopardy - and so, also, would be the concept of a free world counterforce to communist aggression."46

Truman after consulting and notifying congressional leaders asked to address a joint session of Congress. He appeared on March 12, 1947. Part of what he said follows:

"The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved."

Truman outlined the situation of Greece and Turkey, their strategic importance.

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45 This narrative is indeed a very significant one. On one occasion Truman had said: "I wish I had a college education. I might have accomplished something better. I feel a terrible inadequacy of education."
On this instance at least, we think that the 2000 books he had read served his country well.
46 From documents handed by the first secretary of the British Embassy in Washington: Mr. Sichell, to Mr. Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. The two met before the formal meeting of the British Ambassador Lord Inverchapel and General George C. Marshall, Secretary of State.
"The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists... There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn... Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world including Greece.

"We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required...."

"The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

"At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

"One way of life is based on the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

"The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms....

"I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way....

"This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious... The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world - and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation...."47

Following Truman's declaration, Congress in May 1947 adopted the aid-bill to the two countries and with the signing of the bill on May 22 a period of 'special relationship' started between the United States and Turkey.48

47Lawrence Stern in his book 'The wrong horse' says that Clark Clifford, had worked over the words of the speech in launching the Truman Doctrine. 'That's the speech which articulated in carefully drawn and resounding phrases America's entry into the cold war. (p. 4). (see also p. 15 and 16).

48For at least one dissident voice against the new American Program, see Stone (I.F.). The Truman Era. 1953. He says:
"From the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, America declared its intention to police the world against new ideas. The country which a century before had fought the reactionary holy alliance with the Monroe Doctrine now set up a holy alliance of its own under the Truman Doctrine. We aimed to be organizers of a world counter-revolutionary crusade, and with the slogan "total diplomacy" to obtain at home by more velvety means some of the same kind of conformity in foreign policy the Russians also
The security of Turkey was assured by the proclamation of the Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, "which meant both military and economic assistance from the United States, thereby strengthening Turkey's international position and lightening her domestic investment abroad.\textsuperscript{49} Again following the adoption of the Doctrine a United States military and naval missions arrived in Ankara to administer the forthcoming American assistance (May 19, 1947), on September 1, 1947 Turkey ratified the Turkish -U.S. Agreement on Military Aid. On July 25, 1950, Turkey offered the United Nations 4500 armed troops to meet aggression in Korea, on September 1951, Turkey joined NATO and in 1952 became a full fledged member.\textsuperscript{50} By 1955, the relations between the two countries allegedly deteriorated due to unwillingness of the United States to provide more economic aid, the United States demanding for internal economic and fiscal reforms.

It is true that, especially since 1955, "alliance between the two countries has marked up and downs, but both partners have nonetheless clung to a core of mutual interest and residual confidence in the ultimate value of relationship."\textsuperscript{51}

According to Dr. George Harris, the Director of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, US Department of State:

"The (mutual dependence) of the two countries continues today. Turkey is looking to the West for solutions, and Washington sees increasing value in the Turkish collaboration." Again, Dr. Harris thinks that although the two countries "will continue close relations are not likely to return to cooperation as extensive as in the depths of the


\textsuperscript{50} According to my friend A. Kılıç, the period 1947-1955 of U.S.-Turkish relations constitute the 'honeymoon period', again Kılıç sees the definitive end of the period' in 1955 Kılıç op. cit. pp. 134-155

\textsuperscript{51} The decision of the US Congress to cut off to Turkey, imposing an embargo on all arms, even for those for which payment had already been made - lasted from February 1975 to August 1978, then Congress responding to presidential please voted an end to arms embargo.

For more see Legislation on Foreign Relations through 1981. Joint Committee Print - Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee on Foreign Relations. Vol. 1 U.S. House of Representative - U.S. Senate.

cold war" and that "over the longer run, Turkish-American relations are likely to show some change."{52}

As to the Soviet-Turkish relations since 1946, "no further initiative by the Soviet Union for the revision of the regime of the Straits took place."

The state of tension and bitterness between the two countries ended after Stalin's death in March 1953.{53}

The new Soviet regime, speedily undertook a re-examination of Soviet Union's external relations. It was soon realized that a major blunder had been committed in relations with Turkey.{54}

On May 30, 1953, the Soviet Government issued a declaration in which it was said that ..." In the name of preserving good neighborly relations and strengthening peace and security, the Government of Armania and Georgia have found it possible to renounce their territorial claims of Turkey...." Concerning the question of the Straits it was said that ".... the Soviet Government has reconsidered its former opinion and considers possible the provision of security of the USSR from the side of the Straits on conditions acceptable alike to the USSR and to Turkey. Thus the Soviet Government declares that the Soviet Union has not any kind of territorial claim on Turkey.

Turkey replied on July 18, expressing its satisfaction at the renunciation of territorial claims noting that the Soviet concern for good relations corresponded with its own desires and stressing that 'the question of the Black Sea Straits' as the Soviet Government well knew, was 'regulated by the provisions of the Montreux Convention'.

