NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY AND TURKEY

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In the aftermath of the Bosnian and Kosovo tragedies, the European public opinion has criticised European governments for not preventing ethnic conflicts in the continent and indeed the public opinion has been right in its judgement. Europe has been perceived as incapable of making any headway on the problems until the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to intervene to the recent tragedies lived at the end of the 1990s. The political will was lacking, but also the structure to prevent conflicts. The resulting situation raised the question of the need to set up a new comprehensive security and defence system that will give Europe greater responsibilities for its defence by establishing European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which has been a long historic aspiration for many Europeans.

The issue is of great importance to Turkey's foreign and security policy. As a non-EU member of NATO, Turkey has been very suspicious of the European initiatives of the establishment of the ESDI. It has supported the creation of ESDI, but not detached from NATO. In the last major summit of NATO held in Washington in April 1999 and in the meeting of Florence in May 2000, Turkey has opposed the use of NATO capabilities by WEU members, without consultation with the North Atlantic Council (NAC), where the decisions are based on consensus.

This paper will try describe the ESDI, its evolution and its effects to European security, as well as the position of Turkey towards the ESDI. We argue that Europe is becoming more
European, and is developing a European way of defence and security. Regionalisation tendencies in the world have encouraged the other states to seek their own ways. ESDI is the obvious expression of this tendency.

1. European Security in the 1990s

In the new geo-strategic environment of 1990's Europe, issues of identity became as crucial as questions of national interest.¹ The international environment has profoundly shaped Europe's security identity. The rise of Europe's integration together with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, have significantly affected Europe's security identity. The difficulties faced by the European countries created new opportunities to consider and reshape the future security architecture of the continent.²

Europe needed to reform its security and defence structures that will stimulate original thinking and give her a more active leadership role.³ As a response to this need, the European member countries of NATO embarked upon a process designed to strengthen their contribution to NATO's missions and activities, which was called as strengthening, what US President Kennedy called, "the European pillar of the Alliance", and to enable them to assume greater responsibility for the common defence and security, by establishing the ESDI within NATO. This was done with a view to providing a genuine European military capability without duplication the command structures, planning staffs and military assets and capabilities already available within NATO. Such an approach was seen as responding both to the European wish to develop Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the need for a balanced partnership between the North America and Europe.⁴

³Assembly of WEU, The ESDI, Colloquy, Madrid, 4-6 May 1998, p. 65.
The concept of ESDI at present is little than an idea, but it is an idea, which is rapidly coming of age. It is a concept born of Europeans' determination to take their share of security and defence burden. The identity obliges NATO to make available collective assets of the Alliance to WEU. Its purpose is to enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of NATO as an expression of their shared responsibilities and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership. The ESDI, together with Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF),\(^5\) comprises the basic element of NATO's internal adaptation process, which is guided by the fundamental objectives of ensuring NATO's military effectiveness and also by preserving the transatlantic link.

2. The Evolution of ESDI


The Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in December 1991 identified the WEU as an integral part of the development of the EU and a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and it was decided to develop WEU as "the defence component of the EU".\(^6\) In order to deepen the defence identity, in the framework of WEU, seven European military

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\(^5\)CJTF, approved at Brussels Summit of NATO in January 1994 is an instrument whereby once the Alliance has decided to intervene, forces are assembled for a particular operation and each of the Allied countries decides individually what forces it will contribute. CJTF in non-standing multinational force. For more information on CJTF, look at NATO's official website at http://www.nato.int.

formalities were formed. All of them were declared as forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU).  

At the Brussels Summit in January 1994, NATO leaders welcomed the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the launching of the EU, as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. They further announced that they "stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of the consultation in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their common foreign and security policies." NATO Heads of State and Government directed the NAC to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures might be developed and adapted in order to achieve three objectives: to conduct the Alliance's missions, more efficiently and flexibly; to improve cooperation with WEU; and to reflect the emerging ESDI. At the Summit, US President Clinton told his allies that US no longer opposed the idea of separable European defence structures, capable of conducting military operations without direct US participation. But these structures should be tucked inside NATO, and detached only when needed; in other words, they should be

