BOOK REVIEWS


An account of Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the founder and first president of the Turkish Republic, written from outside the Turkish world is very welcome - though in this case, long immersion in the study of Turkish history and politics entitles the British savant, Andrew Mango, to honorary membership. Mango joined the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1947 and was for fourteen years in charge or broadcasts in Turkish. He retired in 1986 as Head of south European and French Language Services. He has since been engaged full-time in the study of Turkish affairs. The former publisher of Turkey Confidential, a monthly newsletter on Turkish questions, Mango visits Turkey several times a year. He lectures and writes fluently in Turkish. Atatürk is a mature work of scholarship, crafted over many years. It is a splendid culmination on Mango's long interest in Turkey.

This vintage study admirably addresses the needs of English-speaking readers for whom it is primarily written, but it also has value for all those interested in the deeds of the last great Turk on the world stage. Its outstanding characteristics are its balanced sympathy for its subject and its astute empathy, which is no small accomplishment, for Atatürk is no easy topic for a biographer. The book, however, is not only a biography but also a political history of modern Turkey.
The volume is organised both chronologically and thematically. It is divided into five parts and twenty-nine chapters. Part One provides relevant details about Atatürk's family, educational background and formative years. Part Two investigates the place of the Tripolitanian, Balkan and the First World Wars in the Turkish leader's career and examines their impact on him. Part Three deals with the battles of the Turkish War of Independence, relates developments leading up to the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty and points out the special significance of this legal instrument to Turkey's future. Part Four treats the proclamation of the Republic and the subsequent launching of Westernising reforms. Attention is also concentrated on the maintenance of law and order in the country. Part Five discussed the economic and foreign policies of the Turkish leadership. Finally, the author gives a summary of observations and conclusions about the various aspects of Atatürk's personality and works.

The analysis of each of the above themes is well documented, for Mango has explored in depth the voluminous official speeches, statements, circulars and telegrams of Atatürk. Apposite references to contemporary books and articles complement this use of government publications. Yet, the adopted approach is not entirely satisfactory. Unfortunately Turkish Presidential and General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate's archives, the proceedings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and papers of the Republican People's Party, as well as pertinent foreign archival material are not utilised. Curiously, the writer does not appear to have used important Atatürk biographies in French and German, with the sole exception of Alexandre Jevakhoff's Kemal Atatürk: Les Chemins de l'Occident (Paris, 1989).

Mango's reflective life-sized portrait is based largely on published Turkish sources, which until now have never been adequately checked, compared and collated. Mango is fully conversant with the large secondary literature on Atatürk and the views of recent admirers and detractors. The author is at the same time well acquainted with Turkish biographers' works on Atatürk and thoughtfully compares his own interpretations with theirs. The investigation suggests creative ways of analysing existing information to provide insights enabling readers to better comprehend the life and times of one of the greatest figures of the twentieth century. Here is by far the most thorough scrutiny of
Atatürk in the English language and an absorbing biography in its own right. It is written in a fine and straightforward style, with touches of humour but no sentimentality. Although long (666 pages) the narrative is always lucid.

Mango ably looks at the range of Atatürk's activities and accomplishments in all its variety - soldier, diplomat, politician and statesman. The resulting evaluations are not in themselves particularly novel but their tone is judicious and considered. The author brings out the extraordinary feats of Atatürk's career. He stresses that few could have predicted the extent of the Turkish army's victory over the Greeks in 1922 and the ensuing diplomatic triumph at Lausanne the following year. Besides Atatürk, Mango paints lively and spirited sketches of Turkish statesmen and military commanders of the period: İsmet İnönü, Fevzi Çakmak, Rauf Orbay, Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Refet Bele. For those who are familiar with the story, very little is new in the book; it goes over well-trodden ground and is mostly based on earlier scholarship. However, the author challenges, elucidates, and contextualises his sources and the reader is offered a wealth of original ideas and reinterpretations. The tome is also very readable and is packed with details, some edifying, some less so, but none spurious. The writer is inevitably controversial and polemical in many of his assumptions.

