GLOBAL SECURITY CALCULUS: FORCING THE TURKISH-AMERICAN STRATEGIC ALLIANCE TO NEW ORIENTATIONS

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In recent developments of globality, states, albeit reluctantly, have "relinquished" some of their decision making powers, not to a higher authority but to a process where interests have become impossible to define relative to national boundaries. In this changing world, security has acquired a "new" meaning: Until the end of the Cold War, security essentially meant defending and protecting the territories of states from other states who were perceived as sources of threat, whether individually or in concert with others. Amidst the mercurial turnabouts, security is no longer just a problem of territoriality. It has become supra-national, cross-national and has expanded to encompass a set of individual and collective values relating to life, rather than sheer borderlines.

The end of the Cold War has not signified the termination of conflicts, but rather, has caused a shift in heretofore well known objects, objectives and boundaries of conflict. New threats emerge in diffused, fluid and indeterminate modes that are difficult to pin down to particular sources, agents or loci, or to ascribe particular targets. The new threats do not only menace singled out target countries, but represent a risk for a whole social, political and economic way of life incorporated in the modern geo-culture, the
principles of modernity governing the Western world since the Enlightenment, and formulated as political goals by it after the World War II. Since the new "enemy" is far less visible, monitorable and manipulable, security as a notion has become an even more integral concern of the Western world, especially after the experiences in former Yugoslavia, Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo etc., which has served to warn about the indivisibility of security for the protection of the modern concept of life. Thus, nowadays a structural incorporation to a (mainly Western) world rapidly moving toward an organic integration, functionally means taking active part in the shaping of the "better" world; being able to determine the core values of global security in the near future. The inner core of global security in the near future is likely to be based on a world that is predictable, controllable, manageable and therefore safe and free, i.e., where no setbacks on the rule of modern democracy and economic liberalism are necessary or tolerated.\(^1\)

It is probably an overt signal of this holistic aspect of security at one with economic interests taking shape in an integrating world which led President Bill Clinton to declare that economic security is at the top of the international agenda. This basic principle will probably constitute the context of the emerging relationship between Turkey and the USA, as Turkey evolves from strategic security partner to trade partner.

Historically, America's interest in Turkey began with economic motivations at the turn of the century, when, little after his inauguration as President, Theodore Roosevelt said for world domination, the United States had to overcome Turkey and Spain who "held the keys".\(^2\) Indeed, the U.S. regarded Turkey as an object of its "open door" policy during the so-called term of "isolationism". However, after World War II, the relationship was based mainly on a problematic of military security, economic

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relations being relegated to a unilateral flow of aid which, as in the case of Cyprus, were dangled over Turkey's head to influence Ankara's policies. During the Cold War period and within the context of the previous concept of security, the overall role of Turkey was little more than that of a sentinel. It's contribution amounted to it's geostrategical position astride the southward passage of the Soviets, in return for a guarantee of territorial integrity. Comfortable in that security calculus, Turkey hardly bothered to improve economic ties with the U.S.; partly because geography made it a natural partner of Europe but also because until the 1980's, when mutual trade volumes increased and aid dependency was reduced, Turkey's economic structure was not oriented toward international markets.

Adding to that, the traditionally meager civil factors in Turkish politics, the bilateral relations were locked within a context of "pure" politics. The lame economic leg of the relations limited Turkey's political options to bargaining solely over its assumed geopolitical situation and significance.

