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ABSTRACT

Cold War dynamics compelled Turkey and the nationalist Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Syria, to join two opposing camps. Conflicting geopolitical interests between Turkey and the nationalist Arab countries led to a rivalry for regional hegemony and an alignment pattern inimical to the security of the other countries. Turkey's membership in NATO in 1952 and the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 caused concern for the Egyptian president Gamal abd-al Nasser, who perceived those pacts as tools of Western imperialism. On the other hand, for Turkey these pacts were guarantors of Turkish security against an expansionist Soviet Union. Diverging threat perceptions between Turkey and the radical Arab states resulted in a tense atmosphere in the Middle East sub-system.

KEYWORDS

The Baghdad Pact, Turkish foreign policy, Syrian foreign policy, Egyptian foreign policy, Adnan Menderes, Gamal abd-al Nasser, Cold War.
Introduction

The Cold War (1946-1991) had different meanings for Turkey and the nationalist Arab countries, emanating from their security needs and threat perceptions.

For Turkey, the Cold War was characterized by the Soviet threat, which entailed territorial demands on its Eastern region, specifically Kars and Ardahan and demands for bases on the Turkish straits. This state of affairs led Turkey to join the Western bloc, which culminated in its membership in NATO in 1952. Russians were perceived as the source of threat against which Turkey allied with the United States. In that vein, Turkish-Soviet friendship between 1921-1945 seems like an anomaly in the centuries-long rivalry and the Cold War dynamics very much reminded the Turks of the expansionist neighbor from the north.

For Arabs, on the other hand, the USSR did not pose an immediate threat since they were not geographically contiguous to that country. On the contrary, the Soviet Union became an important country supporting the Arab cause in international fora. Military and economic aid flowed from the Soviet Union to the revolutionary Arab countries.

The main threat for the Arab countries was Israel and the major area of contention was Palestine, which had to be resolved before a viable peace were to be established in the Middle East.

Turkish-Arab differences became more manifest with the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 by which Turkey and most Arab countries, except Iraq were on different sides. Nasser perceived the Baghdad Pact as the continuation of Western colonialism, which purported to further their hegemony in an implicit manner as opposed to the direct colonialism of the past.

The divergent perceptions of Turkey and the revolutionary Arab countries towards the Cold War led to the problematic relations between Turkey and the Arab countries. It is a function of the different geopolitical contexts of the relevant countries. Their respective identities also played important roles in the orientations of the countries in question. This state of affairs led to the further
exacerbation of Turkish-Arab antagonism, which is historically and ideologically embedded. One point of clarification would be in order here. By diverging perceptions, we do not imply a psychological analysis of the leaders of Turkey and Arab countries. We simply employ this concept to demonstrate the contrasting geopolitical and ideological propensities of these regimes had a direct impact on their foreign policy outcomes. In other words, the Cold War had different meanings to Turkey and the Arab states.

We will try to answer the question about the kind of factors which affected these different perceptions and will focus particularly on the Baghdad Pact and the political developments of the 1950s. We will not deal with the developments after the dissolution of the Baghdad Pact. The main actors in this study are the US and Turkey on the one hand, the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria on the other. Iraq is relevant first as a founding member of the Baghdad Pact and after 1958 as a country joining the revolutionary camp of Arab states. It should be added that this study mainly focuses on Arab nationalist states but not on the moderate monarchies. We use radical, nationalist or revolutionary Arab states interchangeably and with those terms we are referring especially to Egypt and Syria. They are republican regimes, practicing some form of Arab socialism. They were closer to the Soviet bloc, despite the fact that Egypt in particular claimed to have followed a neutral foreign policy. Conservative or moderate Arab states included Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon, which were usually pro-Western. We will also deal with the role of regional actors and Great Britain as a member of the Baghdad Pact.

We divided our study into three parts. In the first part, we will analyze the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab awakening, the origins of Arab-Turkish antagonism and the roots of the Arab and Turkish nationalisms.