As in the case of relations with the United States the Turco-Soviet relations since 1953 has been marked up and downs and "alternated between invitations for closer and better relations and warnings or propaganda attacks". In the meantime Turkey having the geopolitical realities in mind continues to attach great importance to the collective deterrence of NATO. She considers it a 'shield for her as well as other members of the Alliance.' Turkey believes also that the policy of détente should continue as 'there is no alternative to it'. Finally, one should also keep in mind that Turkey was always careful in all her endeavours, since the founding of the Republic, not to "affect negatively her bilateral relations with the Soviet Union."

Conclusions

Our conclusions from this brief survey and the message to the Presidential Conference in honour of Harry S. Truman will be the following:


{53}In May 1963, a Turkish parliamentary delegation visited Russia and was received by Khrushchev. The Soviet leader told the delegation that Stalin's policy toward Turkey had been "idiotic" and that the Soviet Union desired friendship and neighborly relations with Turkey (Vâlî - op. cit. p. 176).

{54}See Vâlî. op. cit. p. 174-175 and 194. Also Ilavar. op. cit. p. 267.
Harry S. Truman: a "quite ordinary man who became a quite extraordinary President."

According to C. Phillips: "His strength lay in his ability to do the best he could with what he had and not to despair over what he did not have". He never suffered the illusion that he was another Roosevelt or Churchill... destiny had linked his life to theirs in an apocalyptic enterprise and each rode it out to greatness according to his own fashion.

- A tribute to his basic decisions: The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, North Atlantic Alliance, Military Aid Program, POINT IV is well deserved as they had been successful in preventing further spreading of communism and in raising the level of world economy under democratic leadership.

- The consensus is that He had "worn well" and only eleven years after his death he is rightly considered one of the most successful of presidents.

- His Doctrine remain a basic premise of American foreign policy and should remain so as long as the United States will link her "own intelligent self-interest" with the ideology of freedom mentioned in the Doctrine.

- Turkey is very much in agreement with said ideology which is simply to espouse "a way of life based on the will of the majority, representative Government, individual liberty, freedom of speech and freedom from political oppression."

Turkey's efforts since the proclamation of the Republic are always in that direction.

The following should also be kept in mind:

(1) Turkey's foreign policy is consistently and successfully based on a realistic defense of national interest.

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55 Phillips (C). op. cit. p. 3.
56 The answers to a questionnaire sent out by Professor Robert K. Murray of Pennsylvania State University shows that the four "great Presidents" were: Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington and Jefferson and the four "near greats" were: Theodore Roosevelt, W. Wilson, Andrew Jackson and Harry S. Truman.
57 Váli. op. cit. p. 372.
58 Turkey is in the process of becoming again a big power. In 1981, her population was 45,183,000; she has total armed forces of 567,000 (including 374,000 conscripts); available manpower: 10,072,000; 5,951,000 fit for military service. Again in 1981 annual military expenditure was $3.4 billion (about 16% of the total budget). See. The Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook. 1981. pp. 604-607.
(2) Turkey is a 'delicately poised' country, accordingly she has to take infinite care to preserve her stability. 59

(3) Turkey has an army whose role is to safeguard Ataturk's reform and prevent backsliding but not to rule itself. The army is a modernizing, progressive force and its interventions have the support of the majority of the Turkish people. 60

Final Message: Turkey is aware of the positive handicap of the President of the United States in dealing with Congress and realizes that the evolution of foreign policy in American representative Government develops as slow and often painful process; she definitely agrees with Harry S. Truman when he wanted to maintain his "very good country and great nation" in spite of the hyphenates and crackpots and he said: "I have no more use for any sort of hyphenates then I have for Communist-Americans. They all have some other loyalty than the one they should have. Maybe the old melting pot will take care of it. I hope so." 61

59 In the opinion of one author during the last forty years: 'Turkey emerges as a country with "an extraordinarily rich cultural heritage" with "a long history of virtually unbroken national independence" with "a modernist movement having its roots in prerepublican Turkish history going back more than a century" with experience in the art of administration' being blessed most of the time with 'enlightened, honest, dedicated leaders' and was 'able to stay free of foreign military adventures [Robinson (Richard) op. cit. pp. VII, VIII, IX].

60 In his article on Turkey published in 'World Armies' Gwynne Dyer states the following: "...Turkey's army's outlook has been molded and matured by five centuries of experience as the army of a great power... The army's relationship with the Turkish State, and the immense goodwill it enjoys in the mass of the Turkish population as a heritage of many generations of sacrifice and gallantry in wars as the borders of the Ottoman Empire contracted, are fundamentally different from the circumstances prevailing in almost all its neighbors." (p. 716)

In another publication it is said: "... The quality of the armed forces is generally enhanced by a proud national military tradition, and by the toughness, frugality, courage, loyalty and self-reliance of the Turkish peasants, who make up the bulk of the rank and file. Since World War II, about 30 percent of the annual budget has been for defense..." (From an article in Almanac of World Military Power. 4th ed. 1980. pp. 323-324).

61 From Harry Truman's diary of June 1945.