THE TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS TOWARD 1960 TURKISH "REVOLUTION"

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ABSTRACT

The US and Turkish Governments created an amicable relationship after the Second World War. The period from 1947 to the early 1960s was one of almost full convergence of American and Turkish policies. Turkey had found the strong outside support it needed to resist the Soviet demands over the long haul; and American policymakers, eager to line up reluctant nations in Europe or Asia for defensive pacts such as NATO and SEATO, found the Turks an enthusiastic ally. At the end of the period, at the beginning of 1960's, it would have been hard to imagine that in the near future the Turks would join in the chorus of anti-American agitation by shouting the familiar "Yankee Go Home". Although little is reported or known in the United States about the details and extent of this development, since 1959, deep anti-American sentiments have emerged in Turkey, with a concomitant foreign policy reorientation toward neutralism.

KEYWORDS:

Turkey; the United States; Political Relations-Turkey; 1960s Turkey; the Cold War; Turkish Politics.
1. Introduction

Bernard Lewis's balanced and well-written history, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, includes a sensitive account of the struggle for Westernizing reform in the declining Ottoman Empire which was ended in 1950 election in the republican period of Turkey. Lewis also gives very dramatic explanations about national and international transition of Turkey after the World War II:

Many explanations have been offered. Turkish cynics -who are very cynical, say that the whole thing was due to a miscalculation. (...) Such an explanation seems superficial and unsatisfactory. (...) Foreign cynics and some Turks, attribute these changes to a desire to place the West, and especially the Americans. (...) In foreign policy, at least Turkey has identified herself fully and unreservedly with the West. Did this mean that the advance towards democracy inside the country was no more than a reflection at home of a policy pursued abroad or, to put it more crudely, a piece of window-dressing designed to please and flatter Turkey's Western allies?

No doubt the desire to impress and win over the West had its place among the motives that impelled İsmet İnönü to relax the authoritarian regime in 1945. (...) However, it would be a grave error to conclude from this that these various stages of Turkish reform were no more than diplomatic subterfuges. The rulers of Turkey were not likely to change their form of government and surrender power to an opposition, merely to please a foreign state. In addition, if they did not know it from the start, they must soon have realized that the extension of democratic liberties in Turkey would have only a limited influence on a decision in Washington to help or abandon them. (...)

A more extreme form of the theory of American influence is the attribution of the change the direct American intervention. There is no doubt that American pressure was exerted rather strongly in favor of private enterprise and against etatism, and the moves of the People's Party government in this direction were no doubt in large measure to the terms of American loans and the advice of American advisers. There is, however, no evidence supporting the theory of direct American action in favor of political change. The most that can be said is that they helped to create a favorable atmosphere (...)

The transfer of power by a free election was certainly a bloodless revolution, comparable, in its way, with the revolutions of 1876, 1908, and 1923. However, it soon became apparent that once again, it was something less than the millenium. Peasants, taxi men, and
others who had shown an excess of zeal in their interpretation of
democracy duly received a lesson in political science. Policemen
breathed again, and swung their truncheons with covered that after all a
few obstacles still remained on Turkey's path of progress and
freedom.1

2. The Background of the Relations After the Second War

It was no coincidence that Turkey became the first
diplomatic arena of the incipient Cold War. Most countries of
eastern and central Europe had been actual battlegrounds in World
War II; hence in planning the military operations for Hitler's defeat,
Russia and the Western powers were obliged to delineate their
respective zones of military occupation clearly -and hence of
postwar control. Turkey's neutrality, by contrast, had left its future
status ambiguous, and thus made it a tempting target for Stalin's
postwar expansionism. The result was that Turkey's leaders as early
as 1945 felt compelled to state their own policy of containment. A
stance that Washington over the following years backed up with
acts such as the Istanbul visit of the battleship USS Missouri in
April 1946 and the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in
1947.2

According to Cold War historian Melvyn P. Leffler, US
planners were busy studying Turkey, even before the promulgation
of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, because of Turkey's
potential utility in waging war against the Soviet Union. As Leffler
also emphasizes, the United States (and Turkey) may have
exaggerated the 1946 Soviet note to Turkey asking for a Soviet
security veto in the Turkish Straits.3

On other side of the Aegean Sea, Marios L. Evriviades spells
out similar views on US-Turkish ties:

1Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London, Royal Institute
2Dankwart A. Rustow, Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally, New York,
3Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United
In a relatively brief period of time, which accelerated with the Korean War in 1950 and Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952, a US-dominated infrastructure was established in Turkey to serve in time of war as an outpost for the doctrine of massive retaliation against the Soviet Union. This was Turkey's strategic role, which had a direct bearing on US security. This role was further enhanced with the deployment of US nuclear missiles (Honest Johns) on Turkish soil and with passive and active U-2 and SR-71 intelligence monitoring conducted from Turkey. The subsequent deployment of the Polaris missile and intercontinental ballistic missiles and the attendant modification of the doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response reduced Turkey overall importance. However, as long as Cold War continued, Turkey's importance to the US remained vital. Turkey was a willing and often a pleading partner in the US plans, which served Turkey's regional goals and its geopolitical strategy of integration into Western institutional structures.4

According to Rustow, the period from 1947 to the early 1960 was one of almost full convergence of American and Turkish policy. Turkey had found the strong outside support needed to resist the Soviets over the long haul; and American policymakers, eager to line up reluctant nations in Europe or Asia for defensive pacts such as NATO and SEATO, found the Turks an enthusiastic ally.5 When American forces came to the aid of South Korea in 1950, Turkey was among the few countries to respond eagerly to the UN's call for troops; and its foreign minister, Professor Fuad Köprülü, justified the step with what remains a classic statement of the case for collective security: "If I do not give up help today, how can I dare ask the United Nations for help when I am in need of it tomorrow? " For it's past, Washington strongly supported, over some European objections, the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, completed in 1952.6

Rustow also provides a preliminary analysis of the Turkish-American relation's in early Cold War period:

From early days of the Cold War, Ankara's and Washington's strategic analysts were agreed that Turkey and Greece formed an indispensable barrier to Soviet moves around Europe's southern flank into the

5Rustow, Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally, p. 90.
6Ibid.
Mediterranean. Once Congress had accepted the principle of Truman's containment policy, it became easier to subsume the mounting sums for Greek and Turkish aid under the general European rubric than to fight separates annual battles of appropriations. One result thus has been that Turkey in the past four decades has become one of the steadiest recipients of US military and economic aid -its grand total exceeded only by Britain and France, South Korea and South Vietnam, and, most recently, Egypt and Israel.7

3. Political-Military Ties During the Cold War

Another crucial decision was the establishment of close political-military ties with the West, to which economic tie was soon added. This decision grew out of post-war Russian pressure on Turkey to cede territory in eastern Anatolia and grand bases on the Turkish Straits.8

In 1948 Turkey joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and began to receive Marshall Plan aid, even though her productive capacity had not been damaged by the war. In 1949 Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe and, in 1952, of NATO.9 Throughout 1945-46 Turkey became the victim of an aggressive diplomatic campaign by Stalin, who tried to achieve the old Tsarist dream of a Russian takeover of the Straits, as well as territorial advances in Turkey's eastern frontier regions. This provoked a tough reaction from both Turkey and Western powers, so that the Soviets were eventually forced to drop their demands.10

Stalin's aggressive behavior towards Turkey in 1945 facilitated the rapprochement with the West in general and the United States particular. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall

7Ibid., p. 91.
Plan began the process of Turkey’s integration, culminating with Turkey’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952.11

Military developments have proven difficult for outsiders to penetrate; hence, the literature on this important subject is relatively limited. A British Professor, William Hale, in *Turkish Politics and the Military* (1994), explains the critical topic with an extensive coverage on military developments of Turkey. According to Hale;

(...)

(...) In its organization and equipment, the Turkish army of 1948 had altered little from that of the 1920s.

It was into this extremely backward military machine that the United States began to pour new equipment—artillery, trucks, tanks and fighter aircraft—which were designed to help Turkey to fulfill her commitments to the Western alliance. In 1950 and mainly as a means of increasing pressure on the Western powers to allow her accession to NATO, Turkey dispatched a mixed bridge of 4,000 men to join the UN force in the Korean War. The Turkish troops in Korea certainly distinguished themselves in combat, but it was clear that only the best-trained troops were being sent to Far East and that the condition of the army at home was far from perfect. New equipment without better training and more rapid promotion for those who had achieved it was pointless. At the beginning of the 1952, it was reported that 40-50 percent of all American-supplied military vehicles was out-of orders, due to lack of maintenance. The problem was only overcome by the dispatch of American-manned fields teams, who oversaw improvements in training and reported directly to the General Staff in Ankara.