Although still owing a lot to its strategical geography, Turkey has passed that rubicon whence its position on the world map is its only measure of worthiness for the world. As opposed to its role as geostrategically situated passive minor partner in an alliance of "developed" nations, with proper political management, Ankara can turn into an active economic, social, cultural, political and ideological link of the modern world not only to the Mediterranean, but also to the "other worlds" in the periphery. Practically, the eastern and southern frontiers of Turkey constitute the physical boundary between modernity and non-modernity: The "empire of evil" toppled to reveal a "boiling cauldron of evil"to the east and south of the Anatolian peninsula, a borderline of imminent threat to the West, or the Western style of life. In addition to the intricate machinations of Near Eastern politics, Caucasia is not much different from the Balkans of the early 20th century; with hostilities raging between and within borders; religious or ethnic fundamentalism on universal rage; often precipitating violence and terrorism as the means of their proliferation. Thus, in this historio-geography, the eastern Mediterranean has acquired an even bigger significance in the post Cold War era. Although unannounced and certainly not in those terms, now the primary conflict is between modernity and non-modernity. Peace or
security within this backdrop are no longer definable according to
the compass but according to the standing of each particular
element in the equation (states, minority groups, civil formations
etc.) with relation to modernity; the geoculture of the world
system. In other words, the question is less the plight of peace and
security in particular geographies, but their impact on the security
of the modern world.

In eastern Mediterranean, in the post Cold War world, the
United States and Turkey share a broader range of interests, as
their respective interests converge and are accentuated on topics as,
enhancing shared economic and trade relations, cooperating on
global issues such as fundamentalism and terrorism, regional issues
related to Iraq, Iran, Greece, the Caucasus, Caspian Sea oil, and
Turkey’s new military partnership with Israel. This layout points
out to no significant change in the general geostrategy dependent
relationship; except that Ankara has begun seeking an “enhanced
partnership” with Washington, based on its own sense of its
importance for United States policies or strategies, which Ankara
feared was steadily diminishing at the end of the Cold War. The
late President Turgut Özal joined the coalition formed to confront
Iraq, hoping to convert a strategic partnership to a commercial
traffic. This shook the dust off Turkey’s traditional super prudent
foreign policy approach. However, although what Özal had in
mind was more economic gains through military inclusion, post-
Özal activism was unadulterated in its military and security
objectives—though grown out of valid strategic concerns. Initiation
of a diplomatic and military relationship with Israel is exemplary
of a partnership which grows out of both country’s sense of
isolation turning into activism.

Motivated by the preservation of its territorial integrity as
well as traditionally Western oriented security conceptions, even
before the Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1999, during which its Moslem
neighbors supported the latter, Turkey made its intentions clear
and gave the signs that it will not object to a long dreamed of
Washington project of an alliance that will contribute to stability in
the region based on Turkey, Israel and wishfully, Egypt and
Jordan. Although clouded by its own expectations and perceptions,
in one aspect at least, Turkey’s position reflects the modernist
approach to security: If peace can be instituted and maintained,
some prosperity ensues and socio-political turbulences of the periphery can be controlled through "near modern" buffer zones.

It has to be always remembered that the West looks at a "premodern" world on its immediate periphery and contemplates the dilemma: How to maintain a vitally important geography reasonably peaceful, secure, but sealed so its populace will not "contaminate" the world with (unwanted) "premodernities". Therefore, independent of how badly local political authorities desire it or not, institution of peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean is in the global interests of the modern world, and in particular, the US. The Middle East Peace Process and the American diplomatic initiative to thaw the frozen "impasse" in Cyprus are indications of this deep rooted interest. The matter of concern for the regional parties is that, as long as it balances the strategic and political demands of the modern powers led by the US and is practical, workable and more importantly, applicable despite inevitable (maybe even violent) opposition, any resultant "solution" does not necessarily have to be equitable, fair, respectful to local imperatives or, if direly necessary, even the borders of "sovereign" states.

Turkey is lucky that the US shows considerable respect to its ally's sensitivity over territorial integrity. But, although ultimately refreshing, that in itself is not sufficient theoretical or practical basis for the policy of a regional power candidate like Turkey. The consolidation of Turkey's power in the region, which will be the most significant protective bulwark modernity can design, cannot be complete without an economic expansion and ideational component indispensable for leadership. So far, the emphasis was solely on military, security and political aspects of a Turco-American partnership in the eastern Mediterranean which nevertheless opens up vistas conducive for capital and trade cooperation. Indeed, Özal’s gambit may have paid off, in January 1994, the Commerce Department included Turkey in a new approach to U.S. international trade relations with the "Big Emerging Markets" (BEM); a strategy involving countries that Washington believes will account for a major share of the world's economic growth over the next 15 years.