7These formations include European Corps (Euro-corps), which contains German, French, Spanish, Luxembourg, and Belgian forces, were formed by an expansion of a previously existing Franco-German brigade on 5 November 1993, four days after the Treaty on European Union came into force, and is now operational with 40,000-60,000 troops. Alongside Eurocorps, there are number of bilateral arrangements which have been placed at the disposal of the WEU. These include an Anglo-Dutch amphibious force, Franco-British Euro Air Group to coordinate RAF French Air Force joint operations, in support of either peacekeeping or offensive activities, The Multinational Division Center, The Rapid Deployment Euroforce (Eurofor), European Maritime Force (Euromarfor), German/Netherlands Corps and the Spanish/Italian Amphibious Force. The EU has also made commitment to create an independent European satellite system, by enhancing the WEU Satellite Center at Torrejon, Spain. The European Future Large Aircraft program has been planned, which is expected to lead to an outsize load capability with employment benefits for Europe. Richard Whitman, "Creating a Foreign Policy for Europe?" Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 2, July 1998, pp. 12-3.


"separable but not (permanently) separate" from NATO. This marked a change from the assumptions of the cold war, when America and also Britain waged a constant diplomatic battle to steer Europeans away from doing their own thing in military matters.

At the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, in November 1994, preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common defence policy were endorsed. This development, which took into account the results of the January 1994 NATO Summit, was welcomed by NATO Foreign Ministers when they met in Brussels at the end of the year. NATO Ministers indicated that the Allies support initiatives to develop multinational operational arrangements and force structures, which would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while enabling the European Allies to take greater responsibility for the common security and defence.

At the meeting of the NAC in Berlin on 3-4 June 1996, NATO Foreign Ministers referred to the building of the ESDI within NATO as an essential part of the adaptation of Alliance structures. The NATO allies also recognized the ESDI's institutional embodiment in WEU and undertook to make NATO assets available for operations under the political control and strategic direction of WEU.

Decisions were taken by the WEU in Paris in May 1997 on the participation of all European Allies in WEU operations using NATO assets and capabilities, and in the planning and preparation for such operations. The basis has therefore been laid for the development of the ESDI within the Alliance with the full participation of all European Allies.

12 Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 1 December 1994.
13 M-NAC-I(96)63 Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996.
The EU's Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), concluded in June 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam, had a number of implications for further development of the ESDI. In particular, the Treaty made specific reference to tasks which WEU member countries had defined as being those which could be carried out under WEU authority - the so-called "Petersberg Missions" which WEU Ministers had agreed to at their meeting in June 1992 at Petersberg, near Bonn. These are namely humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks assigned to combat forces in the context of crisis management situations. Also with the Treaty, the EU undertook to step up efforts to create a true ESDI.

The Madrid NATO summit of July 1997 ushered in a new stage in the process of adaptation of the NATO to the ESDI. At Summit, the Alliance stressed its firm commitment to support the construction of the ESDI and it made clear its wish for an ESDI to be developed within the Alliance and not outside it. It was made clear that if Europeans want responsibilities to be widely shared, they should take on a greater share of the financial commitment involved with the Alliance. The essential elements of the ESDI formula endorsed by Alliance leaders in Madrid include: making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations; providing for the support of WEU operations as an element of the CJTF concept; creation of forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU; strengthening of the institutional cooperation between NATO and WEU; involving WEU in NATO's defence planning processes; taking WEU requirements into account in NATO's new defence planning procedures for developing forces and capabilities; introducing procedures for identifying NATO assets and capabilities on which the WEU might wish to draw with the agreement of the NAC; establishing multinational European command arrangements within NATO, which could be used to prepare, support, command and conduct an operation under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. In this context, the responsibilities of the

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16 NATO offers several objective benefits crucial to the long-term success of ESDI. The first is the implicit promise of NATO's full combat power. The second is NATO's unique political decision-making structure. The third is the pre-existence of the military planning and decision-making structures necessary to the ESDI. These are views expressed by those who are more Atlantic than European oriented.
Deputy SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) have been clarified. He has been identified as the principal point of contact between the strategic commands and WEU and at the same time, as responsible to co-ordination of NATO planning. He will be a key figure in preparing the transfer of NATO assets to WEU and he has to be prepared to act as operation commander for WEU led operation; introducing consultation and information sharing arrangements to provide the co-ordination needed throughout a WEU-led operation undertaken with NATO support; developing military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions.17

The British and French governments following their bilateral meeting in St. Malo, France in 1998, have taken the lead in developing the European defence capabilities, strengthen their collective political will, and make a greater contribution to security and defence in Europe. On the institutional side, the British and French leaders at St. Malo pointed toward an increased EU role in security and defence under the Amsterdam Treaty - perhaps even a friendly take over of the WEU by the EU-,18 which caused concerns in the US with reactions that St. Malo is "EU-ising" the ESDI.19

3. Defence Capabilities Initiative

At Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The objective of this initiative is to improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces. Maintaining

17"The European Security and Defence Identity," NATO Basic Fact Sheet, No. 3.
the effectiveness of multinational operations will require particular attention to the challenges of interoperability. Improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO.