The American military authorities also promoted a massive reform in the military education system. New schools were established for special training in aircraft gunnery, signals, medicine, ordinance, transport and engineering in the army, for mine and submarine warfare in the navy, and pilot training, radio aeronautics and meteorology in the air force, besides several other technical branches.12


12 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p. 96.
Feroz Ahmad has parallel views; "Inside NATO the character of Turkey's officer corps began to change. Younger officer, who were open the technology and the strategy of modern warfare, acquired a sense of importance and confidence they had never enjoyed before. They visited other countries and discussed the world's problems with officers who presented perspectives different from their own."  

4. Einsehovver-Dulles Administration and Turkey

The Republican Party, after twenty years in the political wilderness, thus had a golden opportunity to use the promise of peace in Korea, which most Americans wanted, in their 1952-election campaign. Coming on top of their good fortune in obtaining Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied commander in the World War and later of NATO, and the country's most popular military figure, as their presidential candidate, this put the Republicans in an almost invincible position. After the expected victory duly occurred, President Eisenhower proceeded to honor his electoral promise of negotiating a peace in Korea, emphasized by a symbolic trip to the war torn country. After nearly three years of conflict, the result was the not unexpected return to the original partition boundary of the thirty-eighth parallel.

The Korean settlement was only one aspect of a changed emphasis in American foreign policy. The Republican Party had traditionally been less concerned about involvement overseas, being more closely identified with the 'isolationist impulse', which had a long and proud tradition in the United States. Although there was no question of a withdrawal from Europe - for example, the Republicans continued to press hard for German rearmament-, there was a less intense concern with European affairs. Many European leaders welcomed this change in American foreign policy.

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For one thing, they felt that Eisenhower, who had twice been their military commander, could be trusted not to treat the European commitment too lightly. On the other hand, their improving economies were leading Western European states toward a feeling that they ought to have more political independence, and that the continent should not cling so closely to American coat tails. If the United States had maintained the same high degree of involvement in European affairs as in the 1940s, the mid-1950s might well have seen several clashes of will between the two sides of the Atlantic. As it was, such a disagreement was delayed until de Gaulle re-emerged in France as the champion of an old-fashioned pride in nationalism and anti-American resentment.

However, the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who in many ways was more important than President Eisenhower as the architect of American foreign policy in the 1950s, was convinced that the military aspect overwhelmed everything else, which the Cold War as played by the Soviet Union was just a new variant of traditional power politics. He believed that the United States should avoid another Korea, but where confrontation was unavoidable, then the venue should be picked by, and when is favorable to, the United States. From this thinking, there developed the concept of massive retaliation.

The effects of this American foreign policy were paradoxical. There was a tendency to prefer remaining more aloof from foreign contact, yet simultaneously seeking to project a more positive and aggressive image. It was the nuclear issue, which had rendered Western European Union irrelevant in the 1950s. The development of Soviet nuclear capacity had very largely invalidated much of the strategic thinking on the defense of the Western Europe: It was improbable that a war in Europe could now be fought only with conventional ground troops. In the late 1950s, the United States and NATO had to reconsider the role and organization of the latter. On the other hand, NATO had gone beyond its original geographical confines in 1952 when Greece and Turkey joined the organization. With West German accession in 1955, the United States had maximized the territorial reach of NATO. Apart from the self-declared neutral states in Europe, only Spain remained outside, though American bases were set up there too in 1953.
By the end of the decade, Soviet diplomacy had become more aggressive. In Europe, the major target was Berlin. Twice, in 1958 and 1961, the new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, tested the West over the fate of the city. The second crisis produced the final confirmation of the complete division of Europe: the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. Emboldened by the Western response in Berlin, which in the end attacked the Wall only verbally, Khrushchev was encouraged to test his luck further afield, a venture, which culminated in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

In 1954, former US Ambassador for Turkey, George C. McGhee, released his first analysis of Turkish President Bayar's 1959 visit to the United States:

The successful visit to the United States in February of this year of President Bayar of Turkey, at President Eisenhower's invitation, has highlighted one of the most significant political events of our times - Turkey's emergence as a full and responsible member of the Western alliance. The increasingly close relations that started with the initiation of large-scale American aid to Turkey in 1947 have created a bond of confidence and respect between both the governments and the peoples of the two countries and have revealed a remarkable similarity in national aims and policies. Until fairly recently there existed a certain amount of anti-Turkish sentiment in this country. It arose largely out of the Ottoman Empire's association with the Central Powers during the First World War and its handling of the Armenian problem, but it was reinforced by some misinterpretation of the Turkish history and a good deal of ignorance about events there since 1919. Today the American attitude is quite changed. Turkey is rightly considered one of our most reliable partners, and few nations enjoy so much prestige in this country.