In the second part of our study, we will focus on the US and the USSR's interests in the Middle East, especially in the 1950s, as well as the advent of the Cold War to the Middle East. The political atmosphere of the 1950s demonstrates the different problems and geo-strategic threats facing Turkey and the Arab countries.

In the third part, we will analyze the creation of the Baghdad Pact, the role of Turkey, its threat perception, and the responses of
nationalist Arab countries (i.e., Egypt and Syria). The roles and expectations of these countries, which were parties to the Pact, and the regional Arab states such as Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia will also be studied.

The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab Awakening

The rise of nationalist sentiments in the Ottoman Empire made the continuation of the Ottoman polity highly unlikely. First, the non-Muslim Christian subjects have gained independence and then Muslim peoples such as Albanians and Arabs demanded independence.

The Ottomans captured most areas of the Middle East in the sixteenth century and held them until the 20th century. Selim I captured most of Mashreq and Egypt in 1516-1517.1 There was relative calm in the region until the nineteenth century, when Arab nationalism emerged first in Lebanon, then spread to the larger area of Mashreq and later, in the twentieth century to Arabia and Egypt. Until that time Arabs did not perceive Turkish rule as foreign and considered themselves as an integral part of the Muslim empire.2 Even though Antonius has claimed that Mehmet Ali and his son Ibrahim, after being the masters of Egypt in the beginning of the nineteenth century, wanted to create an Arab Empire, he also admits that at the time there was no Arab national consciousness3 among the elite and the populace. The fact that Mehmet Ali was of Albanian origin proves this point. Demands for Arab national independence had to wait the awakening of national consciousness first among the intellectuals, then the masses in the twentieth century.

Bassam Tibi explains the emergence of Arab nationalism in three stages: literary rebirth, politicization of this cultural activity and

lastly the political demand of Arab independence. These three stages categorize the evolution of Arab nationalism rather succinctly; starting with the cultural developments of late 19th century, the emergence of some literary and then political societies and culminating in the revolt of Sharif Hussein, manifesting the political phase of the Arab national movement.

Actually, until the revolt of Sharif Hussein, manifestations of Arab nationalism were confined to educated classes and did not have any mass following. Arab-Turkish antagonism has its roots in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. The destruction of the Ottoman Empire, and the failure of the Ottomanist project, in other words the endeavor to create Ottoman citizens out of the different religious and ethnic subjects of the Empire resulted in redefinition of people's political identities. The Arab and Turkish nationalisms more or less simultaneously emerged. There was a widespread belief that Arab nationalism was a reaction against the Union and Progress Party's Turkification policies. Our understanding of the subject is that the rise of two nationalisms emerged more or less at the same time at the end of the nineteenth century and that in the age of nationalism a multi-national political entity like the Ottoman Empire could not have survived.

The development that was critical in the emergence of Arab awakening was the coming of missionaries and their establishment of schools since they helped to reinvigorate the Arabic language as they have encouraged the writing of Arabic textbooks, dictionaries and encyclopedias, as well as the translation of the Bible. Numerous printing presses were transferred to numerous cities in Syria. Nasef al-Yazeji and Butrus al-Bustani were important figures in this intellectual project.5

Ibrahim Yazeji, the son of Nasef Yazeji, popularized a poem that called for Arabs to arise and end the tyrannical Turkish rule.6 In 1875 a secret society was founded in Beirut by graduates of the

6Ibid., p.54.
Syrian Protestant College (later to be named American University in Beirut) that started posting placards in Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo calling for the liberation of Syria from Ottoman rule.\(^7\)

Secret societies were established by Arab intellectuals and among the Arab soldiers serving in the Ottoman army, namely Qahtaniyya, al-Fatat and al-Ahd between 1909-1914. Their initial objective was to increase Arab political and cultural rights but their demands evolved into full independence with the beginning of World War I.\(^8\)