In recent years, however, what we are seeing in an intensifying arc of crises running from the Balkans, through Asia
Minor to the Persian Gulf is that, Turkey stands under intensifying pressure from a number of quarters. Especially when the "containment policy of Iraq" by the U.S. and the U.K. formed into a "confrontation turned to conflict" in December 1998, with the Anglo-American bombing of Iraq, the long partnership has shown signs of stress. Remembering the enormous problems Turkey's support for the U.S.military during the Gulf War caused for Ankara, the Turkish public is sensitive to U.S. plans, to say the least. Ever since it began, the US-led "low-sanction, high-military, encourage-the-opposition strategy" towards Iraq has precipitated suspicions in Turkey, which led to its criticism of the air war over Iraq and declaration that the American strike that disrupted a pipeline to Turkey was unacceptable. Even only this incident is a signal that Turkey's place in this dicey region necessitates the urgent need for an holistic implementation of security.

The corollary, then, that only through a holistic understanding of security, the Turco-American orientation seems to make its way to the inner core of global security. The "inner core" foresees a world that is predictable, controllable, manageable and therefore safe and therefore free, i.e., where no setbacks on the rule of modern democracy and economic liberalism are necessary or tolerated. This world is one that can expect growth in every aspect of life in geometric proportions.
Çağrı Erhan, Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri (Historical Roots of the Turkish-American Relations), Ankara: İmge, 2001, 426 pp.

Originally prepared as author’s doctorate thesis, the revised book firmly embedded in Diplomatic History discipline, combining historical and international political dimensions. It is this feature of the book that provides us with the opportunity to make a comparative analysis between the Ottoman Empire and the US of the 19th century.

The author’s basic thesis is that, in the 19th century when the US power was on the rise, the Ottoman Empire had already started its decline about a century ago. Thus, the disparity between the powers of an ascending and descending states should primarily be taken into account in order to understand the relations between the two countries.

The book comprise of three chapters. The first chapter deals with the establishment of the relations between the two countries (1776-1830). It tries the find out the historical roots of Turkish-American relations, through inquiries into why the US had originally developed an interest towards Maghrib countries, such as
Tripoli and Algeria, which were under Ottoman rule as semi-independent areas. According to Erhan, this interest was mainly result of the US economic needs and policies; as a rising power US needed to expand its economic base with connections abroad.

Thus, when, in the first half of the 19th century, the semi-independent Maghrib countries prevented US trade with the region, creating a deep impact for the American trade bourgeoisie, the US started to build its first deep sea armada to mount a successful military campaign against these countries. Erhan argues convincingly that this period of war, known as Barbary Wars, had an important place and impact on US history.

After the Barbary Wars, when the US navy secured Mediterranean for its trade routes, it tried to sign a trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire. Although, the Ottomans were not desirous to enter into an agreement with the US at the beginning, especially its military needs forced the Ottoman Empire to sign the 1830 Trade Agreement with the US. The agreement included a secret clause, a first for the US diplomacy, according to which the US accepted to sale war ships to the Ottoman Empire.

According to the author, Ottoman-American bilateral relations entered the closest period of co-operation (1830-1867) following this agreement. Through the increase in economic relations, establishment of the diplomatic missions, arms sales from the US to the Ottoman Empire, and arrival of the Protestant missionaries to the Ottoman lands, the US diplomats established close relations with the Ottoman statesmen. The cordial relationship was fostered as the US diplomats in Istanbul did not try to interfere in Empire’s domestic problems and the Sublime Port was convinced that US did not have any secret ambition for the Ottoman lands.

As Erhan states, however, although there were positive factors to further improve bilateral relations, the Sublime Port still did not consider the US as one of the great powers, such as Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Austria.

Despite developing relations, number of problems emerged towards the end of this era; US criticism about the legal status of the Straits, judicial and nationality problems of the US citizens who
settled in Ottoman lands, missionary activities of US citizens, support of the Americans to Christian nations that rebelled against Ottoman rule. Although the US had not officially pursued a policy against the Ottoman Empire, emerging problems nevertheless started to affect bilateral relations.