In 1951, London and Washington invited Turkey and Egypt to join in forming a 'Middle East Command,' which, it was hoped, would preserve the Western military position on the Suez Canal. Egypt's resistance to Middle East Defense Organization was seen...
only as a temporary setback and John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, encouraged the creation of another anti-Soviet alliance based on the 'northern tier' states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, an alliance that would be open to the Arab states as well. Turkey already had a Treaty of Friendship (26 July 1951) and a Cultural Agreement (28 June 1953) with Pakistan. Accordingly, in 1954, Turkey sought to implement Washington's conception of a defense of the Middle East's 'Northern Tier' by concluding a mutual assistance agreement with Pakistan, subsequently enlarged into the Baghdad Pact including Iran, Iraq, and Great Britain. All these Middle Eastern defense schemes proved ill conceived. Egypt itself repudiated the Middle East Command and, after Nasser's coup of 1952, moved toward neutralism and alignment with Moscow. The Baghdad Pact hastened the upheaval which, by 1958, turned Iraq into one of Moscow's closet friends in the Central Treaty Organization, which lingered on for two more decades and it amounted to little more than parallel US aid programs for Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.

After President approval of military aid for Pakistan (25 February 1953), Turkey and Pakistan signed a Treaty of Mutual Defense on 2 April 1954. Turkey had become the link between NATO and any future defense pact farther east. On February 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed a Regional Defense Pact in Baghdad, which was joined by Pakistan on 17 September and by Iran on 23 October. Britain had already joined the Pact on 25 March, raising a clamor among the Arab nationalists that she was retaining her dominant position in Iraq by indirect means. Menderes and Dulles saw the Baghdad Pact as a device to draw the reluctant Syrians and Egyptians into Middle East Defense Organization. However, Western policies had the reverse effect and the attempt to cajole Egypt and Syria forced them to turn to the Soviet Union for arms, giving her an entry into the Middle East.

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19 Rustow, Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally, pp. 91-92.
Following the Suez crisis in 1956, the US formulated a special policy in order to control the growing rapprochement between the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria.\textsuperscript{21} Known as "Eisenhower Doctrine",\textsuperscript{22} this new policy had been sent to the Congress as a message of the President on January 5, 1957 and was accepted by Congress on March 9.

According to Fahir Armaoğlu, there were two things that can be done under these conditions by the US. One was to strengthen the friendly regional states by extending them economic aid. The other was to explain what communist hegemony can produce and to assist them to resist international communism either by bilateral or multilateral relationships.\textsuperscript{23} In connection with this new policy against Soviet expansion and international communism, Eisenhower Doctrine increased the importance of the Turkey in the eyes of the Washington. The US wanted to reinforce its military forces in the Near East to implement the doctrine effectively. The establishment of air bases to aid the transportation of the troops into Europe was a necessary measure for such an action.\textsuperscript{24}

Ambassador James P. Richards was sent to the region to explain the Doctrine as a special envoy by the US President. After having negotiated with the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, a joint declaration was made, carrying extremely important points. Accordingly the relations between the two countries were spelled out on March 22nd, 1957.\textsuperscript{25}

Clear support given by Turkey to the Doctrine led the US to raise the economic assistance and the signing of 1959 Bilateral

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\begin{enumerate}
\item Fahir Armaoğlu, \textit{Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri} (Turkish-American Relations with Documents), Ankara, TTK, 1991, pp. 241-249.
\item American Foreign Policy, \textit{Current Documents}, Washington DC, Department of State, 1957, p. 837; and Armaoğlu, \textit{Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri}, pp. 249-250.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Treaty between the two states. Two developments that are more important had taken place in the region before the signing of the Treaty. The first one was the Syria crisis in 1957 and the second one was Iraq revolution in 1958. Both of them equally effected the Turkey. The Syria crisis was a reflection of power struggle between the two blocks in the Near East, which began in the aftermath of the Second World War and deepened step by step later.²⁶

One of the outstanding consequences of the pro-Naser Iraq revolution beginning with the overthrown of the King Faisāl on July 14, 1958, was the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine to the developments in a country for the first time. Iraq was the basic cornerstone of the British and American Middle Eastern policies due to Iraq's strategic position as a bridge between the Arab World and Northern Bank and the its oil fields.²⁷

According to July 28, 1959 London Declaration, the US would make "security and defense" agreements with the Baghdad Pact members and would officially participate to the Organization, later named as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) by bilateral agreements. To illustrate, March 5, 1959 Turkish-American Bilateral Cooperation Agreement was a result of that policy.²⁸ Causing severe debates later in Turkey, this agreement was the direct practice of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was announced to protect the countries under the threat of the Soviet Union in the Near East. Furthermore, an article indicating the US military and economic aid conditions to Turkey's economic recovery was put into the agreement as well. According to the Agreement, in the case of direct or indirect attack, the US would provide military aid to


²⁷ Gönülö bol/Ülman, İkinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası, p. 300; Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, pp. 255-257.