This is a stimulating and provocative work. While Mango's assessments of Atatürk may not be fully accepted in all quarters, it is safe to say that they will become a central feature of scholarly debate and that this book will take its place as an imperative source for all future studies of this great statesman. Mango has written an unusually penetrating book and has done so with erudition and zest, even if the possible explanations for Atatürk's success in foreign policy, such as the signing of the Montreux Straits Convention, which enabled the re-establishment of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits, and the inclusion of Hatay within Turkey, might be probed further. Why he acted as he did, principled or pragmatic, requires closer attention. The survey also makes no attempt to examine the special links between domestic and foreign policy.

The book includes a selected bibliography, a detailed index, useful biographical notes, maps, chronology, though not prints,
cartoons, charts and documents, as appendices. Copious footnotes supply invaluable bibliographical information. An appealing assortment of illustrations enhances the volume, as does its dust jacket. The photographs are sufficiently fascinating to cause one to regret that more were not included. The tome is handsomely printed. This reviewer did not find a single typo.

The few careless factual errors pertaining to the positions, surnames, dates and places that creep into the text are insignificant. For instance, Hasan Rıza Soyak, Secretary-General of the Presidency, was not appointed representative of the Turkish community in the Sanjak of İskenderun (Hatay), but Atatürk charged him with following up the affairs of that district in Ankara (p. 507); Atatürk’s aide-de-camp’s surname was Gürer and not Gürler (pp. 162 and 177); the first genuinely free elections in the history of the republic were not held on 2 May but 14 May 1950 (p. 531); the Bedirhan family was not paramount in Diyarbakır but in the Bitlis area (p. 249); and so on. My corrections of a number of minor and imprecise details do not, however, detract from the book nor vitiate my earlier praise. They should not obscure the important fact that this inquiry gives the clearest view yet of Atatürk’s entire life. Mango, whose admiration for Atatürk is obvious, has convincingly given the life and achievements of this remarkable statesman a new human dimension. To Mango’s credit, he has not followed the general trend of depicting him in mythic proportions. After reading this perceptive book, one has a better understanding of his character and his overwhelming dedication to the progress and welfare of the Turkish nation.

Mango should be commended for undertaking a reassessment of Atatürk in a vivid and analytical fashion. There are numerous works on Atatürk in Turkish, English and other languages, but none to my knowledge approaches this major personage with such a steady eye and gift for interpretation. Certain points of judgement aside, his inquiry is informative, fair-minded and enlightening. The author has produced a sophisticated assessment which is sympathetic but not sycophantic, critical on occasion but not iconoclastic and one which is a useful addition to Atatürk studies. No serious student of Turkish history of this period should ignore Mango’s outstanding book. This is in all respects an excellent reference work that should be on the shelf of every decent library. This capable study is well worth reading. The
book makes demands on the reader, but it repays the effort in full measure. The work is authoritative and indispensable, but it is not the last word on the subject. No doubt much more remains to be said and written about the creator of modern Turkey.

YÜCEL GÜÇLİ*

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James Pettifer, a Balkan scholar, was educated at Oxford and has done extensive journalism, writing on Balkan affairs for The Independent, as well as The Economist, The Times and The Wall Street Journal. He was one of the first English language writers to live in Albania and has co-authored a book, with Miranda Vickers, entitled *Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity*. He is currently Visiting Professor at the Institute of Balkan Studies, University of Thessaloniki. His other books include *The Greeks* (Penguin, 1966) and *Blue Guide to Albania* (1996).

His latest offering is a rich and rambling look at contemporary Turkey, based on his travel observations; it is a half journalistic, half scholarly book with a heavy Balkan bias in its analysis of Turkey's historical heritage. "A heritage at the heart of the future of Europe" according to Pettifer, mainly due to the war in former Yugoslavia.

A discussion of the contradictions which prevent Turkey from making the best of its European heritage and the problems that have weakened its long standing effort at Western style modernization take up much of the book. Unfortunately, Pettifer's

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In so far as Pettifer comes to grips with the formidable tensions of Turkish modernization and the recent and quite radical Islamic challenge to it, I found his approach rather perceptive and original. His astute analysis of "Atatürk's secular and modernizing heritage" rightly leads him to conclude, for example, that "the complex and incomplete political achievement" of Atatürk remains to a large extent culturally incomplete as well. "It is no wonder that Islam is reviving when the mosque is the only social centre... providing the only possibility of intellectual exchange or cultural dignity". Economically "The dynamism of İstanbul is based on ruthless exploitation of labour and the ethics and employment practices of the ant heap". He starkly concludes that "the technocratic future seems to offer many Turks little compared to the Islamic and Ottoman past. The singular power of Refah (the Islamist party) is embodied in its understanding of this reality".

