Abstract
The contribution aims at assessing the role and scope of the rule of law in the EU legal order before and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The investigation will consider both the internal and external dimensions of the principle with a view to appraise the current state of the art in terms of the applicable legal framework, single out its main criticalities, and review future perspectives for its affirmation and promotion.
The rule of law acts as a fundamental value for the institutions and the Member States. It operates as a parameter of legality of EU acts and as a guiding principle, but it also represents an important leverage in terms of political pressure, both within and outside the Union.

On these premises, the remainder of this contribution is structured as follows. Firstly, the relevant legal framework is examined in light of the applicable case law. Secondly, the attention focuses on the protection of the rule of law when there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State. Thirdly, the main instruments for the promotion of the rule of law in the context of the EU’s external action are reviewed in order to assess the true potential of the principle in this area. Lastly, some final remarks summarize the current shortcomings and outline future perspectives for the protection and promotion of the rule of law in and outside the Union.

The legal framework for the protection of the rule of law in the European Union

The rule of law is enshrined in the preamble and Art. 6 TEU, as well as in the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as a general principle of the EU legal order. However, departing from the phrasing of most national constitutional provisions, the new Art. 2 TEU qualifies it as a value. In this regard, Laurent Pech convincingly observes that “by distinguishing the rule of law from other foundational principles, Art. 2 TEU may seem to suggest the adoption of a narrow and predominantly formal understanding of the rule of law (i.e. judicial review, principle of legality, hierarchy of norms, etc.)”, but “an evolution towards a more expansive and substantive understanding can be

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1 Art. 2 TEU reads: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (emphasis added).
In particular, the institutions, and Member States when implementing EU law, are required to respect more substantive requirements in exercising their respective competences, and most notably fundamental rights. Nevertheless, no exhaustive definition of the rule of law is offered in primary or secondary law.


4 To be honest the rule of law is never precisely defined by national constitutions either. On the rule of law and its constitutional relevance, see generally (also for further references), Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004 and Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, “The Significance of the Rule of Law and its Implications for the European Union and the
The rule of law was not (expressly) mentioned in the original version of the treaties and was not codified until Maastricht. Primary law did, however, foresee the possibility to challenge acts adopted by the institutions, either directly or through the preliminary reference mechanism, and to review the compatibility of national measures and practices with EC law. Moreover, in compliance with (what are now) Arts. 258 and 259 TFEU, the European Commission or a Member State could bring a Member State directly before the Court of Justice contesting a breach of EU law.

As is well known, the first reference to the principle can be found in the 1986 Les Verts judgment. In this instance, the Court of Justice recognized that the European Economic Community was a Community based on the rule of law, “inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty”. This precedent effectively opened a new era in the European integration process, as the Court progressively moved from a formal, “thin” conception to a more substantive, “thick” understanding of the rule of law.

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5 Art. 6 TFEU.
6 Cf. Arts. 263 and 267 TFEU.
7 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166
8 Ibid., para 23.
Space constraints impede an exhaustive analysis of the relevant case law and how it impacted on the subsequent treaty reforms. Nonetheless, it appears useful to briefly outline the main criticalities which have emerged over time and to verify whether they have been successfully tackled. Among the many that could be addressed, the following discussion will focus on two aspects in particular, namely: judicial review and political control.\textsuperscript{10}

As to the former, there are at least four innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty which are noteworthy for our present purposes: the repeal of the pillar structure, the binding force attributed to the Charter of Fundamental rights, the new formulation of Art. 263 TFEU and the possibility to challenge individual acts adopted in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereinafter, CFSP).

Proceeding in orderly fashion, with the expiry of the transitional period (1 December 2014) the unified structure of the Union has effectively attributed to the Court of Justice jurisdiction over former third pillar acts (on judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters), including rules for the abolition of controls on persons at the Union’s internal borders.\textsuperscript{11}

Secondly, Art. 47 CFR guarantees individuals full and effective judicial protection and can be invoked to secure the rule of law


independently of *ad hoc* provisions in secondary legislation, or domestic law.\textsuperscript{12}

Thirdly, natural and legal persons have been recognized standing when challenging acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union and, more generally, regulatory acts of direct concern to them and that do not entail implementing measures.\textsuperscript{13} Yet, individuals are prevented from contesting the validity of legislative measures with a general scope of application, save when they can demonstrate that they are individually concerned.\textsuperscript{14} This notwithstanding, the Union is believed to guarantee full and effective judicial protection. On the one side, judicial review can be limited without necessarily infringing the rule of law. On the other side, both the Court of Justice (hereinafter, CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights consider that the objection of


\textsuperscript{13} In Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:625 the Court clarified that the expression “regulatory act” should be understood as a non-legislative act of general application (paras 45-61).

illegality and the preliminary ruling procedure are capable of remedying this deficit.  