Sharif Hussein and his sons, Faisal and Abdullah in particular, began their contacts with the British in 1914, resulting in the Arab revolt of 1916, together with the full cooperation of the secret societies.\(^9\) The hanging of numerous Arab nationalists, accused of treason against the Ottoman state, by Cemal Paşa in Syria increased the antagonism felt by the Arabs towards Turkish rule.\(^10\)

As a result of Anglo-Arab cooperation, the Ottoman Empire had to withdraw from its Arab territories but after the end of World War I, most Arab states could not gain their independence promised by the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. Ten letters were exchanged between Sharif Hussein of Mecca and the British High Commissioner in Egypt Henry McMahon, in which the latter promised the Arabs the Arabian peninsula, Iraq and Syria, excluding the coastal "area lying west of a line from Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" in return for an insurrection against the Ottoman Empire.\(^11\)

After the Great War (WWI), Arabs failed to gain their independence. Syria and Lebanon became French mandates, Iraq,

\(^7\)Ibid., pp. 79-85.
\(^8\)Ibid., pp. 110-115.
\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 127, 134, 150-153
\(^10\)Ibid., pp. 189-190.
Palestine and Trans-Jordan were under British control. Thus the quest for independence continued after the war as the dream of Arab independence, except Egypt and Saudi Arabia, was not realized.

After 1923, Turkey opted for a secular national identity emphasizing the old Turkish roots at the expense of the Islamic and Ottoman heritage. There was widespread cultural westernization of the daily lives especially for the educated elites. So, even though Turkey fought the Western powers in its War of Independence in the aftermath of the WWI, it did not become an anti-Western state. After the emergence of the Cold War, Turkey had no difficulty in aligning with the Western powers. In fact, the Soviet regime’s demands on Turkey were the continuation of traditional Russian policy of reaching warm waters (i.e., Mediterranean, Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean) and expansion at the expense of Turkic and Muslim peoples. Russia’s conquests, started with the invasion of Kazan Khanate in 1552, later on at the end of the 18th century it snatched Crimea from the Ottoman Empire, and at the beginning of the 19th century defeated the local khanates in the Caucasus and by the end of the century completed the occupation of Turkestan. In other words, Soviet threat was an old danger wrapped in new clothing. Russo-Turkish wars during the Ottoman time made Russia a traditional enemy of Turkey.

It should also be added that Soviet territorial demands on Turkey and pressure for bases on the Turkish Straits very much pushed Turkey into America’s arms.

On the other hand, the Middle Eastern Arab states could not gain their independence right after the First World War. Most of them became British and French mandates, they started gaining their independence after 1930 and increasingly after World War II. British and French mandates replaced most of the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire. This era added an anti-colonial and an anti-Western dimension to the Arab nationalism.

Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser support the argument presented in this study such that both the czarist and communist regimes in Russia posed a direct threat to Turkey whereas Arabs were not directly threatened by Russia. Furthermore, Turkey was not threatened by Western powers after it has gained its independence, whereas the Arab states continued to be controlled by the Western powers, namely Britain and France, even after World War II, and their influence continued all the way down to the present day. One important reason for Turkish-Arab difference was that Turkey has remained independent for many centuries but the Arabs were under the political control of foreign nations (particularly under Turkish rule). So there was a feeling of victimization by the Arabs. The Arabs felt threatened by Israel and aligned against that state whereas Turkey felt no such threat and also it lacked any natural allies as the Arab states did, so it was inclined to align with the Northern Tier countries and the Western countries.

The 1956 Suez War very much proves our point about Arab feelings of vulnerability towards the Western powers. In that war, Israel collaborated with Britain and France to occupy Egypt as a reaction to Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. It was not the Soviet Union that occupied Egypt but former colonial masters of the region Britain and France and a new actor in Middle Eastern politics: Israel.