He has also rightly identified an emerging rift between the political aspiration to the European ideal and the public's realization that "the struggle and sacrifice of the post-war period have not resulted in Turkish leaders being able to articulate the national interest very successfully within the traditional Western framework".

Frequently in the book, Pettifer's knowledge of the Balkans leads him to draw interesting and sometimes illuminating parallels, such as his comparision of the islamist Refah (Welfare) Party of Erbakan to Papandreou's PASOK ("Both new parties arose at a time when the public was disillusioned with the old parties"); or indeed his comparision of the Kurdish imbroglio with Greece's slavic paranoia. Pettifer is also right on the mark when he observes that the legacy of nationalism, with its "racial assumptions" is "a propound handicap to modern Turkey."

He is quite perceptive in discussing much of Turkey's contemporary tensions through the symbolic but very real divide between the capital Ankara, with its monolithic official mentality, and İstanbul, with its cosmopolitan and pluralistic reach. In his discussion of the Ankara-İstanbul divide, Pettifer has correctly
identified a cultural and political fault-line that runs across the most important issues that occupy Turkey at the moment, be it the mostly military struggle with Kurdish terrorism in the Southeast, or the related abuses of human rights and the difficult legacy of the 1980 coup. Always, the security obsessed, inward looking and heavily statist tradition of Ankara clashes with the more liberalizing, outward looking vision of Istanbul regarding the future of the country.

Nowhere is this divide more clear, or better discussed by Pettifer, than in the analysis of Turkey’s economy. Despite some radical moves and much rhetoric in the direction of economic liberalization during the Özal years, Pettifer rightly argues that Turkey’s pattern of state capitalism still obstructs the development of a real business culture. "The weak link remains the limited development of finance capital" according to Pettifer; big business still relies too much on protection from the old planned economy for its success and whenever the going is too tough it is "quick to seek the protective canopy of the Turkish state". Radical economic thinking, with its emphasis on widespread privatization, still encounters stiff resistance from Ankara.

Although The Turkish Labyrinth is full of interesting arguments and observations on Turkey’s problems, whether it be the Cyprus question or the role of the military in political life, none of this adds up to a coherent whole; the book is not more than the sum of its parts, though some of those parts are indeed very informative and frequently illuminating.

Pettifer’s book was lambasted by Professor Norman Stone in a review in the Spectator (16 August 1997), entitled Spot The Errors; Stone argued that Pettifer "attempts an anti-Turkish essay" and deemed the book only fit to be thrown in the Sea of Marmara, mainly due to a number of factual mistakes on place names or historical and geographical detail. Elsewhere in the British press, it has had brief but mainly positive comment. In Turkey his rather objective, even sympathetic view of the Islamist Welfare Party is bound to produce some negative reaction.

At the beginning of the book Pettifer whimsically draws a portrait of a loyal Turkish bureaucrat who laments that "it is very difficult to be Turkish" given the ever present threats the country is
surrounded with; he ends the book on an elegiac mood, stating that "The great theme of Turkey is betrayal of hope and promises." In between, he argues that Turkey's political problem "can only be solved in a European context, if it is capable of solution", but his own analysis provides no real hope in that direction. Nevertheless, his book should serve many a foreigner, European or otherwise, to shed considerable prejudice or ignorance of Turkey and provide a useful introduction to its many complexities.

NİLÜFER KUYAŞ*

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By virtue of its geopolitical and strategic location, Cyprus has played an important role in international relations throughout history. It has been subjected to many invasions and, as such, its name has consistently been associated with "question".

The strategic position of Cyprus also activated the interest of the Ottoman Empire towards the end of the sixteenth century and, with the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1570, Venetian rule ended. The Ottoman Empire's direct sovereignty over Cyprus lasted 308 years from 1570. The İstanbul government, in line with developments at that juncture in world history, had to cede the island to the British, subject to certain conditions.