NATO has examined areas where improvements in capabilities would make a significant contribution towards meeting the challenges of the future. The aim has been to develop a common assessment of requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. In identifying the most important areas for improvement, and with a special focus on interoperability, the work has concentrated on the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, on their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and on command and control and information systems. The initiative emphasises the importance of the resource dimension of this work as well as the requirement for better coordination between defence planning disciplines; takes into consideration the ability of European Allies to undertake WEU-led operations; addresses ways to improve capabilities of multinational formations; and considers issues such as training, doctrine, human factors, concept development and experimentation, and standardisation.

Achieving the DCI objectives will strengthen European defense capabilities so that European Allies will be able to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO. It will also improve their capability to undertake EU-led operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. DCI will contribute to the development of the ESDI, which will enable the European allies to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO.

EU at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, decided that by the end of 2000, to develop the new military capabilities associated with its Headline and Capability Goals, which is a duplication of the NATO's DCI. Headline and Capability Goals involves the establishment of the EU security and defence decision-making structures and the creation of 60,000 men army.

At the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Florence on 24 May 2000, Ministers called for to address the means to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency among EU, WEU and NATO and to make the Headline and Capability Goals of the EU complementary to the NATO's DCI.21

4. The Structure of the ESDI

In practice, these arrangements mean that if a crisis arise in which the WEU decides to intervene (and NATO decides not to), it would request the use of the Alliance's assets and capabilities, including CJTF headquarters, for conducting an operation under its own control and direction.22 The request of WEU, however, doesn't lead automatically to have NATO assets available. The decision to make available NATO assets to WEU is made by the NAC, the highest organ in the hierarchy of NATO structure, which decides with consensus, and it is decided on a case-by-case basis. So, a single negative vote of one of 19 members of NATO means a rejection of the request of WEU. Conditions for their transfer to the WEU, as well as monitoring their use and for their eventual return or recall, would be registered in a specific agreement between NATO and WEU. During the operation, NATO would monitor the use of its assets and regular political liaison with the WEU would be maintained. European commanders would be nominated to act under WEU political control. The assets would be returned to NATO at the end of operation or when required. Throughout the operation, NATO and the WEU would consult closely.23 NATO leaders agreed at their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999 on detailed arrangements to lend military headquarters organisations, multinational staffs, and tanks, helicopters and other equipment to the Europeans if they decide to undertake operation.24

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22The Assembly of WEU, p. 63.
At the Cologne meeting of EU on 3 June 1999, the European leaders decided to make the EU a military power for the first time in its 42 year history, with command headquarters, staffs and forces of its own for peacekeeping and peace-making missions in future crises. Since the late 1999, a single foreign and security policy "czar" of EU has adopted the position to speak for EU on foreign and security matters. The "czar" is Javier Solana, whose post in NATO was occupied by George Robertson, former British Defence Secretary. Robertson has been one of the biggest supporters of NATO's Allied Powers Operation against Yugoslavia, launched on 24 March 1999.

5. The Future of the ESDI

ESDI is gradually ceasing to be a largely theoretical aspiration and turning into a concrete reality. For the first time in history, the Europeans now have the opportunity to build an ESDI. The Balkans bear witness to the failure of European security and defense policy. The ESDI gives hope that there will not be another such failure in the near future. Many people feel that the integration of European defense is inevitable and even a necessity. The ESDI is feasible and could prove enormously productive.