The last era taken by the book covers from 1867 to 1917, which is named by the author as the "Era of Eastern Question and the US". Ottoman-US relations got worse day-by-day during this period. The author connects the emerging US imperialism and its policy towards the Sublime Porte, in this era, as the US started to pursue imperialist policies and aimed to expand its economic, political and military influence around the world. This general tendency also affected its bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire. Erhan argues that the US in this period not only supported Ottoman millets directly in their independence struggles, but the US missionaries too played an important role at the emergence of nationalism among various ethnic groups within the Empire. Erhan follows this pattern trough uprisings in Crete, Bulgaria and among the Armenian population. He also argues that the Ottoman policies against rebel nations caused the Ottoman and Turkish image to be tainted in the US.

The book ends with Chester Project, which was the first direct investment attempt of the US capital into Anatolia, and with the ending of the diplomatic relations with the World War I.

While preparing this book, the author utilised historical documents extensively from US' National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), British Foreign Office and Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry. This strengthened objectivity and quality. But his preference or inevitability of not using the archives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions stands out as the book's main deficiency, though he tried to compensate this deficiency by using memories of missionaries, visitors diaries and books that explain missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire.

With its simple language and user-friendly reading, the book would be of interest not only to experts of Turkish-American relations but also to students and even ordinary curious whose knowledge about the Turkish-American relations is limited. In this
context, the usage of the visual materials, such as the historical
documents that was utilised in the book, could have added
significantly to book's appeal. Although Turkish-American
relations after the World War II has become subject of many
scholarly inquiries, the Ottoman-American relations has not
received enough attention so far. Erhan's book is a strong step to
fill gap in this respect.

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Nasu Uslu, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (Turkish-American

Anybody dealing with the Turkish foreign policy would
mark Turkish-American relations as one of the most important
aspects of Turkey's post-Second World War international agenda.
Although started approximately one century before 1945, political
relations between Turkey and the United States had never been too
close, while economic and trade relations were always above
average. Until 1920s, Washington's "non involvement" policy based
on the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 on the one hand, and İstanbul's
decision to give priority to closer relations with the European
powers on the other, prevented creation of a multi-dimensional co-
operation between these two countries of eastern and western
hemispheres. During the inter-war years, both parties tried to
reestablish diplomatic ties, broken in 1917, with the United States'
entrance to the War; and political relations, besides the economic
one, were resumed stronger than before. However, the turning
point in the relations was the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in
1947, which symbolized the beginning of the Cold War and
Turkey's alliance with the United States. Although shaken by
number of serious crises from time to time, main course of the
relations between the two states has been in a flourishing path since
then.

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Surprisingly, long and promising story of Turkish-American relations have not inspired many Turkish authors. Even among the academics, only a handful of names can be counted with their outstanding contributions to the field: Fahir Armaoğlu, Oral Sander, Haluk Ülman, Hasan Koni, Faruk Sönmezoglu, Süha Bölükbaşı and Duygu Sezer. Certainly not enough, given the importance and variance of the relations for Turkey.

Thus, as one of the rare publications on history and analysis of the Turkish-American relations, Nasuh Uslu’s book, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (Turkish-American Relations) is a welcome addition.

Nasuh Uslu’s book is “the product of a long-run study started by [his] PhD dissertation” titled “Turkey's Relationship with the United States, 1960-1975” submitted to Durham University, UK in 1994. As Dr. Uslu states in the Foreword, he revised and developed his thesis, and prepared two books out of it. Besides *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, Dr. Uslu produced *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs* (Cyprus in Turkish-American Relations), in which he details the American approach to Turco-Greek relations, especially on the basis of Cyprus problem, from the late 1950s up to 2000.

*Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* is an over-size (24 cm) 408-page book, written in single space, Times-New Roman 12 points font, thus contains very detailed information on the subject. Dr. Uslu sustained great effort not to miss any single event in 50 years history of the bilateral relations. This concern, on the one hand, makes the book a reference source for Turkish-American relations, but on the other, creates difficulties to read it within a theoretical context. In order to overcome these difficulties, Dr. Uslu added two complimentary conceptual chapters into his book as an introductory to the history of the relations: "The Theoretical Base of Turkish-American Relations" and "Foreign Policy Formation in Turkey and the USA". In both chapters Dr. Uslu tries to answer basic questions such as, "In a small-big power relationship which side gets more benefits?"; "To what extent can a big power influence and change foreign policies, decisions and actions of its smaller ally and force it to act in a certain way?"; "To what extent can a big power influence national causes and internal policies of
its smaller ally?"; "How does a small power act when it faces threats and pressures from its big ally?", etc.

Dr. Uslu, briefly explains Turkey's need for the American alliance after the Second World War by three factors: protecting security, maintaining military and economic aid and strengthening western-type state model (p. 17).

Michael Handel's book of *Weak States of International System* (London, Frank Cass, 1981) lists Turkey as one of the weak states, and Dr. Uslu seems deeply influenced by Handel's views (pp. 29-33). However, Dr. Uslu's evaluation of Turkey as a small/weak state is a highly questionable approach, as recent analyses of Turkey's position in the international system focus on "middle power" or "medium power" term rather than "weak state" approach. While Handel names Turkey as a weak state by using criteria such as population, area, economy, national resources, military strength, William Hale and Baskın Oran find the term "medium power" more suitable by using the same criteria.¹

Clearly, Dr. Uslu, also bears some concerns for determining Turkey's relations with the United States as "patron-client state relationship", as he affirms in p. 33 that, "it might be said that the US-Turkish relationship bore some characteristics of the patron-client relationship but not enough to fit this categorization. Especially, after 1965 it cannot be said that Turkey followed US policy step by step. Nevertheless, the US was generally happy with the Turkish governments' general attitude until July 1975 when the functioning of US bases in Turkey was halted".

As a point to appreciate, the author touches upon the development of foreign policy decision-making processes of the US (pp. 67-79). For Turkish readers, topics such as effects of the public opinion, military, the Congress, the National Security Council on American foreign policy formation and philosophical

roots of American diplomacy, such as anti-communism, world leadership, realism and moral values are new subjects.

After the theoretical introduction, the book embraces the Turkish-American relations in six chapters: Beginning of the Relations (pp. 87-106); Price Paid by Turkey in 1950s: the Baghdad Pact (pp. 107-137); Price Paid by Turkey in 1960s: the Cuban Missile Crisis (pp. 137-175); Military Relations 1960-1980 (pp. 175-223); Problem in 1970s: the Opium-Poppy Dispute (pp. 223-259); Co-operation Among Problems in 1980s (pp. 259-308); and Post-Cold War Relations (pp. 309-361).

The book relies on a rich bibliography. Primary sources such as government reports and Turkish Grand National Assembly or US Congress proceedings and papers attract attention. Rare references to archival material such as diplomatic correspondence between the US legation in Ankara and the State Department could be forgiven given that the author did not have chance to conduct an archival research in the United States. However, usage of printed diplomatic correspondence series, such as *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986), brings another question into mind, as to why Dr. Uslu had not made use of other printed archival materials. On the other hand, extensive references to Turkish, American and British newspapers are evidences of a serious research in newspaper collections. Besides, the author's interviews with important figures in Turkish-American relations are good examples of a meticulous work.

Despite its occasional flaws, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* fills an important gap in Turkish foreign policy historiography and Dr. Uslu proves to be a promising academic in the field.

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Burcu Bostanoğlu's book on the politics of relations between Turkey and the US, represents a substantially different outlook on the subject by analysing it through the perspective of critical theory.

The book devotes a huge part to the theoretical development of International Relations as a discipline of the social sciences. It begins with idealism and goes on with a lengthy criticism of positivism and its reflection in International Relations, the realist paradigm and modernism.