Fourthly, although CFSP provisions, as well as acts adopted on the basis of those provisions, are excluded from the jurisdiction of the CJEU, Art. 275(2) TFEU empowers the Court of Justice to scrutinize the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council under the CFSP.

That being said, it is now time to turn our attention to the second aspect mentioned above, i.e. political control. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam – mainly in view of the enlargement process – inserted a new Art. 7 TEU allowing the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government on a proposal by 1/3 of the Member States or by the Commission, to unanimously determine, with the assent of the European Parliament, a serious and persistent breach of the principles of democracy and the rule of law, as well as of fundamental rights on the part of a Member State even outside the areas covered by EU law. Subsequently, acting by a qualified majority the Council could suspend certain of the rights (but not the obligations) deriving from the application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, including the voting rights in the Council.

As a consequence, a new Art. 49 TEU subjected membership to the respect of these principles. Following the notorious ‘Haider affair’, the Nice Treaty (2000) extended the application of Art. 7

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16 For the sake of completeness it should be noted that within the institutional framework designed by the Lisbon Treaty this power has been transferred to the European Council.

17 On that occasion EU leaders resorted to fourteen bilateral coordinated moves, including the suspension of contacts with Austrian government officials, the withdrawal of EU support for Austrian applications for senior positions in international organizations, and the absence of contacts with Austrian ambassadors. See further Lucia S. Rossi, “La ‘reazione comune’ degli Stati membri dell’Unione europea nel caso Haider”, Eine Europäische Erregung: Die “Sanktionen” der Vierzhen
TEU to situations where there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of EU values. This prevention mechanism, activated on a reasoned proposal by 1/3 of the Member States, the Commission or the European Parliament, requires a 4/5 majority within the Council and the approval of the European Parliament.

When elaborating the provision, however, the Member States deliberately limited the Court’s jurisdiction to the sole review of the ‘purely procedural stipulations’ in Article 7. This second aspect (i.e. political control) is worthy of further consideration and will be resumed shortly hereafter.

To complete these preliminary remarks, it should not be forgotten that since 1992, the rule of law also represents a key objective of the Union’s foreign policy and is an integral part of the Development cooperation policy. And the Lisbon Treaty has made the consolidation and support of the rule of law and human rights a core objective of the CFSP. In this sense, a sort of parallelism has been created between the internal and external dimensions of the principle, insofar as

the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.


18 Art. 269(1) TFEU.
19 Cf. former Arts. J.1(2) TEU and 130U TEC.
To this end the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, as well as develop relations and partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organizations.21

Protecting and promoting the rule of law within the European Union

To resume our discussion on political control and Art. 7 TEU, we turn to the existence of disquieting internal situations posing a threat to the founding principles of Art. 2 TEU. In this respect, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and, last but certainly not least, Hungary represent perhaps the most visible examples. Structural weaknesses due to organized crime, corruption, or a weak judiciary can be said to be the common denominator.22 With specific reference to Hungary, the Orban government removed the four-fifths vote rule to approve constitutional amendments in Parliament with a two-thirds majority of all MPs with the following results: the number of constitutional judges was increased from eight to fifteen with seven new positions filled with ‘friendly’ candidates; the Constitutional Court is only allowed to review procedural validity of new amendments; the Election Commission, entrusted with the power to control referendum initiatives, was re-shaped; the Media Council was created to assist the Media Authority (which had previously been set up under EU law to protect pluralism) and the president of the latter was substituted with an affiliated individual. The list could be expanded.23

23 A detailed analysis of the constitutional reforms in Hungary is offered by Bojan Bugarić, “Protecting Democracy and the Rule of Law in the
This state of affairs undermines the very foundations of the EU legal order. As stressed by the European Commission in the Communication of 2014 “A new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law”: “the confidence of all EU citizens and national authorities in the functioning of the rule of law is particularly vital for the further development of the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers. This confidence will only be built and maintained if the rule of law is observed in all Member States”.\(^\text{24}\)