The Atlantic Alliance is singularly dependent on the steadfast support and understanding of the American and European public. But in the eve of the 21st century, public support for the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic will be tested as never before. The small group of diplomats, businessmen, lawyers and academicians who forged the mechanisms of post-war unity has largely passed from the scene in both Europe and the US. A new generation is assuming leadership, a generation whose foreign policy views were shaped more by the lessons of Vietnam than by the aggressions of Hitler and Stalin. The men and women who will increasingly control western parliaments, cabinets and political parties over the next years will give comparatively little thought to

25 The European leaders declared: "The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises." The New York Times, 4 June 1999.
why their fathers and grandfathers founded post-war institutions. Moreover, many of the original assumptions underlying those institutions no longer prevail. American and European perceptions outside of Europe are diverging as well.

Although Western Europe has achieved much in economic integration, it is that Europe even now may not often speak with one voice. The US often insists on Europe to have "only one telephone number" (a word for the first time used by Henry Kissinger). The ESDI is not directed against the US, but it does mean that one of its motives is the assertion of difference of a European way. In some way, the ESDI reflects constant struggle between the Europeanists and Atlanticists, between those who stress more on European way of defence and those who are in favour of strengthening transatlantic relationship. The Europeanists argue that the full members of WEU contribute some 65% of the NATO budget and the assets that is going to be used, are assets of their own. The Atlanticists do not really want a working ESDI. They fear the cost of developing distinct European defence capabilities. They fear the erosion of transatlantic relations and argue that Atlantic solidarity is as essential as ever in the turbulent new era, morally and strategically. So, there is still clear lack of the political will needed to give the ESDI a boost.

The ESDI is not idea that aims the foundation of "Fortress Europe". The US has encouraged the ESDI to protect NATO's cohesion and effectiveness, by reconciling greater European autonomy in security and defence matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic link. As British Prime-Minister Blair has stressed,

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27 Scott Syllivan, "The Decline of Europe," Newsweek, 9 April 1984, p. 44.
29 Some of Europeans are very sceptic of ESDI saying that "they are feeling like someone queuing up in front of a shop which was selling goods which were not yet available, and chatting to other people while standing in line. The product people were after was the ESDI. They were not sure how to go about getting it, but they were talking about it." A words expressed by Polish speaker at the Colloquy on ESDI, held by WEU Assembly in Madrid, 1998.
the real task for Europe is to improve its own capabilities to serve Alliance needs, not to create duplicative new institutions for their own sake. For all Europe's moves toward "independence" from the US, Europe's national defence budgets are shrinking and its huge military technological lag behind the US is widening every year. Although Western Europe's combined defence budgets add up to two-thirds of the Pentagon's, they yield less than a quarter of US deployable fighting strength. Europe's armies are for the most part not modernised and incapable of serious power projection.30

Europe will not be able to achieve parity with the US in defence capabilities without substantial effort, which it does not yet seem to be prepared to make. These realities cannot be ignored. There will be no real sharing of responsibilities between Europe and the US as long as the inequality in the means to act continues to increase and as long as the Europeans find it extremely difficult to agree on a definition of their common security and defence objectives.31 There would be no point in giving an institutional structure to a European defence identity within NATO if there were common "European" view on defence and security issues.

6. ESDI and Turkey

Turkey attaches particular importance to the Atlantic Alliance as the main pillar of the European security architecture. It has supported the adaptation of the Alliance to the new European security environment. In this context, it has supported calls for strengthened European role in the European defence and security decision-making process. However, it has put reservations to the shift of the European security and defence decision-making from NATO to EU, particularly to WEU.32 Turkey, sharing the same policy with the US, is against institutionalisation of the ESDI at the

32 Press Release Regarding the NATO Meetings to be held in Florence, No. 78/22, May 2000.
EU level.\textsuperscript{33} Instead, it sees ESDI as genuine and realistic approach to the strategic facts and requirements of an uncertain security environment.\textsuperscript{34}

Turkey is not a full member but an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU), to which the NATO capabilities are expected to be transferred to. However, legally the associate membership in the WEU does not have legal basis. The Brussels Treaty of 1948, which constitutes the basis for WEU, does not stipulate such a status of associate membership. This issue have been very much in the agenda of the NATO, EU and WEU with regard to the participation of the associate members to the future operations of the WEU.

Following the signing in 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty, which stipulated the integration of Petersberg tasks of WEU to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU,\textsuperscript{35} the holders of the associate membership in the WEU appealed to the EU and WEU to frame new structures where also the associate members will be able to participate in the future decision-making structures of the CFSP. Many critics of the associate membership has suggested different statuses for the non-EU members of NATO to be able to join the decision-making structures of the CFSP.\textsuperscript{36}

The issue acquired a new dimension when in the St. Malo Summit of British and French leaders in December 1998 as well as in Cologne Summit of the European Council in June 1999, was given a signal, as stipulated by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, for the merger of WEU with EU. The merger of the WEU with EU was

\textsuperscript{33}Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the Decision Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 17 July 2000 on ESDI and Common European Security and Defence Policy.