²⁸ Hamza Eroğlu, "Türkiye-Amerika Birleşik Devletleri İkili İşbirliği Antlaşması" (Turkish American Bilateral Cooperation Agreement), Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, No. 1, AÜSBF, 1960, pp. 63-64; and Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, pp. 258-260.
Turkey, as happened in the case of Lebanon. As Sander points out, although the same guarantee was given against secret and destroying activities, there wasn't any extreme leftist movement forcing Menderes government to take serious measures, or any minority uprising. Dangers, which could be possible for Iran and Pakistan, were not valid for Turkey.

It is not possible to clearly affirm that Menderes government demanded the article "indirect attack" put into the Agreement in order to use it against the opposition inside the country. It is probable that not political but mainly economic concerns forced the Turkish government to sign this agreement. Besides, it was this concern that forced Prime Minister Menderes, who had lost his hopes for the US assistance, to make plans later on to play the Soviet Union card.

5. The Crisis of Turkey and Emerging Relations with the USSR

In mid-1950s, when the first term of the office of the Democrats in the US was coming to an end, the Menderes government in Turkey found itself facing serious economic difficulties. These stemmed from the desire of Democrats to do too much in a short period of time, the lack of viability of a number of projects, the shortage of foreign exchange, the inadequacy of foreign and private Turkish capital, bad crops and fluctuations in international trade. By 1958, mismanagement of the economy had brought Turkey to bankruptcy. In exchange for a package of loans from western Europe, the United States, and the international organizations, the Democrat leadership was obliged to accept an anti-inflationary program. This stabilization program, worked out with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), included limitations on deficit financing and on over-all credit expansion, as well as de facto devaluation of the Turkish lira.

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29 Eroğlu, ibid., pp. 23-64.
Even at that time, however, rumblings could be heard in the economic as well as in the political sphere. Auspicious interpretations of the Turkish economy, serious weaknesses existed which were to become increasingly evident. Turkey's trade balance remained unfavorable, her foreign debt was enormous, and inflation persisted due to inability to meet the consumption demands of the Turkish people. In the latter part of 1959, of 51 state enterprises conducted by the Menderes regime, 19 were operating at a loss partly because of bad judgment and misjudgment.32

By the late 1950s, Menderes no longer controlled the economy. However, he was sure that his problems were temporary and that his policies would begin to show results within a few years. He wanted to have time with help of his friends, especially those in Washington and Bonn. In July 1958, the Western powers announced their program to rescue the Turkish economy and the Menderes government. They had to provide Ankara with loan of 359 million dollar and the consolidation of Turkey's 400 million-dollar debt. In return, Menderes was asked to 'stabilize' the economy by taking certain measures, the most important being the devaluation of the lira from 2.80 to 9.025 liras to one US dollar. The 'rescue operation' by itself proved ineffective Menderes lacked the confidence to take unpopular measures necessary to stabilize the economy. A year later, in October 1959, he went to America hoping that the ally he had served with such loyalty would help in his hour of need. Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan had gone on ahead to prepare the ground for an aid package of 5 to 6 hundred million dollars. However, President Eisenhower by now had lost all hope in the Menderes government and refused to bail him out. Menderes returned to Ankara empty handed and disheartened. At that point, Menderes, hitherto a totally unrepentant Cold Warrior decided to visit the Soviet Union in following July. This decision was all the more remarkable because during the course of his US tour, he had constantly warned his American audiences not to be deceived by Soviet overtures, for such an enemy, he warned, was not to be trusted. When the Menderes was overthrown in May 1960, the economy was in a state of collapse.33

33Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, pp. 117-118.
According to Turkish diplomatic sources, the Turkish Prime Minister himself mentioned the subject of the Prime Minister Menderes' official visit to Moscow to the US Ambassador on January 13, 1960. The Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu also raised the subject in his interview with the American Ambassador on January 30, 1960, and wanted to learn the view of the US about the visit. The US Ambassador in Ankara presented American view to the Turkish Foreign Minister on February 8, 1960. The US stated that Turkey had the right to decide and they are completely sure about their faithful ally and wanted NATO Council to be informed about final decision on this official visit to the Soviet Union. Therefore, Turkish Foreign Minister negotiated with the Russian Ambassador Rijov in Ankara. These negotiations continued between March 27 and April 6, 1960. The Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Ankara, Rijov, was emphasizing three conspicuous points regarding the Moscow visit: First of all, the Soviet Union knew the bonds of Turkey with NATO states and paid considerable understanding to all of them. Thus this must not turn into a handicap for the establishment of friendship between Turkey and Soviet Union. Secondly, Soviet Union was ready for economic aid to Turkey, regardless of political conditions in which they live. Finally, cultural relations between the two countries must be improved.34

As Suat Bilge points out, the official statement was not clear enough if Turkey wanted to reorganize its relationship with the Soviet Union due to its economic concerns.35 Nevertheless, Turkey's incipient political crisis came to a head in the spring of 1960. During 1959, there had been serious signs that the government, or some of its supporters, might be planning to re-establish a single-party regime, even to murder the leader of the opposition. İsmet İnönü, who was already 75 years old, certainly had plenty of enemies in Turkey.36 Few will dissent from the view that Menderes performed some valuable services for Turkish economic development. Road building and other 'infra-structure'

36Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, p. 104.
projects, however, over extended his activities in relation to available resources, with the result that inflation became a serious problem. He succeeded in continuing to get massive foreign aid, especially from the United States. In 1958 the situation almost reached a breaking point, and in order to get himself bailed out with a substantial amount of financial assistance, Menderes agreed to the term of a Stabilization Program set down by the International Monetary Fund, the chief partner in a composite loan totaling some 359 million dollars. Menderes' implementation of both the letter and spirit of the Stabilization Program was sluggish, however. By 1960, many of shortages of consumer goods—including, for an extended period, an almost total absence of the Turkish coffee—had eased, but the National Unity Committee also found that Menderes had already run through practically the entire Stabilization Loan.37

6. American Outlook on the 1960 Revolution

From 3 o'clock in the morning of 27 May 1960, Turkey was ruled by the National Unity Committee, a body of mostly junior officers (only four of its thirty-eight members were generals), as representative of the Armed Forces.38 The overthrow by the Turkish military of the Bayar-Menderes regime on May 27, 1960, was the latest of a striking number of such events in The Middle East in late 1950s. The instances vary greatly in their apparent origins, but it was interesting to note that the coups (individual assassinations aside) have occurred, all of them, in countries, which have assayed a parliamentary and more or less Western style of democratic government.39

In Turkey, the story of the emergence of conspiratorial groups in the Turkish Armed Forces during the 1950s is full of unexplained points. Conflicting evidence and apparently false

starts. The coup against Menderes in May 1960 had been in the making since the early-1950s. The developing crises in the second half of the decade had brought together several factions within the Army in their general criticisms of the regime. The sequence of events leading finally to the May 27 coup began about six months earlier. The opposition began to devise new ways of defying the government, and the latter was forced to more and more drastic measures. Probably the greatest blunder of Menderes was bringing the army in to quell political disturbances. The Chief of the General Staff, General Rüştü Erdelhun, seems to have convinced the Prime Minister as well as himself that the army would remain loyal to the government. Even had the army not been brought in directly, however, it was unlikely that it would have remained aloof much longer in the midst of the worsening political situation.

On the other hand, it seems certain that the Chief of the General Staff, General Erdelhun had assured Adnan Menderes, that the army would stay loyal to the regime. According to his later testimony, the Prime Minister tried to resign several times before 27 May but was prevented from doing so by President Bayar. Certainly, Bayar was not one to give up without a fight. At the time of his arrest on 27 May he argued fiercely with his captors and even pulled out a pistol, threatening suicide. The evidence thus suggests that members of the government, including Adnan Menderes, were probably aware of danger of a coup, but that General Erdelhun and President Bayar quelled their anxieties.

The "revolution" of May 27 was completed within four hours. Strategic spots were secured, the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet taken into 'protective custody,' and military commanders placed in charge of the areas in which they were stationed. Immediately after they seized power on the morning of 27 May, the armed forces announced to the Turkish people and

40 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, p. 100.
41 Ümit Özdağ, Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali (Military-Politics Relations during Menderes Era and 27 May Coup), İstanbul, Boyut, 1997, pp. 75-87.
43 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, p. 111.
44 Ibid., p. 119.
the world that: "We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO and we are faithful to them".