**Political Atmosphere in the 1950s**

The Soviet Union was very close to a hegemonic status in Eurasia at the end of Second World War. The Red Army was in control of Eastern Europe. It was the combination of Soviet power and its ideology that posed such a threat to the Western world. The

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15Ibid., p. 50.
Cold War started as communism as a worldview threatened democratic and undemocratic nations (all pro-Western powers were seen as part of the Free World), supported by the military might of the Soviet Union. Communist ideology divided the world into socialist and non-socialist camps that were in an antagonistic relationship, which would result in worldwide victory of socialism. This state of affairs made coexistence between the two superpowers extremely difficult.\(^{18}\)

Stalin in 1946 argued that as long as capitalism existed war would be inevitable due to the war-like propensity of capitalism. And Churchill’s iron curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri\(^ {19}\) signaled the growing awareness in the Western camp of the difficulty of coexistence between the two camps.

In this tense atmosphere, John Foster Dulles and others envisaged the Northern Tier countries, in 1950s, as a buffer zone against Soviet expansionism that legitimized itself with communism. Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Greece were part of the Northern Tier that was supposed to contain Soviet imperialism.\(^ {20}\) The protection of the Middle Eastern oil was one of the most important reasons for extending security guarantees to Turkey\(^ {21}\) and to the other Northern Tier countries.

In the aftermath of the World War II, the Soviet Union was successful in establishing friendly governments in Northern Iran: Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Mahabad Republic, both in December 1945.\(^ {22}\) As far as Turkey was concerned, the Soviet Union demanded its Eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan and bases on

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18 N. Graebner, pp.16, 79.
the Turkish straits by revising the Montreux Treaty.\textsuperscript{23} Turkey and Iran were under serious threat and American protection was paramount for the preservation of their national independence.\textsuperscript{24} The traditional Russian policy of reaching warm water ports was behind these territorial designs and demands. Now, the Soviet Union wanted to reach that goal by establishing friendly governments in the region, which meant Soviet satellite states or establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{25} In 1946 Russian troops moved into Northern Iran\textsuperscript{26}. American pressure on the Soviet Union eventually led to Russian evacuation from these territories.\textsuperscript{27} American stance towards these provocations was answered after the death of the Turkish ambassador to Washington, Mehmet Ertegün, whose corpse was brought back to Turkey with the Missouri battleship in April 1946.\textsuperscript{28} This event has demonstrated American resolve in stopping further Soviet expansion. The United States by 1946 was aware that Soviet control of the Middle East meant that Western influence would cease to exist in the region. So the US countered the Soviet threat\textsuperscript{29} and protected the Northern Tier. While the United States administration was reluctant to provide assistance to Turkey, Iran and Greece in 1945, by 1946 Soviet intentions became clear as a result of the latter’s demands and hence the Americans began to give diplomatic support and military and economic aid to these countries.\textsuperscript{30}

All these incidents culminated in the Truman Doctrine of 12 March 1947 that declared that United States should “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures”. Economic and military aid was given to Turkey and Greece and American commitment to these and other countries were formalized under this doctrine.\textsuperscript{31} The Secretary of State Dean Acheson argued that if Greece and Turkey were to fall other countries

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., pp.287, 359.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 299.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp.300, 380.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p.323.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p.334.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p.335.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., pp.360-361.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., pp. 378.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., pp. 413-415, 462.
would follow suit.\textsuperscript{32} This was one of the earliest expressions of the domino theory which argued that fall of one country to communism would lead to the spread of communism, like wild fire, to the other counties in the region.\textsuperscript{33}

It would be in order to argue that the two superpowers, United States and the Soviet Union were concerned in converting as many local allies as possible in the Middle East since they were involved in a global struggle to win the minds and hearts of nations, in which no state- no matter how small- was expendable. Acquiring a new ally for one superpower meant a loss for the other superpower, hence increasing the power of the super power that got the new ally. Regional powers such as Egypt played one super power against the other to get more economic and military aid. Britain and France were concerned about preserving their former colonial status in a new form by alliances and protecting their interests in the region. Ironically, their endeavor to preserve their preponderant status in the Middle East led to their strategic overextension and culminated in their loss of hegemony in the region, particularly after the 1956 Suez War.