Bostanoğlu's work is important and a breakthrough among the works on Turkish foreign policy in the sense that it tries to transcend the realist paradigm prevalent in Turkish foreign policy researches. More than being a study on Turkish foreign policy, the book is also a useful source for the study of International Relations theory since it spares around 200 pages for the theoretical arguments and it gives a general outline of US foreign policy in the 20th century.

Bostanoğlu tries to analyse what she calls "the politics of Turkish-American relations" by using the premises of critical theory. She argues that contrary to the narrow power-interest centred realist paradigm, with this approach the totality of relations could be encompassed. This unique endeavour itself is worthy of praise.

The author focuses on three cases, two of which are Turkey's participation in the US-led war efforts (the Korean War and the Gulf War) where Turkey's policies converge with the US, and in one of them their policies diverge—the Cyprus question. Turkey's participation in the Korean War, which shows Ankara's desire to take part in the Western world and specifically in NATO, coincided with the establishment/strengthening of the US world hegemony after the World War II. The second case study is the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 where Turkey tried to consolidate its place within the Western world on the verge of the "New World Order". And the
third case is the Cyprus question, a point of contention between Turkey and the US since the early 1960s.

After giving a detailed analysis of realism, neo-realism and critical theory, the book offers the development of the concept of hegemony and pays special attention to the US hegemony and Turkey's place in US hegemonic world order. In the book, the parallelism between US foreign policy and the academic development of International Relations as a discipline is explicated succinctly.

It is the contention of the author that Turkey has taken part within the US global hegemony by consent, in the Gramscian sense, used in International Relations by Robert Cox. Therefore, the two of the three cases represents the "consent" while the other one represents "coercion" (the arms embargo).

Rightfully, the author claims that the realist paradigm is part of the US academic/hegemonic tool and realist outlook to foreign policy constitutes the main pillar of US hegemonic practice.

Despite its novel approach to a very traditional subject, Bostanoğlu's work suffers from an important deficiency. Although the author takes up the subject from a critical theory perspective, we do not see any class-based analysis for explaining Turkish foreign policy in general and vis-à-vis the US specifically. Turkey, according to the author, tries to be part of the Western world, but this aspiration is taken for granted, without probing and analysing the class basis of such a policy. Bostanoğlu argues that Turkey joined the Korean War to gain membership in NATO, without any pressure from the US, i.e., with "consent." It is surprising to see here that she follows the traditional-realist line of argument that the reason for Turkey's willingness to be a member of NATO is the result of the "Turkey's fear of the Soviets and the Soviet demands on the Bosphorous and the Eastern provinces (pp. 337-338, 398). It is argued that Turkey has been trying to be a Westernised country for two centuries and Democrat Party wanted Turkey to be a developed country, that Turkey wanted to liberalise its economy with consent and in expectation of foreign aid (pp. 332, 338), and that this policy contains sentimental overtones as well (p. 398).
In a similar vein, the relationship between the two countries are analysed at the governmental level. Bostanoğlu avoids to construct her analysis on the societal level although civil society is the main factor in forming the "consent" and this fact is indeed stressed by the author herself (p. 379). Bostanoğlu's explanation for this is "the lack of the participation of Turkish civil society in the US hegemonic world order" (p. 380). This puts aside the most crucial element of the critical theory perspective and the author simply ignores the role of the civil society in the analysis on the grounds that the participation of civil society in Turkey in the relationship is weak. In fact, there is a huge literature on the role and development of civil society in Turkey and its influence on foreign policy such as Çağlar Keyder, Dogan Avcıoğlu and others. Especially important in this regard is the role of the burgeoning trading class during the Second World War years. Though based on a more instrumentalist version of Marxian analysis Türkkaya Ataöv's early work on Turkish-American relations (Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye, 1969) and Haluk Gerger's book on political-economy of Turkish foreign policy are good examples how this class forced the government immediately after the war years to have closer relations with the US and sought membership in NATO.