So how did the EU react to the deficiencies? In 2012 the Commission initiated a number of proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU against Hungary and expressed serious concern “over the compatibility of the Fourth Amendment to the Hungarian Fundamental Law with EU legislation and with the principle of the rule of law”.\(^\text{25}\) In July 2013 the European Parliament adopted the so-called Tavares report, which heavily criticizes the state of fundamental rights in Hungary and recommends the establishment of an independent mechanism (i.e. a high level expert body) to monitor the development of fundamental rights and report back to institutions and member states on the level of compliance with EU values.\(^\text{26}\) In addition, the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands sent a letter to the Presidency of the Council stating that:

At this critical stage in European history, it is crucially important that the fundamental values enshrined in the European treaties be vigorously protected. The EU must be extremely watchful whenever they are put at risk anywhere within its borders. And it


\(^{25}\) Ibid., at 4.

must be able to react swiftly and effectively to ensure compliance with its most basic principles.\textsuperscript{27}

However, no use was made of the mechanism set up in Art. 7 TEU. In truth, while the infringement action and the preliminary ruling mechanism are far too case-specific, the procedure designed in Art. 7 TEU is \textit{in concreto} of little or no avail. On the one side, it requires a threat of particular gravity – the notion of which, however, remains far from clear – and duration on the other, the majorities prescribed therein are very difficult to reach.

Hence, what could be done to ensure a more effective control over internal axiomatic and systemic deviances without impinging on the principles of conferral and subsidiarity and without breaching the obligation to respect national constitutional identities? Firstly, it is worth considering the institutional perspective.

In the aforementioned 2014 Communication, the Commission proposed a framework to be activated whenever national “rule of law safeguards” do not seem capable of effectively addressing those threats. In the presence of clear indications of a systemic threat to the rule of law in a Member State, the Commission could initiate a structured exchange with that Member State. The process would comprise three phases: 1) assessment of the situation on the basis of information collected by specialized bodies such as the Agency for Fundamental Rights, and of the dialogue with the Member State concerned, in compliance with the principle of equal treatment of Member States (assessment – “rule of law opinion”); 2) if necessary, indication of swift and concrete actions to address the systemic threat and to avoid the use of the mechanism laid down in Art. 7 TEU (reasoned recommendation); 3) verification of compliance with the indicated solutions (follow-up). In the event of no satisfactory follow-up to the recommendation by the Member State concerned within the

\textsuperscript{27} The full text of the letter can be found at: <www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/brieven/2013/03/13/brief-aan-europese-commissie-over-opzetten-rechtsstatelijkheidsmechanisme/brief-aan-europese-commissie-over-opzetten-rechtsstatelijkheidsmechanisme.pdf> (access date: 25 July 2015).
time limit set, the Commission would then assess the possibility of activating one of the mechanisms set out in Art. 7 TEU.\textsuperscript{28}

Despite the potential added value of the Communication, the Legal Service of the Council excluded the possibility to create a new procedure outside the existing framework of the treaties. This assessment was endorsed by the Council in its Conclusion of 16 December 2014, which, however, accepted the complementary nature of the two instruments and underlined the need to engage in a friendly discussion with the Member State concerned.\textsuperscript{29} As a matter of fact, an annual dialogue will be established “among the Member States within the Council to promote and safeguard the rule of law in the framework of the Treaties”. The conclusions, nonetheless, cautiously signal that the dialogue: a) will be based on the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equal treatment of all Member States; b) will be conducted on a non-partisan and evidence-based approach; c) will be without prejudice to the principle of conferred competences; d) will respect the national identities of the Member States; e) shall observe the principle of sincere cooperation.

Secondly, in a \textit{de iure condendo} perspective, it is useful to review some of the most prominent doctrinal positions on how to enhance the protection of the rule of law within the Union. Lucia Serena Rossi, for instance, suggests that the European Council, acting by a qualified majority upon a proposal of 1/3 of the Member States or the Commission, should be allowed to issue binding decisions indicating the concrete measures to be adopted in order to remedy systemic deficiencies in the domestic legal order. Failure to respect such a decision could lead to an infringement procedure (with the possibility to impose financial sanctions on the interested Member State pursuant to Art. 260 TFEU) and, in the worst possible scenario, to expulsion.