\textsuperscript{36}Münevver Cebeci, “A delicate Process of Participation: the question of participation of WEU Associate Members in the decision making for EU-led Petersberg operations, with special reference to Turkey,” Occasional Papers No. 10, ISS, November 1999, p. 3.
significant due to the danger of the deterioration of the position of the Associate Members in the WEU.

Turkey supports the strengthening of the WEU as long as it is aimed to strengthen the "European Pillar of NATO."\textsuperscript{37} However, with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, when the WEU was recognised as the integral part of the development of the EU, Turkey intensified its efforts to strengthen its status in the WEU and its efforts produced wanted results. In the WEU Erfurt Ministerial meeting on 18 December 1997, it was decided to facilitate the participation of associate members in individual operations of WEU. However, so far no decision has been made on the concrete structures.

Cebeci in her paper suggests three options of the associate members:

In the first option, WEU Associate Members may associate themselves unilaterally with CFSP decisions, and may accept EU direction without any involvement in the EU decision-making process. This option would reflect goodwill on the part of the Associate Members while freeing EU from any kind of commitment towards them. Therefore, it would be appropriate to think of this option rather as a transitional solution, which would pave the way for the WEU Associate Members to be further involved in the EU/CFSP framework in the future. Another option would be an arrangement between NATO and the EU that would set the conditions for non-EU Allies' participation. This would be a practical and institutional solution, but it would be confined only to operations carried out by the EU with the use of NATO assets and capabilities. The third option would be the involvement of the WEU Associate Members in the EU/CFSP framework through an Association Agreement.\textsuperscript{38}

Thus there is need for the solution of the problem on the future position of the Associate Members of the WEU in order to create genuine ESDI and CFSP. Any institutionalisation of the ESDI in the EU level, without participation of the European

\textsuperscript{37}"The Transatlantic Alliance: Turkey's Perspective," Speech delivered by former Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Çevik Bir, at Istanbul NAI Congress, May 1-3, 1998, in CIDC Insight Turkey No. 17, June 1998, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., p. 6-7.
members of NATO, will create new dividing lines in the map of the European security architecture.

There is a necessity for the comprehensive non-exclusionary entrance strategy of the EU's CFSP towards the non-EU members of the European continent.\(^{39}\) It would not be realistic to expect that the credible ESDI will be established without the Europeanisation of the security in the Central and Southeastern Europe. By the Europeanisation of the security, drawing from the definition made by Radelli,\(^{40}\) we mean the a) establishment, b) spread and c) institutionalisation of security and defence rules, paradigms, norms, beliefs and perceptions which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU security decisions and then transferred to the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies of the countries willing and able to contribute to the European peace and stability.

7. Conclusion

The new idea of creating genuine European defence and security system, i.e. ESDI, for the foreseeable future will continue to be developed within NATO. It may give way to other future formulas, which will hopefully have a better grasp of the realities of tomorrow. In NATO's southern region, the practical arrangements for the ESDI are already being developed. The existence of the Extraction Force in FYR of Macedonia, commanded by a French General, and manned by the French, Dutch, Italian, German, and British forces, as well as European Protection Corps in Kosovo, is certainly a positive sign in the development of an ESDI-style command arrangement.\(^{41}\) What needs to be decided how the Partner countries (the members of the NATO's program of Partnership for Peace) would be able to participate in the ESDI, and how will be relationship between ESDI and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The US is

\(^{39}\)David Buchan, "Solana hopes to add value to EU foreign policy-making", \textit{Financial Times}, 15 September 1999.


inevitably involved in the four corners of the world. American military and political will continue to dominate the peace and war issues. NATO so far has been sustained in every sense of the word by the US. Whether this is liked or not, the US needs Europe and Europe needs the US. Both sides, however, know that the new concept of ESDI will give a new shape to their partnership, the direction in which such partnership can be found has already been defined as "burden sharing." The Europeanisation of Europe needs not be seen as a threat. It is in fact quite normal development and even desirable by both sides of the Atlantic.