\textbf{Cold War and the Middle East in the 1950s: The Baghdad Pact}

Arab nationalist identity got stronger after monarchies were overthrown in Egypt in 1952, in Iraq in 1958; and in Syria after independence in 1946. In other words, as Arab states gained independence and created nationalist state identities, the historical and ideological incompatibilities between them and Turkey further exacerbated the geopolitical factors that led to conflicting views of the Cold War. But the latter's foreign policy behavior can also be explained by the balance of threat theory articulated by Stephen Walt, who argues that states balance against the source of threat not against

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33}Graebner, p.185. To prevent such a contagion communism had to be contained everywhere. Kennan argues in an article written 25 years after the X article, that he did not talk about worldwide containment of Soviets but rather in areas that were essential for American security interests.
\end{itemize}
the source of power as balance of power theory contends. Threat perception of the Soviets did not result in the portrayal of a dangerous Soviet Union, rather the real threat came from Israel and Britain and France.

Iraqi-Turkish treaty of 1955 evolved into the Baghdad Pact. The other parties to the Pact were Britain, Iran and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia was suspicious of the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan who were the traditional rivals of the Saudis during the time for the quest of Arabia. For this reason, it was against the Baghdad Pact. Egypt opposed alliances with major powers and perceived them as manifestations of imperialism. Nasser did not believe in the Soviet threat, so he argued the Pact was created to prolong Western domination as for him a pact built to counter the Soviet threat was unrealistic. The American administration supported the Baghdad Pact even though it did not become a party to it. The reason for this state of affairs was the negative attitude of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to the Pact and the fact that Eisenhower Administration wanted to improve relations with Nasser. Also joining such a Pact would lead to demands for extending security measures to Israel, an eventuality Dulles in particular was against. Having said that however, it should be pointed out that the Baghdad Pact was signed between the parties as part of the American global strategy of containment and upon American encouragement.

Particularly after World War II, Turkey was committed to the Western alliance under the leadership of the US. This state of affairs can be explained by geopolitical factors and identity politics. The balance of threat theory, mentioned before, can also explain Turkey’s perception of the Cold War. In other words, Turkey aligned against

37 Ibid., p. 25.
38 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 5.
the source of threat, with the powers that have become rivals of the Soviet Union.

For the Arab countries on the other hand the source of threat was not the Soviet Union but Israel and Western imperialism; the latter two were either collaborating with each other or they were identical as manifested in the 1956 Suez Crisis. Arab states conducted foreign policies that were constrained by the norms of Arabism, which defined proper conduct for Arab states. The Palestine issue and non-alliance with the former colonialist countries were important norms that defined a legitimate Arab government. So, when the Baghdad Pact was established among Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Britain, one of the important norms of Arabism was violated and Egypt under Nasser wanted to destroy the Baghdad Pact as well as prevent new members from joining in, such as Lebanon and Jordan. In fact an Arab Cold War emerged among the radical socialist Arab nationalist states against the pro-Western monarchies, which saw in Egypt a major threat to their domestic orders. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union was not perceived as a threat by the nationalist Arab regimes. Hence the diverging conceptions of the Cold War by Turkey and Arab nationalist states, such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria, was a function of the different geopolitical positions of those countries.

These norms were validated by a decision in December 1954 at the Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo drafted the resolution banning alliances outside of the Collective Arab Security Pact. Iraq and Turkey signed the Baghdad Pact on February 24, 1955, later to be joined by Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. Four days later Israel attacked Egyptian-ruled Gaza strip, an event Nasser perceived as being coordinated with the signing of the Pact. The Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said perceived the Soviet Union as a threat and he wanted cooperation with Turkey on the Kurdish issue. Turkish President Celal Bayar visited Jordan to lobby King Hussein for the Pact. King Hussein in his memoirs admits that he was sympathetic to the Pact but the riots instigated by Egypt caused great concern for the stability in Jordan. He was unable to join the Pact due to the grave dangers to his kingdom as government buildings were burned and the

39Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab politics*.
government could restore order only by calling in the army—the Arab Legion.\textsuperscript{41}

It should be noted that the Turkish-Iraqi pact invited any member of the Arab League or any country that was interested in regional security for accession. Britain joined the pact on April 4, 1955. Pakistan joined in September and Iran in October 1955. The United States did not formally join the pact but was the motor behind it as an instrument in containing the Soviets. Dulles put the Northern Tier idea forward in 1953 and with the creation of the Baghdad Pact his ideas were concretized. The Muslim members of the Pact joined it to get more arms from the United States, whereas Britain joined the Pact to preserve its power in the Middle East. It was also interested in keeping its bases in Iraq which were to expire in 1956, and continue its influence around the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{42} Nationalist Arab states perceived Turkey, due to its participation in the Pact, as a tool of Western imperialism.\textsuperscript{43} Evidently, diverging threat perceptions between Turkey and the radical Arab states account for this state of affairs. And it should also be noted that the diverging perceptions emanated from geopolitical realities, not some politico-psychological factors.

Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 made protection of the Middle East explicit, which was implicit in the Truman Doctrine. President Eisenhower made it clear that the United States administration would send armed forces to protect the Middle East if there were a direct attack on the region from a state “controlled by international communism”.\textsuperscript{44} One related topic of the Eisenhower administration


\textsuperscript{42} Campbell, The Defense of the Middle East, p.55, 57, 59, 61.


\textsuperscript{44} Campbell, The Defense of the Middle East, pp.121-122.
was the possibility that Syria would turn into a communist state and there were plans to forcefully change such an eventuality.45

The 1956 invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel, and the Turkish and Iraqi prospects (encouraged by the United States) for the invasion of Syria to topple a government they viewed as pro-Soviet proved to the nationalist Arabs that it was Israel and the colonial states such as Britain and France, and the neocolonial USA which were the real threats to the Arab world not the distant Soviet Union. Eisenhower Doctrine’s emphasis on the communist threat was not relevant to the issues in the region where economic development and political independence as well as the Palestine question were major concerns. Britain and France by invading Egypt hoped to preserve their great power status in the region but as a consequence of the war were replaced by the United States as the strongest Western power in the Middle East.46

Gamal abd al-Nasser became one of the influential leaders of the Third World movement after he had attended the Bandung Conference in 1955 where he had met Nehru, Sukarno and other important leaders of the Third World, who were advocating non-alignment. While keeping his options open to both superpowers he followed a policy of positive neutrality47 and tried to preserve independence in Egyptian foreign policy and tried to maintain its neutrality between the superpowers. National independence was the primary concern for Nasser. Other radical statesmen, who had similar opinions with Nasser, were very much under his influence. Even people in the moderate Arab states were under Nasser’s influence, which prevented leaders such as Jordan’s King Hussein and King Faisal of Iraq, as well as Saudi Arabia from following a pro-Western policy. The former King of Jordan, Hussein in his memoirs complains that the then Jordanian Prime Minister Suleyman al-Nabulsi was constantly praising Nasser and was clashing with King Hussein on

46Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, pp. 69, 80, 85-86.
policy issues. They were worried about the communist threat but probably in a more indirect way than Turkey since the latter had a border with the Soviet Union whereas none of the Arab states shared their borders with the USSR. So, while the Soviet threat against Turkey was real, Turkey played a role in the Middle East very much indexed to American security concerns and hence did not pay much attention to Middle Eastern sensitivities. Its involvement in the Baghdad Pact seemed to nationalist Arabs as the rebirth of Ottomanism or worse as Turkey being a tool of Western imperialists. However, this does not mean that Arabs were right and Turks wrong or vice versa. Both Turkey and the radical Arab states were right from the geopolitical positions they occupied, a state of affairs, which made the Soviet Union a real threat to Turkey, making explicit territorial demands on Turkey. Arabs being protected from the Soviet Union by buffer states such as Turkey and Iran, found in the Soviet Union an ally or a force that could counter Western hegemonic designs and provide military and economic aid to them. In fact, diplomatically the Soviets after the death of Stalin in 1953, had become one of the supporters of the Arab cause in international fora.