The second point that should be pointed out is the concept of (national) interest which Bostanoğlu uses in the book without giving any definition of it. It is interesting that the author severely criticises Turkish foreign policy because of its inefficiency in pursuing the national interest (p. 338), Turkey was unable to use the gains it could have achieved by using its geopolitical situation (p. 339) and Turkey was not strong enough in influencing the Turkic origin Caucasus and Central Asian republics (p. 340). With sentences like "Turkey is doomed to loose if it follows the same passive policy of 1950s in the 1990s" (p. 342), "...Turkey could not develop an active policy in line with its interests concerning the Cyprus issue" (p. 435), "Turkey, with its potential to be a regional power, is a country that should have a more influential role on Baghdad" (p. 416); the author recommends policy options for the official foreign policy basing on the premises of the realist perspective.
In general, Bostanoğlu's book represents a fresh outlook to the foreign policy works and is stimulating for the new studies to come.

İLHAN UZGEL

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This edited volume brings together a group of experts with varied backgrounds to provide an impressive collection mostly to the American audience. With their diverse backgrounds and well-established credentials in government, journalism and academia, and with their knowledge of Turkey and the Turkish language, the contributors are able to present lucid, well-written, easily digestible and argumentative chapters on post cold war Turkey and Turkish-American relations.

Certain individual chapters within the book are of high quality and offer significant insight into the nitty-gritty of different aspects of Turkish-American relations. Heath Lowry and Alan Makovksy especially provide useful perceptions into the past and the future of the relationship between the two countries. Their balanced analyses of opportunities for improvement of this relationship and obstacles for further enhancement provide useful sobering warnings as well as hope for the future of the relationship that 'has implications for American interests far beyond those of Soviet containment' (p. vi).

Even those contributions that leave the reader with a less satisfactory taste are well structured and professionally done. Their weaknesses flow mainly from the fact that their authors' primary

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interest is not Turkish-American relations *per se*. The book was commissioned by an American foundation for the American audience with an intention to explain them the importance of Turkey for the American interests, without much scholarly concern. The fact that three of the seven authors (Abramowitz, Wilkinson and Makovsky) have worked or still working for the US government; one author (Çandar) is a journalist; and the main area of specialisation of the rest of the authors is not the Turkish-American relations (Öniş is an economist; Robins is an expert on Turkey's Middle Eastern policy and Lowry is an Ottoman historian), reflected in the book's occasional flaws, which are not many in any case.

Despite the individual quality of most of the chapters, the collection as a whole lacks a coherent framework and fails to be a comprehensive study of all aspects of US-Turkish relations. While domestic aspects of both countries figure predominantly on many chapters (chapters 2-6), only chapter seven deals with a third-party involvement to the smooth functioning of the relationship between the two countries. One expects to find additional chapters dealing with Turkish-American-Israeli triangle, or Turkish-US cooperation in the 'Caspian Games', though many authors take them up in passing. Also Öniş's chapter is a survey of Turkey's economic problems and how these are relevant to Turkish-US relations is not made clear, except a rightful conclusion that there is a room for improvement (pp. 114-115). Çandar, on the other hand, being an ardent supporter and sometimes advisor/originator of late president Özal's 'active foreign policy', cannot occasionally escape from partiality and a bias approach. Finally, despite an excellent *Introduction and Overview* by Morton Abramowitz, the book needs a concluding chapter that could have summarized the findings of the various chapters into a coherent whole to present guidelines for the future, though again many authors do that individually.

Another problem that bothers the reader is the result of the dynamism that overwhelms Turkey specialist; Turkey is a country on the move and change in every aspect of the daily life from economics to foreign policy is an inescapable phenomenon. The authors of individual chapters of this book were also caught by this dynamism, thus detailed information are sometimes outdated (for
example see pp. 11, 13, 112, 235, 258), though not their overall analysis.

The main problem with the book is that it is an edited volume; thus, like all other such works, brings together some perfect and some not so-good articles. Nevertheless, there are good and insightful individual papers and overall it does justice to its stated aim, that is, to offer 'insightful and important explanation(s) of American interests, Turkey's domestic problems, and a likely future agenda of bilateral relations' (p. vii). In short, it would be a good addition to Turkish foreign policy studies and for those who wish to get a grasp of how American foreign policy is made regarding its smaller allies.

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