Britain, which had initially wanted Cyprus as a military base, exercised sovereignty over the island from 1878 until 1960. In the

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1950s, when Cyprus again became an international issue, Britain accepted independence for the island and, in 1960, on the formal establishment of a Cypriot state, Britain withdrew. To correctly analyse the Cyprus question, which still confronts us as an international issue, we have to look into its historical roots and characteristics; advancing views without a knowledge of history will not shed light on that history.

This book endeavours to serve this purpose and it looks into the Ottoman's transfer of the island to Britain, which can be considered the beginning of the "Cyprus Question", as we know it today. In this book, Dr Uçarol deals with the developments of 1878 in detail, drawing on official documents. The book consists of an introduction, and four chapters. In the introduction, the period of Ottoman rule (1570-1878) and developments concerning the order established during this period are briefly examined.

The first chapter is devoted to the political developments that led to the appearance of the Cyprus Question. The second chapter covers Britain's colonialism; its Eastern Mediterranean policy and the importance of Cyprus within this policy; its initiatives to settle on the island and, in this connection, its diplomatic activities vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire; the Ottoman Empire's policy towards Great Britain; developments in the defence alliance between the two states; and the conditions under which the island was transferred.

The third chapter examines how the transfer of Cyprus to Britain was enacted, how the population of the island reacted to British rule and efforts to put into effect the idea of enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece). The fourth chapter deals with problems arising from the British administration's regulations and practices in governing Cyprus and disputes arising from the implementation of the defence alliance.

This book, which studies the evolution process and causes of the Cyprus conflict in meticulous detail, is one of the rare academic works that specifically deal with that period. As such, it is important as a basic source for those who wish to obtain information on the historical realities underlying the Cyprus question and for those who want to conduct research on the issue.
At the conclusion of this work, which has been prepared using domestic and foreign material as well as the Prime Ministry's Ottoman Archives, there are copies of 18 documents. Simplified versions of these documents have also been used in the text.

İstanbul University, Faculty of Literature originally published this book in 1978. A second edition was published 20 years later after reviewing and revising the first edition and adding appendices. It is now being presented to the readers in English translation by Rüstem's Ltd.

BAŞAK OCAK*

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Dr Kypros Chrysostomides' work is the most recent and comprehensive addition by a Greek Cypriot author to the bibliography on the various aspects of the Cyprus Question. The developments in Cyprus since December 1963 have, over the years, provoked a steady stream of academic and official publications, most of which, like the present one, tended to support the Greek Cypriot position. The Greek Cypriot side, due to the recognition accorded to it and its diplomatic missions abroad, has always been in a more advantageous position than its counterpart, the Turkish Cypriot side, in having its case heard. The latter has, moreover, always been afforded far less opportunity in international forums and resolutions have been taken behind its back. Dr Chrysostomides' work is aimed at giving up-to-date and detailed legal support to already widely publicised Greek Cypriot views.

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However, it cannot be described as a fully objective and unbiased account of all the relevant facts of the Cyprus problem or a balanced diagnosis and evaluation of all the legal issues involved.

The main theme of the book is the continuous existence of the Republic of Cyprus as the only state on the island. In the author's view the same state, which was created in 1960, preserves its unaltered continuity within the international legal order and is represented by its sole legal government, that is, the Greek Cypriot administration. The northern part of Cyprus, according to the author, is under Turkish "belligerent occupation," which prevents the lawful "government of Cyprus" from exercising its sovereignty and authority over this area. In the author's view, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is a "puppet state" and a "nullity" in international law and, therefore, it cannot be considered as a unit of self-determination; the Turkish Cypriot community cannot be described as a "people" but the two communities in the island constitute one single "people" of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots are usually described throughout the book as a "community" and occasionally, as a "minority". One should point out from the outset that Turkish Cypriots regard such hard-line assertions as, not only unfounded, but also very offensive.