In general, public opinion in the West does not seem to have been much concerned about Turkey's internal political situation at this time. Menderes did not appear to have enjoyed a substantial body of support abroad, and there was little public outcry in Western Europe to the effect that the 27 May coup had violated democratic principles.45

In his prominent book about the Turkish military, William Hale gave an information about an extraordinary American aid to Turkish Military Leadership:

The NUC's relations with the rest of the armed forces were further exacerbated on 3-4 August 1960 when around 35,000 officers, including 235 generals and admirals were compulsorily retired. (...) Defense Minister Seyfi Kurtbek, it will be remembered, had proposed such a plan, as long as the opposition of the then commanders but had blocked 1953. The likelihood that the purge had NATO support is suggested by the fact that it was financed by a special grant from the United States.46

In the early 1960s, the American view on 1960 Turkish "revolution" was very realistic.47 One of the American political scientist, Walter F. Weiker, who resided in Turkey for about 18 months -six months preceding the coup and for a year after it- and who has studied subsequent developments carefully, has written an analysis of the five political problems that come to head during or because of the military takeover. His monograph describes the efforts of the military regime to return Turkey to the path of

45Ibid., p. 120.
46Ibid., pp. 124-125.
47The Department of State's venerable Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series has served for generations as the official documentary record of US foreign policy on Turkey. In 1996, Fahır Armaoğlulu examined selected reports on Turkey, see his: "Amerikan Belgelerinde 27 Mayıs Olayı" (27 May Event in American Documents), Belleten, Vol. XL, No. 227, April 1996, pp. 203-226; Also see an extraordinary book recently published by Cüneyt Akalın, Askerler ve Dış Güçler (Soldiers and External Powers), Istanbul, Cumhuriyet, 2000.
Atatürk and reveals the magnitude and complexity of many of the problems that remain to be solved:

The political difficulties in Turkey illustrate several dilemmas of American foreign policy in relation to developing countries. One is the idea, which seem to have prevailed in some quarters at various periods in recent past, that any internal difficulties encountered by allies of the United States will necessarily benefit the Russians. Reports in the American press in April and May 1960, while noting that foreign policy was not at issue in the Turkish troubles, nevertheless made it clear that the question whether Turkey might become a weaker ally was very much an American concern. Reports appeared, though all were denied by the United States government, that both American Ambassador Fletcher Warren and Secretary of State Christian Herter, the latter in Istanbul for the NATO Foreign Minister's meeting, had appealed to Menderes to take steps to improve the internal political atmosphere in Turkey.

Fortunately, the fallacy of these concerns was demonstrated in the first hours of the May 27 revolution, when the armed forces made it fully clear that Turkish commitments to NATO and CENTO were in no way affected, and in the months following Menderes' ouster. All civilian political elements also demonstrated that they had no intention of doing anything that might weaken Turkish firmness against the colossus of the North. On the contrary, it was the military regime that became the first to undertake such projects as building radio stations in Eastern Turkey to counter Russian propaganda that for many years had had a virtual monopoly of radio access to the most undeveloped Turkish provinces.

Another dilemma of American policy is the problem of contact with the political opposition groups. The Menderes government especially in the later part of its decade of rule, discouraged official relationships between foreign diplomats and leaders of the Republican People's Party. It is; of course, true that diplomats are accredited to the government of the host country, and might be abusing their privileges by defying express or strongly implied wishes of that government about the behavior of the diplomats. It is precisely in a bipolar situation like that of Turkey before 1960, however, that acquaintance with opposition thinking is most important.

(...) It is precisely because of these many material and ideological ties to the West that the United States has potentially great leverage in demanding the best possible use of its aid. The weapon so often used by developing nations, the threat to turn to the Soviet block, is of virtually no relevance in the Turkish case. History and ideology make
it unlikely that, under present conditions, Turkey would succumb even to the most tempting Soviet offers. It is also highly improbable that Russia would offer terms of aid or support for Turkey for anything less than neutralization of the Straits, a point on which Turkey has said repeatedly that it would not even consider yielding.

(...)

A concurrent complaint of the Turkish opposition to Menderes was that the United States did not use its leverage to persuade Menderes to ease his repressive political policies. In this area the line between legitimate American concern for Turkey's political health in order that development may take place most efficiently and effectively, and 'interference in Turkey internal affairs' is more imprecise than in the strictly economic sphere. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that the Menderes regime was nudged or urged to practice the democratic values that Turkey as a self-styled Western nation has preached.