The Baghdad Pact was dissolved in 1958 as a result of a coup d'état in Iraq by General Abd al-Karim Qasem, during which the King Faisal II, the Regent Abd Lillah and the Prime Minister were killed. Gerges argues that Iraq’s accession to the Baghdad Pact was one of the most important reasons for the overthrow of the monarchy. Hence Iraq was transformed from a pro-Western state into a revolutionary Arab state. Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) replaced the Baghdad Pact in 1959, which in turn ceased to exist as a result of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. United States was directly involved in the activities of CENTO (unlike its non-direct involvement in the Baghdad Pact) besides Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Britain

48 Uneasy Lies the Head, p.128.
50 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 113-114.
Dean Acheson, Secretary of State during the Truman administration, considered the Baghdad Pact as having provoked the Arabs and having scared the Soviet Union. He was critical of John Foster Dulles's obsession with pactomania and criticized the Eisenhower Administration for not having recognized the merits of neutrality as long as the countries in question did not fall under the Soviet orbit.\textsuperscript{52}

Conclusion

Middle Eastern politics during the Cold War should be analyzed as a function of the interaction between the superpowers and their endeavors to penetrate the area, as well as the liaisons between the superpowers and the Middle Eastern states. Regional states, especially Egypt, played one superpower against the other and contrary to realist thought in international relations theory, there was no one-way influence running from the United States and the Soviet Union towards the Middle East; rather there was mutual influence running from the superpowers towards the regional states but also from regional states towards the superpowers. Hence both regional and international factors are important in understanding Middle Eastern politics. The United States and the USSR were open to influence from the smaller states because they were very much concerned with keeping allies and preventing their adversary from getting new allies.\textsuperscript{53}

The rivalry between Egypt, Syria against Iraq and Turkey could also be seen as the competition for regional hegemony. Leadership in the Arab world and in the larger Middle Eastern region was one of the main objectives of Nasser, whereas Iraq with a large population wanted to enhance its power by aligning with Turkey and the Western powers. The moderate Arab states had a different conception of Arab nationalism than Nasser. For the latter, Arab unity meant Arab nationalism under the leadership of Egypt. According to King Hussein, this was a new kind of imperialism serving Egyptian


\textsuperscript{53}Gerges, \textit{The Superpowers and the Middle East}, pp. 2-3.
interests. He believed in a different kind of nationalism that was based on the sovereign equality of Arab states.

The core doctrine of Arab states' foreign policies, even if they were only at the rhetorical level, included nonalignment, neutrality, support for the Palestinian cause, ostracizing Israel and propagating Arab unity. What Barnett calls norms of Arabism and what Gerges calls all-Arab consensus dictated respect to these ideas, constructed Arab states' identities and constituted legitimate and illegitimate foreign policy behaviors. The norms of Arabism proscribed and prescribed proper ways of behavior for Arab states, so states such as Jordan and Lebanon wanted to establish close relations with the Western powers were prevented because of ideational factors that were provoked by Nasser. So the ideas controlled their state identity and hence influenced their foreign policy behavior. State sovereignty was constrained by ideas of Arab nationalism. But it should also be added that the geopolitical situation of the Arab countries allowed such a policy, particularly since most neighbors of USSR were Soviet satellites. In conclusion, it would be in order to say that both ideas and interests led to the divergent policies of Turkey and the nationalist Arab states. In this vein, both constructivism with its emphasis on ideas and identities and realism with its focus on power and strategy are relevant theories of international relations for the explication of the diverging perceptions of Turks and Arabs of the Baghdad Pact.

54 Uneasy Lies The Head, pp. 74-75, 152.
55 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 9
57 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 9.