Though the author uses ingenious legal arguments to support his view, it is apparent that the main thrust of the work centres on "recognition" and conclusions are drawn from this concept by equating "recognition" with "legality". In other words, the basis of the assumption of legality is the international community's recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as the government of Cyprus; since that administration is recognised as such, it is assumed to be the legal government of the Republic of Cyprus. The author simply disregards the fact that that administration is merely composed of Greek Cypriots despite the provisions of the 1959 settlement and the now moribund 1960 Constitution, which provided for the partnership and co-founder status of the two communities, the bi-communality of the state and the dichotomy of functions and powers between the state and the communities. Moreover, the author ignores the fact that, since 1963, the recognised government of Cyprus has repudiated the Basic Articles of the Constitution, which were entrenched in the Zurich and London Agreements as unchangeable fundamental provisions underpinning the Republic of Cyprus, thus endowing
the Republic with only limited sovereignty. However, in the author's view, the doctrine of "necessity" justifies such changes because the doctrine must be read into the provisions of the written Constitution of Cyprus.

The author's views are indeed controversial. There are conflicting views as to the continued existence of the Republic of Cyprus and its representation in the international community. The international community (except Turkey) has recognised the Greek Cypriot Republic as the Republic of Cyprus and, consequently, its representation by that administration. However, the undeniable fact is that the Republic of Cyprus as envisaged by the Treaties and the Constitution no longer exists, as the state of affairs envisaged by those instruments has not prevailed since December 1963. What today presents itself as the government of Cyprus is, therefore, in fact the Greek Cypriots' administration and represents only the Greek Cypriot community. Similarly, the government of the TRNC represents only the Turkish Cypriot community. However, international law has refused to keep abreast of developments and realities on the island by continuing to recognise only the Greek Cypriot administration as the government of Cyprus despite the de facto character of that administration, in that it is not the bi-communal Republic that the Treaties envisaged and it is not governed by the basic provisions of its Constitution. These serious and substantial defects in the title of the so-called government of Cyprus are glossed over in Chrysostomides' book.

Turning to more specific comments about the book, it is not difficult to notice that it contains a rather selective and highly tendentious account of Cyprus' recent history. There is, for instance, hardly anything about the Greek Cypriot struggle for enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) before and after the compromise independence of 1960, particularly as to how that movement affected the fate of the country and relations between the two communities in the running of the affairs of the Republic. Nor is there much about the Greek Cypriot side's attitude towards the Treaties and constitutional provisions relating to the bi-communal participation of the two communities. There is no credible explanation as to how and why the Turkish Cypriots were excluded from participation in all the organs of the Republic. There is no direct reference to the Greek Cypriot administration's human rights violations against the Turkish Cypriots and the
degrading conditions under which these people had to subsist in
the enclaves where they had to take refuge for their safety. There is
no mention of that administration's "ethnic cleansing" of the
Turkish Cypriots - including the fate of 211 missing Turkish
Cypriots abducted after the events of 1964 by the Greek Cypriot
police and military elements. There is no mention of EOKA-B and
its activities during the 1964-74 period; the attacks on Turkish
Cypriot areas such as the Nicosia suburb of Omorphia (K.
Kaymaklı) in December 1963, Tylliria (Erenköy) in 1964, and
Kophinou (Geçitkale) and Ayios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) in 1967;
and there is nothing about the activities of the Greek officered
National Guard nor of the thousands of Greek troops that were
allowed clandestinely to come to the island. The author has
completely avoided dealing with the real causes of the collapse of
the bi-communal partnership on the island. Nothing is said about
the Greek Cypriot parliament's 26 June 1967 enosis resolution
(which has not been withdrawn), confirming that, despite adverse
consequences, it would not suspend the struggle for union with
Greece, being conducted with the support of all Greeks; and Law
No. 48 of 1987 of the same parliament which accorded legal
recognition to the "national struggle" (enosis) and its organisation
(EOKA).

In the face of the very strong defence of the doctrine of
necessity the author puts up, it may suffice to refer here to the
1987 report of a Select Committee of the British House of
Commons, where it is stated;

Although the Greek Cypriot Government had been claiming to have
been merely seeking to operate the 1960 Constitution, modified to the
extent dictated by the necessities of the situation, this claim ignores
the fact that both before and after the events of December 1963, the
Government of Archbishop Makarios continued to advocate the cause
of enosis and actively pursued the amendment of the Constitution and
the relevant Treaties to facilitate this ultimate objective. In February
1964, for instance, Archbishop Makarios declared, "The Agreements
have been dead and buried".