Opportunities as well as problems for the United States arose during the NUC period. From the American point of view civilian, multiparty politics is normally preferable to military rule. Yet, there are possibly some distinct advantages of regimes that are not multiparty -military as well as civilian- in certain circumstances. Turkey, among other countries, has had difficulty for many years in achieving under a multiparty system some of the things that economists generally consider basic to enabling it to move from the 'take off' platform into a stage of increasingly domestic-generated development. Tax reform, for instance, was undertaken by the NUC, although it was not effectively implemented.

(...)

Admittedly the United States cannot look with benign approval on military usurpation of power from democratically elected governments. There are many cases, however, when the United States is either unable to prevent such an occurrence, or where the armed forces come to power for reasons that might be considered more acceptable, for example, overthrow of a government that is not democratic. Military regimes in developing countries are of a wide variety: short-term transitional, long-term, transitional, in search of merely administrative reform, revolution from bottom to top, liberal, totalitarian, or right or left wing. Research is beginning to show a variety of tasks that such regimes have attempted, either successfully or unsuccessfully, and that have had varying effects on such issues as popular participation in politics, the growth of interest groups, political parties, local government, and economic development.48

48Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, pp. 159-162.
As a lesson Professor Weiker commented:

The Turkish Revolution of 1960-61, which temporarily interrupted multiparty politics, has provided some important lessons for the United States about the difficulties that are sure to be encountered on the road to continued economic and political progress in the rapidly modernizing nations of the world. The Turkish experience can provide American policy makers with valuable guidance so that similar situations, which are sure to arise in other 'emerging' nations, may be met constructively.49

George S. Harris, in *The Middle East Journal* produced at the very beginning of 1970s, another specialist view on 1960 Turkish Revolution: "The military did not remain long in power. Their own differences in long range objectives and inexorable pressure from the civilian politicians led, after a falling out among the military leaders themselves, to the elaboration of a new constitution followed by elections. But the path to reincorporate the army under civilian control has not been uneventful."50

7. Conclusion

In 1959, before the end of the year, President Eisenhower visited Turkey between 6-7 December, during his 11-nations good will tour (December 3-23). The President of United States and his party arrived at Ankara from Italy on December 6. After an airport greeting from President Bayar and ceremonial functions, including a wreath lying at the tomb of Atatürk, the President met with Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, and Foreign Minister Zorlu at the Çankaya Palace. After this meeting, the President attended a formal dinner given by Bayar and returned to his residence. On December 7, the President, accompanied by President Bayar left by helicopter for Esenboğa Airport and left Ankara for Karachi, following brief airport ceremonies.51

49 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
The United States had drifted toward stagnation and less involvement during the closing years of President Eisenhower’s administration. Despite continuing super-power conversations, the aura of goodwill that had surrounded the Geneva summit had gradually been dissipating. It was torn apart in 1960 after the U-2 incident, in which American reconnaissance plane was shot down over Soviet territory. As a result, in the early 1960’s it would have been hard to imagine that in the near future the Turks would join in the chorus of anti-American agitation by shouting the familiar "Yankee Go Home". Although little is reported or known in the United States about the details and extent of this development, deep anti-American sentiments have emerged in Turkey, with a concomitant foreign policy reorientation toward neutralism. The examination of the Cyprus question would also reveal that there were other factors involved; among them were the emergence of a socialist movement, dissatisfaction with the United States aid program, American attempts to meddle in internal Turkish politics, and Soviet receptiveness to Turkey’s overtures for a more amicable relationship.

The Marshall Plan was one of the decisive turning points in the early Cold War era. After deliberating briefly on whether or not the Soviet Union should participate in the plan, Stalin quickly decided against it. For forty-five years, the Cold War was the central factor in the world politics. It dominated the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union and affected the diplomacy and domestic politics of most other nations around the globe. Few countries, in fact, escaped its influence. Because the distinctive characteristics of the Cold War, took form in the years immediately following the Second World War, examining its origins is central to understanding international history in the last half of the twentieth century.

52 Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, pp. 261-262.
Revolutionary nationalism in the Third World was at the heart of one of the most significant transformations of the post-war years. The era of decolonization, roughly between 1945-75, provided a window of opportunity for the Soviet Union and vulnerability for the United States and its allies. During the course of the three decades, scores of former colonies attained their political independence. Many national liberation movements were authentic expressions of the popular will for autonomy and freedom and proved to be beyond the control of any foreign power. Unfortunately, however, 1950s were "the honeymoon years" for the Turkish-American relations.