\textsuperscript{28} The European Parliament and the Council would be kept regularly and closely informed of progress made in each of the stages. In addition, the Commission would, as a rule and in appropriate cases, seek the advice of the Council of Europe and/or its Venice Commission.

\textsuperscript{29} Council of the European Union, General Affairs, 16 December 2014, doc. 16936/14, p. 21.
(although, for reasons of democratic legitimacy, national parliaments should also be involved).\textsuperscript{30}

According to Floris De Witte, instead, it would be advisable to establish an \textit{ad hoc} Commission (so-called Copenhagen Commission), a body of experts empowered to make a binding proposal leading automatically to the opening of the procedure where the Court would be using a “Copenhagen Charter”, defining the minimum requirements for a functioning pluralist democracy; \textit{de facto} a legal standard for assessing possible violations. Subsequently, the European Council and the European Parliament, would be called to vote on the matter and decide upon the applicable sanctions.\textsuperscript{31} In this regard, Müller argues that following a negative advice of the Copenhagen Commission, the European Commission “should be required to cut funds for state capital expenditure, for instance, or impose significant fines”.\textsuperscript{32}

Above and beyond their merits, these valuable and ambitious proposals would require a modification of the treaties and, thus, unanimity. But in a fairly recent contribution, with an appreciable attempt to put meat on the bones of Art. 7, von Bogdandy suggests that the reluctance to pursue ‘internal fundamental rights issues’ – opting for a more technical approach, essentially relying on internal market violations – could be compensated by an extensive reading of citizens’ rights. More concretely, building upon the \textit{Zambrano} case law, so the argument goes, it would be possible for nationals of the Member States, even in the absence of movement, to contest before the CJEU, via the preliminary ruling mechanism, the deprivation of


“the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union” when ever “systemic deficiency” materializes in a given Member State. Space constraints impede an in-depth analysis of the reasoning conducted by the author. Suffice it here to report the following passage:

We are taking that jurisprudence one step further and propose to basically define this “substance” with reference to the essence of fundamental rights enshrined in Article 2 TEU. This standard applies to public authority throughout the European legal space. Consequently, a violation by a Member State, even in purely internal situations, can be considered an infringement of the substance of Union citizenship. In order to preserve constitutional pluralism, which is protected by Article 4(2) TEU, we suggest framing this as a “reverse” Solange doctrine, applied to the Member States from the European level. This can be put briefly as follows: beyond the scope of Article 51(1) CFREU Member States remain autonomous in fundamental rights protection as long as it can be presumed that they ensure the essence of fundamental rights enshrined in Article 2 TEU. However, should it come to the extreme constellation that a violation is to be seen as systemic, this presumption is rebutted. In such a case, individuals can rely on their status as Union citizens to seek redress before national courts. In

The presumption that assists the Member States could be rebutted only in presence of “major operational problems that lead to a systemic violation of European fundamental rights”. In

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33 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, para 42.
other words, “simple and isolated fundamental rights infringements” would not qualify. 36

Although certainly suggestive, this solution seems to underestimate the impact of structural deficiencies on domestic courts and the risk of governmental non-compliance based on alleged breaches of the national identity pursuant to Art. 4(2) TEU. 37

That being said, nothing in primary law prevents the Commission, as the guardian of the treaties, to bring an infringement action against a Member State for breach of the values listed in Art. 2 TEU. While it can be argued that the procedure laid down in Art. 7 TEU operates as a lex specialis, 38 it is not impossible to construe the two enforcement mechanisms as additional and complementary; the latter being applicable only where the former “becomes insufficient to address a systematic threat to the values of Art. 2 TEU”. 39 As previously seen, the Commission and the Member States appear to share this interpretation. This is why, at least for the time being, von Bogdandy’s suggestion – albeit politically very demanding, merely additional, and not necessarily effective – is perhaps the more practicable response to the current value-control impasse.