On the issue of self-determination, the author asserts that the
"people of Cyprus" exercised the single right of self-determination
in 1960 by opting as a whole for an "independent state" and that,
through the exercise of this right, "This people as a whole acquired
at the same time 'internal sovereignty'." However, in view of the
Greek Cypriot side's well known assertion that the colonial power handed down and imposed the 1960 Constitution with threats to allow Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots the separate exercise of the right to self-determination (which would mean partition of the island), the argument as to the exercise of self-determination "by the people of Cyprus as a whole" is, in the this reviewer's opinion, untenable. On the contrary, the statements made in the British House of Commons before the 1960 settlement was achieved, as well as the manner in which independence was granted (that is, not by a unilateral act of the British government but by the consent of the two communities whose leaders signed all the documents that established the bi-communal Republic), would suggest that, if in 1960 there was an exercise of the right to self-determination, it was not exercised by the "people of Cyprus" as a whole but separately by the two. In this respect, Cyprus is a unique case. One should also recall the oft-repeated words of Archbishop Makarios: "The agreements created a state but not a Cyprus nation."

Moreover, in view of development within the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, self-determination is a right of peoples that can be exercised in conformity with international law any time when the legal conditions exist for its exercise. Any settlement that the process of negotiations between the two parties may achieve has to be an agreed solution and would necessarily have to be submitted for the approval of the two politically equal peoples by way of separate referenda. This will also necessitate the making of a new constitutional arrangement. Therefore, this reviewer is not in agreement with the author's proposition that the sovereignty of the future republic, which will be established on the basis of the agreement of the two negotiating parties, should be derived solely from one of them -the present "Republic of Cyprus" (i.e. the Greek Cypriot administration)- as the allegedly sole legal Republic entitled to the exercise of sovereignty, and not from the two peoples organised in their respective states. The author's suggestion that this should be so for purpose of state succession, citizenship and other matters, is far from convincing.

The author describes the Turkish intervention of 1974 as a "belligerent invasion and occupation" of the northern part of the island. However, there is no sufficient account in the book of the Greek coup d'etat of 1974, which prompted the Turkish action or
of the chain of events that led to the coup, its aims and effects, as Archbishop Makarios expressed to the UN Security Council that the Greek military regime had openly violated the independence of Cyprus, had extended its dictatorship to the island and that this amounted to an invasion from the effects of which both Greeks and Turks would suffer. The author has completely ignored the Turkish intervention's raison d'être, which was to put an end to Greece's invasion, to protect Turkish Cypriots from imminent attacks and to help to restore bi-communal partnership on the island that would depend on negotiations between the two Cypriot parties. The contention that the Treaty of Guarantee was invalid from the beginning is in contradiction, not only with the position of the UN which has persistently referred to the Agreements, but also to the position of eminent Greek Cypriot leaders who have strongly criticised the UK for failing to intervene in 1974. If the application of the Allies' massive force against Iraq can be justified as collective self-defence and, if the NATO member states' intervention in the Kosova crisis without Security Council authorisation can be described as humanitarian intervention, it is indeed difficult to understand why the Turkish intervention of 1974 is condemned as a "belligerent occupation."

The author asserts, "The TRNC is ab initio a nullity in international law, which cannot be rectified." In this respect, he relies strongly on the UN Security Council resolution adopted in the wake of the declaration of statehood. However, that resolution was taken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which means that it is not legally binding on the member states of the UN unless such states adopt it through the usual legal procedure, in contrast to resolutions under Chapter VII, which authorise the imposition of sanctions. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot authorities did not bow to the relevant resolution and the declaration of the TRNC has not been withdrawn. By the passage of time, the resolution has lost its rigour and the talks between the two Cypriot parties were commenced under UN auspices on an equal footing. Furthermore, that resolution did not negate, and could not nullify, the state that was born and the TRNC continues to exist as a reality. To say, as Dr Chrysostomides has done in his book, that an existing state, like the TRNC, is a "nullity" in international law, is untenable. The author has to be reminded in this respect of principles developed by international law relating to unrecognised, and therefore, de facto states.
The author has drawn considerably from reports and judgements of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, as well as from judgements of the European Court of Justice. It is a fact that the judicial organs of the Council of Europe have generally attributed, under certain circumstances, "jurisdiction" and "responsibility" to Turkey under the European Convention in respect of northern Cyprus. However, the findings in those cases have generally been based on the concept of non-recognition of the TRNC. These judicial organs have, as a rule, refrained from deciding on the status of the TRNC or on the legality of the Turkish intervention of 1974. Even though some conclusions have been drawn from the Turkish "military presence" in northern Cyprus for purposes of "responsibility" under the Convention, this in no way gives support for the author's scenario of a puppet state. The so-called "examples" cited for this proposition are, in the opinion of this reviewer, totally out of place and have no analogy with the TRNC.