The European Union as an ‘exporter’ of the rule of law at the international level

Let us now briefly dwell on the external dimension of the rule of law. As a foreign policy objective, the principle operates as a mild

36 Ibid., p. 513. See also J. Werner Müller, “Should the EU Protect Democracy…”, p. 155.
38 This view is supported by the fact that the CJEU has only been assigned limited jurisdiction over serious violations of such values.
This is mainly due to the lack of any formal definition in primary law and in EU policy reports. Moreover, there is no codified list of minimum requirements to be met and no general benchmarks or indicators to carry out the relevant compatibility assessments.

Despite these important legal vacuums, in order to export the rule of law abroad the Union relies on both soft instruments and legally binding unilateral and bilateral instruments. Pursuant to Art. 21 TEU (and in line with the principle of coherence affirmed therein), the idea is to promote a thick and holistic understanding of the rule of law, which ultimately requires: effective and accessible means of legal redress; independent and impartial tribunals; an institutional framework ensuring that governments are subject to the law; the repression of corruption and fraud; and, from a more substantive viewpoint, the effective protection of fundamental rights.

Firstly, the Union intervenes via soft law instruments such as conclusions, resolutions and public declarations calling upon national governments to observe the EU’s values, or simply acknowledging and praising them for developments in the relevant areas. Non-legally binding guidelines have also been issued. In addition, a number of so-called human rights dialogues (around forty at present) with third countries have been established.

Secondly, the EU intervenes on the international scene by means of unilateral trade instruments, which, inter alia, offer additional trade preferences in the case of ratification and implementation by the most vulnerable developing countries of international conventions on human and labor rights, environmental

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42 A complete list of the ongoing dialogues can be found at <http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/dialogues/index_en.htm>.
protection and good governance. At the same time, temporary withdrawal of trade preferences is possible in the event of serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down therein, which, however, only implicitly refer to the rule of law.

Thirdly, the EU has resorted to technical and financial assistance instruments to contribute “to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and of respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms”. These instruments also foresee suspension clauses. The latter can be activated by the EU Council for breach of the rule of law.

Fourthly, the EU has concluded with third countries and international organizations a number of trade, cooperation, dialogue, partnership or association agreements which contain a ‘human rights clause’. Normally, these agreements also include a suspension (or non-execution) in case of non-compliance or abuse. As a matter of fact, starting with the Cotonou agreement of 2000 with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries) the rule of law has also become an ‘essential element’, together with democracy and respect for human rights, of any agreement of this type. In accordance with the latter Agreement (as last amended in 2010), which is assumed to be

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44 This occurred, for instance, with Myanmar/Burma and Belarus.


46 Ibid., art. 21.


48 Council Decision 2010/648/EU on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean
the model for all (substantive) human rights clauses, either party may withdraw from the agreement or take ‘appropriate measures’ when the other party fails to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law (the agreement’s ‘essential elements’) or in the case where a party is guilty of a serious violation of one of these essential elements. For countries such as China, the prospect of including such a clause in any new partnership-cooperation agreement with the EU has put on hold the conclusion of a new treaty on Economic and Cooperation Agreement.49

More recently, the EU Council released the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019.50 The document underlines the improved “mainstreaming of human rights across the EU’s external action”, but also calls for further efforts in “strengthening good governance and the rule of law through support to the separation of powers, independence and accountability of democratic institutions”. Most notably, the EU Council insists on the need, by 2016, to:

(e) improve coherence in the application of human rights clauses which are systematically included in all new EU international agreements.

(f) support the ongoing development of human rights indicators undertaken by the OHCHR with a view to: (i) facilitating measurement of the realisation of human rights, including online publication of indicators at global level, and (ii) systematising compilation and use of HR and surveying good practices and lessons learned.


(g) engage systematically with the UN and with the regional organisations (e.g. AU, OAS, LAS, CoE, OSCE, ASEAN, SAARC, PIF) on best practices for human rights and the strengthening of democracy in all regions.\textsuperscript{51}

This passage of the Action Plan demonstrates that the EU Council is well aware of the current limits affecting the EU’s foreign policy aimed at promoting human rights protection and strengthening democracy worldwide. The elaboration of standardized benchmarks and indicators aligned with the best practices elaborated at the international level is evidently considered to be a priority.

Final remarks

The EU embraces the rule of law as a founding value and offers a high level of protection to individuals. In accordance with the findings of the CJEU in its seminal \textit{Kadi} ruling,\textsuperscript{52} the rule of law can claim a supra-constitutional status in the sense that all other principles should be read and applied in conformity therewith.\textsuperscript{53} However, a thorough examination of its constitutional legal order reveals some important shortcomings, mainly ascribable to the

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 31.
\textsuperscript{53} However, not all commentators would agree with this reading. See, in particular, Laurent Pech, “A Union Founded on the Rule of Law…”, p. 365.
nature of this complex supranational entity, which – at the end of
the day – remains an international organization.

To begin with, the absence of any specific competence in the field
of fundamental rights explains the lack of a special remedy
available to individuals. The issue has been advocated and
extensively discussed during the Convention which led to the
signature of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004\textsuperscript{54} and is even more
topical now that the Court of Justice has rejected the agreement
on the accession of the EU to the ECHR.\textsuperscript{55}

Furthermore, the Court of Justice lacks jurisdiction over CFSP
measures (besides those directly impinging on individuals).
Taking in due account the (long-lasting effects) of Opinion 2/13,
this is particularly alarming as it risks jeopardizing the overall
legitimacy of the EU’s external action. In this regard, it is worth
insisting on the circumstance that the rule of law is not only
essential in shaping and upholding the very identity of the
European Union; it is also crucial for economic development. If
coherently observed and promoted, it is capable of creating a
favorable business environment and investment climate.

With specific reference to what we identified as the internal
dimension, Art. 2 TUE postulates the avoidance of any systemic

\textsuperscript{54} The European Convention, Final Report of Working Group II
‘Incorporation of the Charter/accession to the ECHR’, CONV 354/02,
22 Oct. 2002, p. 15. A similar proposal had already been advanced in the
Report by Mr. Tindemans to the European Council, Bulletin of the

\textsuperscript{55} Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014 on the accession of the European
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. For a
critical assessment of the Opinion, see Jean-Paul Jacqué, “Non à
l’adhésion à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme?”,
<www.droit-union-europeenne.be/412337458> (access date: 23 July
2015); Editorial comments, “The EU’s Accession to the ECHR – a
“NO” from the ECJ!”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 52, No 1
Opinion 2/13 Objects to Draft Agreement on Accession of the EU
to the European Convention on Human Rights”, European Human Rights
deficiency within the Member States while observing the principles of equality and national identity affirmed in Art. 4(2) TEU, as well as the principle of conferral stated in Art. 5(1) TEU. Although for legal and political reasons Art. 7 TEU is far from effective, it remains the best option and there are ways to ensure compliance independently of structural reforms that would require treaty amendments. Nevertheless, the current discrepancies between pre- and post-accession assessments must be eliminated, and it appears that the CJEU might, once again, be called upon to play a major role in securing the effet utile of EU law.

On the other hand, the Union has not followed a linear path in its foreign relations, which is very difficult to combine with the principle of coherence stated in Art. 21(1) TEU. Indeed, in the absence of a comprehensive instrument to objectively ascertain the observance of the rule of law, the institutions have developed a country-specific approach in pre-accession negotiations and human rights conditionality for association agreements and other international trade and cooperation agreements. In this regard, although it will be conceded that the EU can only play a regional, and therefore limited, role in the current international environment (as opposed to the Council of Europe and the United Nations), the adoption of indicators and minimum legal requirements – possibly modelled on the Venice Commission’s “Checklist for evaluating the state of the rule of law in single states” – seems to be essential. These of course could (and


58 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Report on the Rule of Law, Study No. 512 / 2009,
should) vary depending on whether the interested third countries want to conclude a commercial agreement or apply for accession. But a case-by-case approach must be avoided for the sake of credibility. As indicated, the recent adoption of the EU Action Plan for 2015-2020 seems to point in the right direction.

Be it as it may, future developments should be encouraged, promoted and monitored attentively. Indeed, it appears that a lot still needs to be done in order to fully comply with the ambitious goals declared in Lisbon just over five years ago.

Strasbourg, 4 April 2011. The Report includes six assessment chapters (legality, legal certainty, prohibition of arbitrariness, access to justice before independent and impartial courts, respect for human rights, non-discrimination) with specific questions to be addressed/answered. In relation to prohibition of arbitrariness, for instance: are there specific rules prohibiting arbitrariness? Are there limits to discretionary power? Is there a system of full publicity of government information? Are reasons required for decisions?