In the book under review, a chapter is devoted to the negotiations between the two Cypriot parties, focusing attention particularly to the stages of the process after 1974. Though the book contains useful information in this respect, it generally tends to put the blame for lack of progress on the Turkish Cypriot party. However, the author fails to refer to those various instances when the atmosphere of the talks was seriously disrupted due to the Greek Cypriot side interrupting the process to resort to international forums, which tended to undermine the agreed parameters thereof. One serious gap in this chapter is its silence about the Turkish Cypriot side's acceptance of the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's comprehensive proposals for a federal solution presented to the parties in New York in January 1985 after tireless efforts within the process of proximity talks, and the Greek Cypriot's rejection of it. This rejection had various political repercussions on the island, and the Turkish Cypriot side, who from November 1983 had in good faith frozen its constitution-making and the holding of a referendum on the constitution, decided to finalise the TRNC Constitution and submit it to a referendum in May 1985. The author refers to "strong disagreement within the Greek Cypriot community" to Perez de Cuellar's later document submitted in July 1989. Reading between the lines, the impression created is that, even today, a definite
majority of the Greek Cypriot community is against a federal solution of the Cyprus problem.

Another chapter is devoted to relations between "Cyprus" and the European Union (EU), as well as, the prospects for the country's accession to the Union. In the author's view, even without a settlement, Cyprus should enter the EU with its entire territory and that the extension of European law to the North of the island in case of a solution would be automatic. The author produces counter arguments against the Turkish Cypriot side's position, namely that the Greek Cypriot administration cannot legally make such an application on behalf Cyprus as a whole and that Cyprus cannot, under the Treaties and its Constitution, enter into an economic or political association with other states in which both Greece and Turkey are not members. In support of this view, the author adopts the gist of an opinion which the Greek Cypriot administration procured of three international lawyers to the effect that Article 50 of the Constitution (which refers to the veto powers of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President) is no longer "applicable" as the Vice-President is not presently holding that office. This ignores completely the fact that the right to veto was a mechanism by which the Turkish Cypriot community could be assured that the Republic would not join an organisation of which Greece alone was a member (and vice versa). It is very cynical of the Greek Cypriot side, which wrecked the bi-communal partnership Republic, now to argue that the Turkish Cypriot entrenched rights of co-determination no longer apply. That right of co-determination would also necessitate the consents of both communities for Cyprus' accession to the EU, to be expressed through separate referenda, as the Ghali Set of Ideas acknowledged.

The German analogy about accession to the EU is also misconceived. When the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of the European Community, it made no claim that the territory of membership should extend beyond the area under its control. It did not claim to represent East Germany for purposes of membership. In contrast, the Greek Cypriot unilateral application purports to cover the whole island, including the TRNC's territory, and, more significantly, aspires to acquire membership for the whole of the island, even without a settlement of the islands' problems and achievement of a customs union between the North and the South. Another relevant factor in this respect is that there
are no examples of the reconstitution of multiethnic societies after these have broken up into separate ethnic components. True, the international community is currently trying hard to reconstruct multiethnic societies in Bosnia and Kosova, but the results have been meagre as it is very difficult, if not impossible, to turn the flow of history. There are very serious doubts as to whether the EU can integrate the two peoples of Cyprus before a political settlement is achieved. On the contrary, the EU's acceptance of Cyprus before a settlement would likely help to widen the rift and division in the island.

Dr Chrysostomides' seemingly scholarly work is overlain with legalistic abstractions and artificial labels. The work tends therefore to suggest a highly "legal" approach to the many complicated political and factual aspects of the Cyprus Question. This approach reflects the Greek Cypriots' long obsession with the concept of recognition. In this reviewer's opinion, if progress in the inter-party talks is really desired, there is a need, more than ever, to give due consideration to the exigencies of political realities to the realpolitik before it is too late and before another instance is added to the list of missed opportunities.

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